FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER

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OCTOBER 1970

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 49 OCTOBER 1970 No. 1

THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA

By Prince Norodom Sihanouk

NEITHER Lon Nol nor President Nixon has left Cambodians any alternative to armed struggle and revolution—a struggle and revolution whose object is to enable our people to regain their freedom, our nation to recover its dignity and our country to become independent again.

Before taking up the fundamental questions regarding my country which are of especial interest for Americans, I would like to cite some significant American statements about "the Cambodian tragedy."

In an address to the U.S. Senate on "the Cambodian tragedy" on April 16, 1970, Senator Mike Mansfield said: "What was for a decade and a half the only oasis of peace in Indochina has been turned into a bloody battlefield in the space of one month. . . . The conflict already involves the potential of an ugly genocide by government-stimulated mob action against the several hundred-thousand Vietnamese civilians—for the most part farmers, fishermen and tradesmen—who come from both North and South Vietnam and who have lived for decades in reasonable peace in Cambodia. In short, the Pandora's box which was held shut by the leadership and diplomacy of Prince Sihanouk is now wide open. For years Cambodia was in the eye of the Indochinese hurricane; now it is swept up in the full fury of a racial, ideological and militarist storm. . . . We do know, or ought to know on the basis of experience that even with a massive infusion of American equipment we are likely to have minimal constructive effect on that upheaval and we will open the door to another destructive impact on our own national interests."

Like an echo to Senator Mansfield's warning, *The New York Times,* in an editorial the next day, wrote: "Evidence of govern-

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ment-inspired mass murder of Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia should provoke second thoughts in Washington about the stability as well as the morality of the régime that recently displaced Prince Sihanouk in Phnompenh. Evidence of appeals to the ancient prejudices of the Khmers against a neighboring people is a sign of desperation on the part of a government trying to shore up a shaky political base."

Thirteen days after the publication of this editorial President Nixon ordered United States armed forces stationed in South Vietnam to invade Cambodia, and permitted the armed forces of the Saigon Generals Thieu and Ky to accompany them in order, he said, to wipe out the "Vietcong sanctuaries" there.

In appraising that invasion, Senator William Fulbright declared, on May 28, 1970: "The administration now apparently intends to sustain an indefinite full-scale military intervention by proxy in Cambodia. . . . It is equally clear that the purpose of this proxy military campaign is not merely to eliminate communist border sanctuaries . . . but to sustain the feeble Lon Nol military régime in Phnompenh."

The "communist sanctuaries" in fact occupied an infinitesimal part of Cambodia before Mr. Nixon's invasion, occupied a third of the country in the course of the invasion and occupy up to two-thirds of the country in the wake of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops (not accompanied, however, by the withdrawal of the South Vietnamese troops of Thieu and Ky).

II

Neither Lon Nol nor President Nixon, who decided to support him in order to keep his dictatorial régime in power at all costs, wants Cambodia to return to independence, neutrality, territorial integrity and democracy. I am sorry to have to say it, but I must: the United States does not think of "independence" and "democracy" for its satellite countries in the same way it thinks of independence and democracy for itself.

At Phnompenh, the Lon Nol group illegally deposed me for "betrayal of democracy." Without the sanction of any constitutional provision whatever, the Phnompenh parliament, in complicity with Lon Nol, set itself up as a "people's tribunal" to judge me, while preventing me, at the same time, from returning to Cambodia and answering the various accusations that the parliament made. According to our constitutional laws, the

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humblest citizen has the right to defend himself in court, and the Cambodian state has no right to exile Khmer citizens. As far as the Chief of State is concerned, the Constitution even specifies that "his person is sacred and inviolable."

Immediately following my deposition there were peaceful demonstrations in my favor almost everywhere in the country. Lon Nol savagely put down the demonstrators by force of arms; his soldiers and even his tanks massacred them pitilessly by the hundreds.

In this connection I can cite the following testimony of American and British correspondents:

T. Jeff Williams (Associated Press [AP], March 30): "Firsthand evidence gathered in Cambodia's provinces by the Associated Press shows that it is organized Sihanouk supporters who are ready to march on the capital, not Vietcong troops. . . . This has brought the army into confrontation with the Cambodian people in several instances and many Cambodians have been killed."

Anton Wills-Eve (Reuters, April 1): "Witnesses said that government troops met the rebels with a hail of machine gun fire, cutting down everyone in sight and leaving many dead on the road as an example to others not to rise up in support of Prince Sihanouk. An eye witness described the rebels as peasants. . . ."

T. Jeff Williams (AP, April 3): ". . . Another violent demonstration . . . erupted. . . . The population staged a demonstration in favor of Sihanouk. Army troops . . . opened fire on the marchers, killing thirty by the official count. . . . In addition, the government is rounding up thousands of persons suspected of being . . . pro-Sihanouk. . . . Navy gunboats are anchored in mid-stream to guard against mass crossings by demonstrators attempting to reach Phnompenh. . . . A question often raised by observers here is why the government is permitting its troops to shoot its own people. . . ."

This testimony requires no comment, but my readers will also want to know the fate of the citizens arrested by the hundreds by the Lon Nol régime after the demonstrations described above. I therefore present the testimony of Jacques Doyon, of the French conservative newspaper *Le Figaro* (April 20, 1970):

"It will be recalled that the 'pro-Sihanouk' demonstrators who came from Kompong Cham on the 26th and 27th of March arrived in the thousands at the gates of Phnompenh and were

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dispersed by rifle fire. . . . A number of people fled from the rain of bullets, in particular along the Mekong. They took refuge in Vietnamese villages, and the manhunt was on.

"It will be remembered that, as we have written, a good many of them, probably several hundred. . . . were imprisoned until April 10. Commencing on that day, according to the inhabitants of the area, river transport boats came to take on the prisoners. . . . To lighten the transports, the demonstrators were thrown into the water after being executed; some of them had their hands tied behind their backs."

It is facts like these which account for the creation of the National United Front of the Kampuchea, which brings together all the anti-fascist Cambodians—the non-communists whom the press calls "Sihanoukists" and the communists known as "Red Khmers."

III

Without waiting for the end of hostilities, Washington diplomacy has been very active in creating a "Phnompenh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane Axis." Indeed, the Western press has been speaking of it quite openly of late.

It is an "axis," or, if you will, a "de facto federation"—the obvious objective of which is to keep the countries of the region in the "American camp" and to prevent their peoples from embracing communism or socialism. But the real question is whether such a "federation" can implant itself in the hearts and minds of the peoples concerned or whether it will not always remain an artificial creation of the United States, maintained by it, "at arm's length," by dint of dollars, artillery and bombs, as is the case of Cambodia at the moment.

The American people's ideals of freedom, democracy and independence are certainly worthy of respect. But is the Nixon government sure of defending these ideals in defending the régimes of Lon Nol and his kind in Indochina and in Southeast Asia in general?

The United States has valid reasons, certainly, for defending itself against the propagation of communism in Asia and most particularly in Southeast Asia, if one looks at it from the standpoint of the highest interest of the American nation alone, of its influence and its strategic position in the world. But it would be pure hypocrisy to assert that the United States is

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defending the highest interests of the Indochinese peoples in preventing at all costs régimes like those of Lon Nol and of Nguyen Cao Ky from falling to communism, using for that purpose bombs and napalm, and an apocalyptic destruction of the countries and peoples concerned.

I am not and will not become a communist, for I disavow nothing of my religious beliefs or of my nationalism. But I know the Khmer people, the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of our region too well to believe that they can accept having the interests of reactionary, fascist, militarist and corrupt leaders imposed on them or accept having a great white power insist that for their own sakes they should take dictatorship in place of democracy and the satellization of their country in place of national independence.

In the eyes of rich bourgeois and feudalists, communism must seem terrifying. But in the eyes of peoples who are continually exploited by these bourgeois, these feudalists and these dictatorships which owe their strength solely to American protection, communism can only be, now and in the future, a deliverance. A deliverance, yes—because the problems of social injustice, of corruption, of militarist or bourgeois dictatorship, and of national independence, too (see the examples of China, North Vietnam and North Korea, which are incontestably independent), are being or will be solved thereby.

This is why the longer the United States insists on maintaining unpopular and pro-imperialist régimes in our countries, the more it will draw upon itself the hatred of our peoples and will, in consequence, build up both their revolutionary movements and their fighting solidarity.

In the face of the pro-United States "Phnompenh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane Axis" there was formed, in April 1970, the "Axis" of the revolutionary peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, China and North Korea. The pro-United States axis will vanish the moment the Washington government stops supporting it with dollars, guns and bombs. But the common anti-imperialist front of the Khmer, Vietnamese, Laotian, Chinese and Korean peoples will survive it whatever happens, for even atom bombs will not be able to halt the revolution of the Asian peoples.

IV

How, one might ask, would I expect the traditional enmity

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between Khmers, Vietnamese and Thais might be overcome in order to make such a federation possible?

Has not the Lon Nol régime, that new American ally, made a "brilliant demonstration" of the possibility—necessity being the first law—of reconciling, bringing together and "federating" his Cambodians with the Vietnamese of Thieu and Ky and the Thais of Kittikachorn and Charusathien? In spite of the exceedingly painful memory of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, were not the Japanese, too, able to reconcile themselves and ally themselves to the Americans, their "mortal enemies" of yesterday? And was it not the same with the French and the Germans? Then why should not the Cambodians, the Vietnamese and the Thais be capable of surmounting their long-standing mutual "repulsion"?

Notwithstanding the very recent genocide of Vietnamese in Cambodia, has not the pro-U.S. Phnompenh régime "carried off" brilliantly a "marriage of convenience" with the pro-U.S. Saigon régime? As the magazine *Newsweek* concluded in its July 13, 1970, issue. "Like most marriages of convenience . . . the alliance offered undeniable benefits to both sides."

To the "Sihanoukist" Khmers, the coup d'état perpetrated against me and against the policy of mine which Senator Mike Mansfield was kind enough to praise, as well as the intervention by the United States and its allies in favor of the fascist Phnompenh régime and its policy of abdicating national independence, left no alternative, on the national level, but to reconcile themselves to and make common cause with the "Red Khmers," and, on the international level, to ally themselves in a "common front" with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the revolutionary government and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Lao Patriotic Front.

It is understood that after victory (which may be some time in coming, but which will inevitably be ours in the long run) each of our three peoples will be free to map out its own political and ideological line of conduct. On this subject, the "Joint Declaration from the Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples" of April 25 is unequivocal:

> The parties affirm their determination to safeguard and develop the fraternal friendship and good-neighborly relations among the three countries so as to give mutual support in the struggle against the common enemy and to coöperate in the future and on a long-term basis in the building of each

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country following the road which it finds appropriate. In the relations among the three countries, the parties are determined to apply the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; nonaggression; mutual respect for each other's political régime and noninterference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.

Certain Western circles seem to be banking on racial antagonism between the Khmers and their neighbors to make it impossible for them to get together, so that they will thus always remain weak and will consequently feel the need to have themselves protected by a Western imperialist power.

Now, President Nixon's policy of armed intervention in Cambodia, his "Vietnamization" and "Asianization," has had the effect of throwing, on the one hand, the fascist, pro-imperialist Khmers into the arms of the anti-communist Vietnamese, and, on the other hand, Khmer progressives and peasants into the arms of the Vietnamese socialists. It is with good reason that *Newsweek* calls this new phenomenon a "marriage of convenience."

But one should not exaggerate the extent and intensity of racial antagonism in the past between the Khmers and their neighbors. Senator Mansfield quite justly observed that before the "genocide by government-stimulated mob action against several hundred-thousand Vietnamese civilians," the two peoples of supposedly antagonistic races "lived for decades in reasonable peace in Cambodia." Now and in the future, the one problem that weighs and will weigh most heavily in the balance will be that of the behavior of each of the two Vietnamese "camps" with regard to the Khmer people. Our people will be "with" or "against" the Vietnamese in so far as the latter are or are not "correct" toward them.

On this subject, I think my readers will be interested in the following reports from American correspondents.

Robert C. Miller (UPI, Phnompenh, July 5): "The confused Cambodian civilians are being raped, robbed and hit over the head by their South Vietnamese allies. . . . The misbehavior of some of the 25,000 South Vietnamese marines, soldiers and sailors in Cambodia poses a new—and, many Cambodians believe, the most dangerous—threat to the Lon Nol government. . . . On the contrary, every Vietcong and North Vietnamese trooper is a walking ambassador of goodwill to the Cambodian noncom-

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batants. They are following to the letter the same rigid policy laid down in China by Mao, namely, 'be nice to the peasants, for they are your strongest allies.' "

As for the Cambodians in communist-controlled areas, the French magazine *L'Express* writes, in its issue of July 5, 1970, the following: "An exceptional witness . . . saw them: Richard Dudman [of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*] taken prisoner by the Vietcong in May, with two other American journalists, and released last week: 'In the hamlets, fists raised against the Americans. Everywhere, a spontaneous coöperation between the peasants and the Cambodian guerrillas, as well as the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong. . . . The common fear of the bombings and the irruption of war following the American and South Vietnamese intervention have cemented the tacit alliance between the people of the rice-paddies and the guerrillas.' "

V

Might some or all of the states of Indochina be neutralized after the war? This question was answered for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the international agreements signed at Geneva in 1954 and 1962.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, it was specified in the agreements of 1954 that in 1956 the country would be reunified under a single government by means of general elections. President Ho Chi Minh, whom the whole Vietnamese people, communist and non-communist, considered their national hero (for he was the true liberator of his homeland from French colonialism), would have won these general elections handily if they had taken place. But the United States, citing as a pretext an (imaginary) "invasion by North Vietnam," intervened in force in South Vietnam to prevent the aforementioned elections from taking place, to perpetuate the division of Vietnam and to keep South Vietnam in the camp of the "free" world—that is to say, the American world.

According to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, South Vietnam was to be neutralized only between July 1954 and July 1956. After July 1956, it was to be reunited with North Vietnam and form a single state under a single government—communist if Ho Chi Minh won (and his triumph was beyond doubt), non-communist if the neutralists and anti-communists won. Knowing that if the Geneva Agreements were applied in both their letter and

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their spirit South Vietnam would be lost to the "free" world, the United States decided, in 1955, to violate them. This led to the "Vietnam War" yesterday and is leading to the "Indochina War" today.

As for Laos and Cambodia, I can attest that the more the United States steps up its armed interventions or those of its allies in these two countries, the less chance there will be of their being "neutral" or "neutralized" in the future. And the more the United States and its allies support the régime of Lon Nol and prevent the National United Front of Cambodia from unseating it, the more they will push this Front and, in consequence, the Khmer people and the Cambodia of tomorrow into the Asian socialist camp (which now includes the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea).

Sihanouk's fall in Cambodia will not have had the same consequences for the United States and its "camp" as Sukarno's fall had in Indonesia, for it must not be forgotten that Cambodia is not an island far removed from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China: my country is their next-door neighbor.

VI

Even if the states of Indochina accepted communist ideology, would this necessarily involve accepting Chinese predominance?

China is certainly a very great power, in relation to which our three Indochinese countries seem miniscule. But having twice visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, I can say that that Vietnamese country is very independent with regard to China as well as to the Soviet Union. The political or physical presence of China there is almost imperceptible and in no way comparable to the American presence in Cambodia since March 18, 1970.

In Laos, China does not exert a perceptible influence, and its material and financial assistance to the Lao Patriotic Front does not call for any quid pro quo, political or other.

My country is separated from China by Laos and Vietnam. And the Chinese leaders have often explained to me that their country would have nothing to gain from making a satellite of Cambodia—quite the contrary.

By respecting Cambodia's sovereignty and making it a "show-

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case" or "demonstration" of its respect for the principles of peaceful coexistence, China undoubtedly has more to gain in relation to the world and, in particular, the third world.

This said, it would be difficult indeed to prevent the Indochinese peoples from becoming "Maoists," that is to say, fighting to gain power for the people and sweep their countries clean of the gross capitalist feudalism and foreign imperialism which, coming from the West, opposes this power of the people by buying consciences and by arms.

In writing this, I am not, for all that, *communisant,* a fellow traveler.

If I am fighting in the camp of the Indochinese and Asian revolutionaries, it is because, on a personal level, I want to see justice done me some day after having been odiously calumniated and dishonored by the Lon Nol group; and because, on the national level, I must fulfill my duty as a patriot, a Khmer—and an Asian.

With Lon Nol and the armed intervention of the foreign powers that support him, my homeland and my people have lost everything—peace, dignity, independence, territorial integrity—and are immersed in the worst sufferings, the worst misfortunes and the worst catastrophe of their history.

In these circumstances I can only hope for the total victory of the revolution, in which I shall certainly not have my place but which cannot but save my homeland and serve the deepest interests of the mass of the "little" Khmer people.

As for the future relations of that people with the United States, they will once again become good as soon as Washington stops confusing the Lon Nol group with the Khmer nation and consequently stops helping it—directly or indirectly—to crush popular resistance.

This resistance cannot be crushed. If they are clearly understood, the long-term interests of the United States ought to impel its government to respect this resistance instead of treating it as hostile.

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AMERICA AND EUROPE

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

TWENTY-FIVE years have passed since the collapse of Europe. Vienna-Versailles-Potsdam: these historic milestones mark the calamitous decline of the European world order during the last hundred and fifty years.

At Vienna, European statesmen sought to restore a European balance of power, having defeated—with the critical assistance of maritime Britain and Eurasian Russia—the Napoleonic effort to establish a unified continental system. In 1815, it was still European statesmanship that resolved Europe's imperial problems and thereby ordered the structure of world power.

At Versailles, with Russia excluded, European statesmen grappled with the new force of national self-determination and strove to limit the power of the single most dynamic European national entity, Germany; but they did so in a political and idealistic context created largely by a transatlantic statesman, who represented the entry of American power into the European arena. Europe alone no longer could fight its wars nor build its peace.

At Potsdam, 25 years ago last July, Europe was absent. In the prostrate capital of the most mighty European nation the future of the former center of the world was shaped in a confrontation between an Atlantic-Pacific continental power, the offspring of Europe's liberal tradition, and a Eurasian ideological empire, likewise a transplanted product of the European intellectual diffusion. Though some of the most lively debates at Potsdam were the personal contribution of the British war leader, the British presence—representing primarily an overseas empire—was already becoming an extension of American power.

A new post-European world order thereby emerged, with Europe itself powerless and divided. This was a shift of historic proportions, the disappearance of what for several centuries in fact had been the center of world power, the partition of hitherto the world's most dynamic continent, the emergence instead of two competitive, ideologically distinct, non-European centers of power.

To this day Europe is effectively absent from world politics. Its decline has been halted on the social-economic plane and in

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many respects actually reversed, but the basic political reality is still not fundamentally different from what it had been in the days, a quarter of a century ago, when Europe's cities were ruins and ashes. Social and economic restoration has not yet been matched by political rebirth. Europe is still to decide whether it seeks again a world role, whether it wishes to be a larger Sweden or a bigger Finland.

There are some suggestive parallels between the historical circumstances leading to the arrangements contrived in 1815 and the events surrounding the 1945 Potsdam agreement. After almost 25 years of practically continuous warfare, intensified by a new ideological challenge emanating from the French Revolution and its subsequent Napoleonic embodiment, peace among the several major powers was eventually arranged. How to partition Poland among the three key imperial claimants in such a way that the interests of each empire were satisfied was a key question. The formula negotiated endured for a century, largely because an intricate system of balance of power was reinforced by a shared consensus.

The division of Germany in 1945 was similarly preceded by a prolonged period of warfare and political instability. The years 1914–1945 can be seen as involving the progressive disintegration —social as well as political—of the earlier arrangements, and of repeated failures of intra-European remedies. The surgical division of Germany—and with it of Europe as well—put an end to that instability. The new system has already endured a quarter of a century. Might it become a historical rival to the one created by the Congress of Vienna?

II

The stability of the division of Europe—seemingly underlined by the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the continued dependence of West Europe on U.S. arms—is deceptive. Three basic considerations point otherwise: (1) The Europeans do not like it. Moreover, potential instability in several European societies could erupt, precipitating a contagious process of accelerating political change. (2) The division of Europe is basically dependent on the stability of the two dividing powers, and that stability cannot be taken for granted, either in relations between them or in political conditions within them. (3) Basic ideological consensus is absent, thereby prompting each side—as it competes

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with the other—to deny the legitimacy of existing European arrangements.

Though the Europeans themselves are divided as to the needed remedies, they share a common resentment of their dependent condition. This resentment is as true of a Frenchman as it is of a Pole; indeed, that is precisely why General de Gaulle, who most explicitly articulated that resentment, was so popular in Eastern Europe. Moreover, European societies, approaching in varying degrees the transition point from the industrial to the technetronic stage, face increasingly complex political and social questions, questions to which they alone cannot effectively respond. The necessity and desirability of European unity are widely recognized—again, both in the East and in the West.

In this connection, a striking paradox involving the current European social and political scene is worthy of note. In the West, affluence and development have created a situation in which the social-economic order, though materially satisfying, is not capable of commanding the positive loyalty of the individual, increasingly alienated and uncertain of his philosophical moorings. At the same time, the political order, pluralistic and free, is positively accepted by the masses, and revolutionary parties do not command widespread popular support. In the East, in spite of relative impoverishment, the socialist concept of welfare seems to be, on the whole, viewed as the more desirable, even if imperfect, mode of social organization; in contrast, the political system that gave birth to that social order is despised. That system is still dependent for survival on coercion and censorship, not to speak of the direct intrusion of foreign power.[1]

All of that makes for uncertainty, easily combustible by the unpredictable consequences of such events as, say, the death of Tito, the resulting political struggles in Jugoslavia and the temptation for Moscow to seek to restore to its influence the one area lost to it since the 1945 division of European spoils. The partition of Germany, not to speak of Berlin, similarly remains a potential trouble spot; the reception given to Chancellor Brandt by the East German population of Erfurt dramatically refuted all those who have assumed that in less than a generation a distinctive sense of national identity can be manufactured

[1] This state of affairs is explicitly acknowledged by more farsighted East European communists; W. Bienkowski of Poland says almost as much in his remarkable "Motory i Hamulce Socjalizmu." Paris: 1969.

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through compulsion. At the same time, Italy shows mounting symptoms of becoming the Czechoslovakia of NATO, a country of uncertain political and even foreign orientation. In brief, Europe is still not at ease with itself.[2]

But neither are the two dividing powers. America is uncertain of its world mission; indeed, if it can be said that the Soviet Union, not yet a global power in a comprehensive sense, aspires to world might, America today displays many signs of uncertainty as to whether it is worth being the only global power. I have discussed at length elsewhere the nature of the present American dilemmas, arguing that America is in the midst of a difficult but potentially creative transition from one age to another.[3] But whatever the merit of my analysis, for Europeans, contemporary America is doubtless a less certain protector, a less committed partner.

The Soviet Union similarly confronts domestic and external challenges, which in the longer run could adversely affect its position in Europe. The domestic equivalent of the American transition is the increasing dysfunctionality of the Soviet political system to Soviet social-economic growth. Originally an instrument of social-economic modernization, the Soviet political system, rigid bureaucratically and dogmatic intellectually, has increasingly become an impediment to the kind of scientific-technological creativity that innovation nowadays requires. This condition is breeding a political crisis, all the graver because of official efforts to suppress any of its outward manifestations. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet conflict poses for the Soviet Union the specter of protracted conflict potentially of dimensions many-fold graver than the painful American involvement in Vietnam. This fear, as well as Soviet rivalry with America, stimulates a massive defense effort, increasing both the internal influence of the more rigid, doctrinaire elements and the scope of Soviet international involvement. Neither Soviet stability nor restraint can thus be taken for granted.

Finally, unlike 1815, basic consensus is absent; instead, the powers enforcing the present arrangement are ideologically competitive. That competition is real and direct, and it is far from

[2] A Soviet disarmament expert described Europe recently as in a "metastable state," an analogy derived from chemistry. "This means a state in which the slightest interference is enough to start an extremely turbulent reaction." It seems an appropriate analogy. (See L. Bezymensky, "A Pan-European Task," *New Times,* July 3, 1970, p. 3.)

[3] "Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era." N.Y.: Viking, 1970.

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waning. The two powers thus continue to divide Europe not necessarily because both of them want to divide the Continent but because this competition leaves them no alternative.

III

More fundamentally, the philosophical differences between America and Russia have made for a rather different relationship on the part of each of the two powers toward Europe. Though the competition between them has resulted in the partition of Europe, the American relationship to Europe has been, on the whole, innovative, creative, and even revolutionary; the Soviet has been far more conservative and even reactionary. This is an important fact, one of which Americans have every right to be proud; moreover, it is a consideration of relevance to current policy issues.

The United States has consistently striven to restore Europe to its previous grandeur, first through the Marshall Plan and, throughout the postwar era, by consistently supporting and encouraging the movement toward European unity. It has been the widely held American view that a united Europe, even though potentially (and now increasingly so in fact) an economic rival, would have a major contribution to make to world peace. The common intellectual and philosophical heritage of the Atlantic world had doubtless much to do with the American desire for and confidence in European unity. At the same time, American social mores, educational patterns and corporate techniques have had a strikingly powerful impact on Western Europe, modernizing and even revolutionizing established European modes of behavior.

In contrast, the Soviet presence in Europe has been a combination of very traditional imperialism with an ideological compulsion for creating carbon copies of the Soviet model in countries subject to Soviet control. The Soviet Union insisted on expanding westward its state frontiers, seizing parts of Finland, the Baltic states in their entirety, more than half of prewar Poland, half of prewar German East Prussia, a slice of Czechoslovakia, and a good part of Rumania. Every western neighbor of the Soviet Union, whether friend or foe, suffered territorial losses to Soviet advantage.

The Soviet Union, moreover, has striven throughout the postwar era both to prevent West European unity and to keep its own

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client states in a clearly satellite position, forbidding any coöperative coalescence among them. Collaboration—military, political and economic—has been permitted only with direct, and hence overwhelming, Soviet participation, which clearly establishes Moscow as the dominant partner. The isolation of the East European states from the rest of Europe has expressed itself most dramatically through the Soviet occupation in August 1968 of Czechoslovakia, a state which was seeking to sever neither its political nor its security ties with Moscow but which did attempt to liberalize its political and cultural life, in keeping with its deeply imbedded Western democratic traditions.

Though it may not be fashionable to point out these contrasts at a time when the conformist thing to do is either to condemn American policy as shortsighted or, at the very best, to put it on the same moral plane as that of its adversary, the basic fact is that the general character of America's postwar European policy was fundamentally designed to help Europe regain its health and vitality. It was thus a policy of enlightened self-interest, pursued energetically and with a creative flair.

Yet today there is a tendency among some Americans to view the American role in Europe as largely completed. Some urge military disengagement; others postulate a "low profile" on the grounds, as Mr. Nixon put it in his annual message, that the time has come for America to shift from a preponderant role toward more genuine partnership. Preoccupied with domestic affairs and with the Vietnam conflict, American policy toward Europe has increasingly acquired a passive character. For the West Europeans, it is mostly a matter of providing "soul massage": NATO sessions are treated to solemn assurances of continued American commitment but without much policy content. For the East Europeans there is even less; Mr. Nixon's trip to Bucharest was symbolically useful, but neither his administration nor Mr. Johnson's moved toward fulfilling the more challenging vision of closer all-European ties, outlined by the U.S. President in his October 1966 speech. On matters of substance, such as the question of an all-European conference, the United States has simply dragged its feet.

All this has stimulated European apprehensions concerning America's role in Europe. With the American mass media and intellectuals competing in presenting to the world apocalyptic versions of America's domestic difficulties, with social and racial

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problems commanding greater attention in American politics, with the American economy showing signs of strain, and with the war in Vietnam continuing to absorb American policy-makers while fostering more generally an isolationist mood, the Europeans are becoming gradually more skeptical of American assurances and uncertain about American intentions. While European fears of a new U.S.-Soviet hegemonic deal through SALT have been assuaged by skillful U.S. briefing of its allies at every stage of the negotiations, the residual fear of a new Yalta still lingers as an alternative to the specter of precipitous U.S. disengagement.

The result is good neither for America nor Europe. Each needs the other. Without Europe, America will turn inward, disillusioned with its post-World War II activism, shifting from a sometimes naïve idealism to self-centered cynicism. Without close ties with America, Western Europe's political independence is less than certain, especially given the growth in Soviet military power. Both together—for all their imperfections—represent the most decent and the freest forms of self-government and social organization so far developed by man. The values and the way of life—in a word, the civilization—of the West depend on the ability of America and West Europe to work closely together in weaving a new fabric of international affairs.

It is, therefore, true—as Mr. Nixon has said—that America "can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." But that being so, America must have a constructive and not merely a verbal European policy. Intimacy without shared goals and purposes ceases to be intimacy and becomes a transient relationship. Indeed, Mr. Nixon's analogy, though not exactly flattering to the Europeans, highlights the inescapable interrelationship between America and Europe, an interrelationship which imposes on both the obligation to work in common on the central questions confronting Europe's future. This involves, above all, focusing on how to redress the partition of Europe and how to define Europe's international role.

IV

The East-West issue is far from dead or even dormant, though that is precisely the impression the framers of the Brezhnev doctrine wish to convey.

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Czechoslovakia has demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the communist systems of the Leninist-Stalinist variety. The leadership's lack of a deep political base and its divisions at the top, combined with economic difficulties and popular resentment of Stalinist rule, quickly developed into a systemic challenge, as earlier happened also in Hungary, Poland and East Germany. This is not to say that a democratic evolution of Eastern Europe is inevitable; both Soviet power and the relative weakness of an organic democratic tradition in most of the East European countries tend to work against it. It is, however, still the case that the present communist systems have not been successfully grafted onto the East European social organisms; the phenomenon of "system rejection" is largely nationalist in origin but, because of the depth of that feeling, it is difficult for Moscow entirely to suppress it.

Some Western observers have concluded that the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, formalized through the Brezhnev doctrine, means that henceforth all change in Eastern Europe must be synchronized with change in Moscow. There is some truth in that, but the conclusion is exaggerated. A change in East-West relations must involve both Eastern Europe and Russia, lest Moscow conclude that the West is striving to detach Eastern Europe and to turn it against Russia. To acknowledge this is not the same as to conclude that henceforth the focus of Western initiatives must be Moscow alone. Nor is it to say the encouragement of East European democratic evolution, greater independence and closer coöperation with the West is to be avoided lest it precipitate a new Czechoslovakia. To adopt this position is to engage in a self-fulfilling prophecy; more than that, it means tacit recognition of the Brezhnev doctrine.

It should be remembered that this doctrine was formulated by Moscow at a very high cost to its prestige and international position. The Kremlin is not anxious to have to repeat—say, in Rumania or Poland—the spectacle of one communist state militarily invading another. Because of that, the Soviet leaders exert every effort to discredit and inhibit the Western policy of building bridges, to convince the West to deal with Moscow alone. The decline in the ideological attraction of the Soviets and in the appeal of the scientific vitality of the Soviet model (which at one time was undeniable among some East Europeans shattered by the experience of World War II, as C. Milosz elo-

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quently shows in his "The Captive Mind") has made the Soviet leaders even more anxious to make certain that all East-West relations are routed through Moscow.

The Soviet leaders are, doubtless, especially concerned by the revival of the Western attraction for the East Europeans, a revival which is even felt in the upper ranks of the ruling East European élites. After the conclusion of World War II quite a few East Europeans, especially among the intellectuals and economic specialists, saw in communism an opportunity to close the traditional gap dividing Eastern and Western Europe: through rapid industrialization and social modernization they hoped to construct a new society which would be morally and socio-economically even superior to the West. The predominant mood was one of social innovation, ideological optimism and even contempt for the West.

That optimism is now a thing of the past. For all of their efforts, the East Europeans realize that they are still lagging behind Western Europe, that the West is leaping into the technetronic age while their own political systems, modeled on the Soviet one, are becoming obstacles to rapid technological-scientific growth. In the industrial age, steel was often cited as the index of growth; today computers can be taken as the equivalent index, and the following figures are especially suggestive:[4]

COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPUTERS AS OF END OF 1969

United States	70,000
Japan	5,800
West Germany	5,750
Britain	5,600
France	5,010
U.S.S.R.	3,500
Italy	2,500
Canada	2,400
Australia	900
Netherlands	850
Switzerland	800
Eastern Europe	750
Africa	750

Anxiety on this issue has been mounting, and the East Euro-

[4] Based on data obtained from *Technology Review*, February 1970; *European Review*, Spring 1970; V. Basiuk, "Technology and World Power," F.P.A. Headline Series, New York, 1970; and R. V. Burks, "Technical Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe," The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., 1969.

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peans, like the Russians, are turning to technology-importation as a short-term solution. At the same time, more and more East Europeans are recognizing that Leninism has become an obsolete dogma which has little to say with regard to the novel psychological and scientific dilemmas of the post-industrial, technetronic age. President Ceaucescu of Rumania was expressing a widely held view when he called, in July 1970, for an updating of Marxism, an updating which is not likely to come from the citadel of bureaucratic orthodoxy.

Though anxious and defensive about Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders—perhaps in part to compensate for this and certainly in part to exploit American passivity—have been active in regard to the West. Their policy has been occasionally contradictory, but that is inherent in the partially conflicting goals of Soviet policy: to consolidate control over Eastern Europe, to obtain Western acceptance of it, to divide the West, to gain access to Western technology, to induce the West Germans to adopt a more solitary posture, to retain a whip hand over Berlin. Thus on the one hand, the Soviet leaders have been actively promoting a so-called "European security conference" in the hope of thereby gaining formal Western recognition of the status quo; yet, at the same time, their residual ideological orientation has made them strive to use this device to weaken Western unity. On the one hand, the Soviet leaders have been urging closer East-West economic ties, yet on the other they have inveighed against East-West peaceful engagement, constructing an elaborate theory of "peaceful counterrevolution" to justify their efforts to limit closer intellectual and cultural ties. On the one hand, they have sought to benefit from Western technological innovation, and on the other to increase West Europe's dependence on Soviet gas and oil supplies.

But whatever the surface contradictions, the inner logic of the Soviet policy is coherent. While denying the West access to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union seeks to prevent the reappearance of Europe on the international map. A loose, splintered Europe, gradually but not dramatically drifting apart from America, would become, not badly from the Soviet point of view, a regional sort of Sweden—essentially Western in political orientation but inactive and "radically chic;" better still, a Finland, not directly subservient but necessarily sensitive to thinly veiled Soviet political influence. This goal, given the mounting

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threat of a Sino-Soviet crisis and the increasing need for acquiring Western scientific know-how, must be pursued cautiously. Indeed, only through restraint can the drifting apart of America from Europe be promoted; precipitous moves would be counterproductive. Limited coexistence thus best serves Soviet interests in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The above analysis underlines the continued need for countervailing U.S. political involvement in the East-West European relationship. Without such positive involvement there is the real risk that otherwise even highly desirable initiatives, such as Bonn's *Ostpolitik,* will either fail or, worse, be turned around to divide the West. The problems of Europe, even of Germany, are too complex—and involve, as we have argued, too profound a historical transformation of world power—to be redressed by the solitary efforts of middle-sized European powers.

Soviet leaders appear to be more aware of this than Washington, and they have stepped up their efforts to obtain from Bonn, through bilateral talks, all the demands that otherwise the East would have to negotiate with the West: de jure recognition of East Germany, of eastern frontiers, as well as security guarantees and trade benefits. Facing Moscow alone, Bonn has drastically altered its own posture; in the past it sought reunification through free elections, with a reunified Germany free to choose its own association; it is now seeking some improvements in all German contacts and access to West Berlin, something which Moscow can always later withdraw, in return for granting de facto and perhaps soon de jure recognition of the GDR. In a word, Bonn has shifted from maximal objectives at minimal cost to minimal objectives at maximal cost.

More disturbing, some Germans connected with the *Ostpolitik* quietly acknowledge to their Western friends that the real motive for the West German initiative is rooted in declining West German confidence in the stability and commitment of America. Top West German leaders, on returning from visits to America, have confessed to their friends their dismay at the state of American society and their distrust of political trends in the United States. Their approaches to Moscow have been designed in part to enhance West German security through bilateral arrangements. Though this may not be the dominant motive, it does appear to be shared by some key German policy-makers.

To be sure, recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line and the re-

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pudiation of the Munich agreement can improve German relations with East Europe as well as redress historical wrongs. The German-Soviet nonaggression agreement of this August will be most helpful in dissipating the image of a revanchist Germany, although it would have been better if the Federal Republic had recognized the Polish frontier through a bilateral agreement with Poland; doing so in the context of a German-Soviet agreement confirms the Soviet claim that the Soviet Union is the key guarantor of East European integrity. But on the larger goal of European restoration, progress can be made only on a wider front, from the basis of greater power symmetry. West Germany has the power to legitimize Germany's division and to gratify the Soviet hunger for Western technology but by itself it cannot bring East Europe back to Europe nor even significantly promote the process of reassociation of the German people. Indeed, conducted from a limited base of domestic support, the *Ostpolitik* could breed within Germany a polarization on the subject of foreign policy, with negative consequences for Western unity, especially if the success of the *Ostpolitik* should turn out to be not very different from its failure.

The proper course for Washington, accordingly, is not to warn the West Germans against moving too fast, thereby making it easier for the Christian Democrats to oppose Brandt, or to issue belated public blessings for the West German efforts when the warnings have been ignored, but to take an active part in shaping the Western initiative on the East-West front. Such an initiative could take the shape of proposing a comprehensive agenda for East-West talks on the major European problems, perhaps even with the participation of neutral or nonaligned countries on some of the topics more directly of relevance to them. This is what most Europeans, both East and West, would like the United States to do; in fact, only Moscow, perhaps some Rapallo-minded Germans and a few residual Gaullists prefer American passivity. That passivity—even opposition in NATO councils to a Western initiative in response to the East's proposals for a European Security Conference—has enabled the Soviet Union throughout 1969 and the early parts of 1970 to pursue its European policy, orchestrating its Eastern and Western initiatives, without fear that an affirmative response from the West will compel the East—never quite as single-minded as it appears on the surface—to focus seriously on the major East-West issues.

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With the hand of the United States forced by its allies in early 1970, the West finally moved in May to respond to the East with a counter-proposal "to hold exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the Central region." This was a step forward but a timid one. It still did not involve a larger political initiative, designed to put on the agenda the outstanding issues in the East-West European relationship.

Yet that larger initiative is needed to match Moscow's political moves, and America's active and positive participation in shaping it is needed to underline America's continued commitment to healing the partition of the Continent. One should not entertain illusory hopes; such an initiative will not resolve the problem. Perhaps the East wishes to negotiate; perhaps its proposals have been a bluff. If the latter, the bluff at least will have been called; if the former, a start on the long process will have been made, to the advantage of all concerned.

The Western agenda could include such items as: (1) the mutual force reductions already proposed in May 1970, to a discussion of which the East has responded affirmatively; (2) the creation of a joint NATO-Warsaw Pact commission or a European security commission, to monitor eventual security arrangements and perhaps even to initiate others,[5] especially in the nuclear field, matching thereby progress in the bilateral American-Soviet talks; (3) the creation of permanent consultative East-West political machinery, for example, at deputy foreign ministerial level; (4) the liberalization and regularization of travel, cultural and trade relations, specifically and explicitly including in that context more formal arrangements concerning access to Berlin, perhaps initially negotiated elsewhere by the Four Powers; (5) the reiteration of the principle of noninterference, especially through armed forces, in the internal affairs of individual states, a prerogative claimed by the Soviet Union through the Brezhnev doctrine; (6) widening the technological-scientific coöperation, provided progress is also made on the other issues, for otherwise the West would be gratifying the East's hunger for Western scientific know-how without any commensurate reduction in political tensions.

Doubtless, these points could be modified or others added.

[5] Proposed in my "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968.

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The agenda proposed here would partially cover the points raised by the East (especially in regard to trade and technology) but also go beyond that. Negotiating with the East about the agenda would itself be the beginning of the negotiating process; it would therefore involve the initiation of the desired East-West dialogue. The word "process" is a key one. In proposing to the East a wider-ranging negotiating process, the West should not expect an immediate agreement but a protracted dialogue, initially essentially exploratory and subsequently more negotiatory.

Such negotiation would, at the same time, complement SALT, a purely bilateral U.S.-Soviet undertaking, the *Ostpolitik,* addressed—again on a bilateral basis—more specifically to the German question, and the Four Power talks on Berlin. It would give the Europeans a greater sense of involvement, but on the basis of a symmetry of power, and without the risk either of European fears of a bilateral American-Soviet arrangement or of fears by the Germans of being left alone to resolve their fate with the more powerful Russians.

As an additional advantage, the East-West negotiating umbrella would permit the West Germans greater flexibility in setting the pace of their own negotiations with the East. At the moment, they have no clear point of reference, nor is it easy for them to cut apart their specifically German concerns from issues affecting the interest of their allies.[6] The allies should follow the lead of Bonn on such matters as relations with the GDR, but Bonn should have the opportunity to calibrate its own moves in relationship to progress in broader East-West negotiations.

A broader Western political initiative might be facilitated by a somewhat more flexible Western attitude toward the question of troop reductions. That issue is enormously complicated. To make it the primary or the major Western initiative is probably a mistake. It elevates a military problem above political issues, though its resolution remains (in addition to technical-military considerations) primarily dependent on political progress. Moreover, political conditions in Eastern Europe are, from

[6] For example, the United States has for many years operated from Germany the single most effective instrument for preventing the indoctrination of the East Europeans and the Russians with the officially held view of the West, including specifically that of Germany. The operation of such instrumentalities as Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty has been a crucial factor in inducing over time a significant evolution not only in public but also in official communist attitudes. These instrumentalities represent a common Western interest, not to be bargained away bilaterally.

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the Soviet standpoint, much less secure than the corresponding political conditions in Western Europe. They could be seriously affected by the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops.

Raising the troops issue may be wise tactically as an initial negotiating gambit, especially since it is bound to be an attractive one in Europe as a whole. However, in the context of the larger proposal it might prove feasible for both sides to agree to some symbolic reductions, designed primarily to improve the climate for discussion of the more basic political issues. It would, therefore, be desirable for the West to propose—without the systematic studies necessary for more ambitious and balanced troop reductions—some symbolic initial reductions by both sides, say, the withdrawal from Germany of 20,000 American and Soviet soldiers respectively.

The East-West issue is sometimes posed as a matter of recognizing or not recognizing the status quo. Perhaps a more appropriate term than recognition would be "regularization." Formal recognition could be construed by one side as a belated victory, and by some allies, especially the Federal Republic, as a betrayal of commitments made long ago. It is not even certain that all East Europeans would be happy about it. A regularization of the East-West relationship, however, including that involving the two Germanys, could provide the basis for evolutionary change, pointing toward the eventual reconciliation and reassociation of the European peoples, including also the Germans.

That reassociation should remain the goal of American policy —not only verbally but through demonstrable commitment. Though distant, it is necessary to the eventual restoration of Europe. It is also something very much desired by most East Europeans. It is thus in America's interest—and in keeping with its own ideals—to demonstrate its active engagement in undoing peacefully the legacy of Potsdam.

V

In the long run, the restoration of Europe requires the reassociation of its western and eastern halves. In the shorter run, it can be best served by the continued integration of Western Europe and its close coöperation with the United States. There is no incompatibility between the two objectives. The reassociation of Europe will not be achieved by a disunited Western

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Europe, divorced from America; Moscow would see to that. The reassociation of Europe may eventually be attained through a gradual process of mutual involvement, conducted from a stable basis of symmetrical power, reinforced by the technological, social and political vitality of the West.

It is often argued that Moscow will not permit a more united Western Europe—not to speak of a Western Europe closely associated with the United States—to develop closer ties with Eastern Europe. Yet "permission" is not the issue. As we have argued, what is involved is a process of change—which, because it is gradual, cannot be easily nor effectively resisted—and this can be promoted only by a West that is attractive and increasingly united.

The American presence in Europe, moreover, is a fact. Recent years have seen an explosive growth in American economic investments in Europe and in the proliferation of large multinational corporations. In spite of American-West European difficulties in regard to tariffs—even in spite of a threatening tariff war—a kind of an Atlantic supermarket is developing, precluding American disengagement from Europe. Reinforcing this growth is the ever-increasing scope of scientific collaboration, of educational-cultural ties, of an intensifying flow of communications and the cross-Atlantic movement of tourists.

The American military presence in Europe thus should be viewed not as primarily a perpetuation of Potsdam or of the cold war, but rather as a reflection of a common involvement. It would be better from the American point of view, of course, if the West Europeans assumed a larger burden of their defense, but it is not entirely right to keep comparing the American and the West European defense expenditures to the disadvantage of the latter. Leaving aside the global scope of American security concerns and the historical fact of Europe's recent collapse, there is also the consideration that, on the relative level, an informal East-West symmetry already exists: American and Soviet defense expenditures are roughly even in terms of percentage of GNP, and so are the West and the East European ratios (in 1968, 9.2 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively, for the United States and the Soviet Union; and ranging from 2.3 percent to 6.2 percent for the other NATO powers—excluding Luxembourg—and from 2.9 percent to 5.7 percent for the other Warsaw Pact states). A significant increase in the West European effort,

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which would probably involve primarily an increase in West German forces, could prompt the Soviet Union to require the East Europeans to make a similar response, a prospect not necessarily helpful to the process of East-West reconciliation and reassociation.

There is, of course, no special magic to the present U.S. force levels in Europe. The point is to avoid the uncertainty and ambiguity bred by such perennials as the Mansfield Resolution. It sometimes appears as if the American Senate was bent on maximizing uncertainty concerning commitments of the United States to its allies. The real problem is financial. Though estimates of the actual costs of U.S. forces in Europe vary, a realistic figure appears to be somewhere around $3 billion per year. A special study made for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs states that while "it is not possible to quantify with precision the net effect on the overall U.S. balance of payments of U.S. defense expenditures and receipts overseas," there is a considerable deficit in the U.S. defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments in Western Europe and in the U.S. defense expenditures in Western Europe.

Given the psychological and fiscal considerations, the preferable course of action would be for the West Europeans themselves to propose a flat ceiling on U.S. forces—perhaps somewhat lower than the present—in exchange for longer-term financial contributions. Though short of a formal treaty, a longer-term U.S. pledge of troop levels cannot have a formal status. A presidential commitment would be the second-best alternative, reducing somewhat the uncertainty now troubling the West European-United States relationship.

A common West European defense effort may become a reality, especially if the EEC is enlarged or even as it moves in that direction. Here the nuclear question might again become active. However, if SALT results in some agreements, it would appear unlikely and perhaps even undesirable for the United States to encourage the West Europeans to create their own strategic forces by pooling the British and the French nuclear components. On the other hand, if SALT fails to go beyond some initial arrangements, or if SALT encourages the Soviet Union to become even more active in such areas as the Mediterranean, American backing for a European defense effort in the strategic field may make a great deal of political sense.

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In addition, some thought perhaps ought to be given to promoting even greater integration and rotation of existing U.S. and West European forces, perhaps of U.S. forces at a smaller unit level than is now the case. Such integration would stimulate the emergence of a collaborative spirit, a comradeship which, in the longer run, can have positive political consequences on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, to highlight U.S.-West European interdependence, groups of highly trained European security technicians could also be assigned to serve in the continental United States, as part of the common Western defense effort.

In contrast to continuing, even increasing, Soviet efforts to subordinate Eastern Europe and to integrate it with the Soviet economy, the United States has continued to support the growth of the EEC as a separate though allied entity. This support reflects a wider historical judgment, namely that the rebirth of Europe is desirable for the world, even if in the shorter term it may breed complications for U.S. economic interests. If a tariff war between the two entities proves unavoidable, even with goodwill and foresight on both sides, every effort should be made to compartmentalize it to the economic plane through persistent efforts to consolidate and expand other relationships.

Two areas offer possible opportunities for new initiatives. The first involves scientific and educational coöperation. Much could be gained by both sides if both Western Europe and America were to coördinate more closely their various educational reform schemes, stimulated in part by recent unrest. Though the educational problems are different on the two sides of the ocean, it does not follow that the remedies—as well as the general direction of change—will be fundamentally distinct. On the contrary, it would seem that both Western Europe and America will have to undertake a fundamental reëxamination of the purpose of modern education, a re-thinking which will require a great deal of philosophical reflection on the basic ends of social existence.

More specifically, both sides could benefit from greater pooling of their educational efforts, from enlarging the interchange of students and professors, and from increasing standardization of their academic requirements, degrees and ranks. Starting with the higher educational institutions, a deliberate effort should be made to create a common educational structure which would be philosophically and technically beneficial for both sides.

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This is especially the case in regard to joint space exploration. Negotiations for European participation in American space ventures are under way, and some European involvement in the "space shuttle" project is a possibility. However, much more could and should be done if space exploration is not to become an exclusively American and Soviet domain. The extraordinary interest and enthusiasm evoked in Europe by the American moon flights show that there is a European emotional potential to be exploited, and there is no doubt that the Europeans have much to contribute financially and scientifically to space investigations. A stimulating first step might be to include some Europeans as astronauts in the American space program.

The second general area for initiative involves political consultation and coöperation in problems posed globally by modern science and technology, which in turn pose crucial political issues both for the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. The Nixon administration has moved to focus NATO's attention on some of the latter concerns but, in my judgment, that is a mistake. NATO should concentrate on the central political issues confronting the West: having served constructively as an alliance to prevent war, it can now seek to create a new structure of East-West security. That task is big enough, and loading new problems on NATO will not increase NATO's political popularity or effectiveness.

A new and broader approach is needed—creation of a community of the developed nations which can effectively address itself to the larger concerns confronting mankind. In addition to the United States and Western Europe, Japan ought to be included. Its inclusion would be good both for Japan and for Western Europe, giving both a sense of participation in concerns of global dimensions, yet rooted in their own attainments as well as problems. A council representing the United States, Western Europe and Japan, with regular meetings of the heads of governments as well as some small standing machinery, would be a good start.

Such a council should not be confused with a directorate, as occasionally proposed in the past; it would be primarily consultative. Only through consultation and discussion can common perspectives and eventually purposes be crystallized. The most creative period in the American-European relationship was when there was an active crossbreeding of ideas across the

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ocean, when outstanding Europeans and Americans dared to think boldly and to innovate. Today, a forum is again needed, but on a scale commensurate with our global concerns. For West Europeans to think in Atlantic terms when Europe was still shattered was a creative leap forward. For Europeans and Japanese to join Americans in defining a common global perspective is the logical next step.

Can the United States move in these directions, can it initiate the measures proposed here? Its domestic problems certainly stand in the way, but an even graver impediment is the apparent loss of confidence and of vision among some of its leaders. If the contemporary Soviet leadership can be said to be bureaucratically mediocre and ideologically moribund, much of the American establishment appears to be intellectually paralyzed and politically pusillanimous. Yet the country as a whole is groping for new objectives and for the definition of specific ideals—domestic and foreign—to be attained. To restore Europe is to preserve and to enlarge that part of the world community which has come closest to establishing a humane and just form of social organization. It is with Europe that the United States shares certain concepts of law and personal freedom. Unless America continues actively to promote a broad vision of European restoration America does not have a foreign policy.

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ON VIOLENCE, PEACE AND THE RULE OF LAW

By Ramsey Clark

SCIENCE and the increase of population are the major dynamics of our time. Science promises civilization its highest fulfillment but simultaneously threatens its survival. A billion more people will populate the earth in 10 years, three to four billion more in 30. No one can escape the combined impact of mass population and technology. We are, finally, truly interdependent.

In a world of such sweeping change, causing greater differences in daily human experience in one generation than in all previous history, the old rules have limited relevance. History teaches the wrong lessons. Metternich misleads. Present leaders of the world powers, indelibly impressed by Munich, fought in a world war before the Bomb. The experience that dominates much of their judgment was gained three decades ago, or more. It seemed then that weak men, confronted by fascism, doomed us to World War II because they sought "peace in our time," and as a consequence Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France fell like . . . dominoes.

The old wars, though cruel and inhumane, were gentle compared to what can be. Generals who fought battles with rifles, tanks and propeller-driven airplanes on strategies developed by Bonaparte, Lee and Rommel have new weapons that cannot be used in a traditional manner. More and more nations seek to devise and wield the destructive power of technology. Unless it is prohibited, they will.

Politicians, emotionally conditioned by conflicting ideologies such as communism, capitalism, imperialism, totalitarianism and democracy, and schooled in alliances, colonial empires, economic exploitation, spheres of influence, balances of power, détentes, wary stalemates and summitry, endlessly negotiate, or quarrel over meaningless issues. Meanwhile, all around them divisions grow, tensions heighten and fear and mistrust rise.

We must ask ourselves how long we can go on like this. Contemplate the vast change of the past 30 years. Assume there will be even greater change in the next 15. Does a continued standoff really assure survival?

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II

In America—at least subjectively—we have come to realize that our system is no longer working as it should. While the velocity of change has increased dangerously, institutions and national attitudes adapt at the leisurely pace of the nineteenth century. Leaders posture, tinker and finesse. Clearly our efforts are inadequate. Population, rising crime, racial injustice and strife, the decaying hearts of our great cities, the mechanics of supplying essential needs in an interdependent mass society, anonymity, mobility, sheer quantities, the pollutions of air, water, noise, fear and violence, the armaments race and world peace all seem beyond our ability to control. But among the many clear and present dangers, the highest priority belongs to war.

Violence as a way of solving problems must be relegated to the past. It is no longer tolerable. It can no longer succeed. The once romantic ideal of peace has become essential realism. For we have no evidence that man is now possessed of a wisdom which failed to stop the club but can restrain the bomb. Has fear, even certainty, of mass destruction effectively contained the flood of violence? What of Warsaw, Schweinfurt and Hiroshima? It is more frequently the failure of reason that permits an act of violence than the force of reason that guides it.

The major powers must come quickly to understand the peril of the mere presence of nuclear weapons. They are not Caesar's legions, to conquer, occupy, control or even successfully intimidate. They can only destroy. No nation has discovered methods of wielding power over others with such weapons. None will. Has China coerced Cambodia; France, Algeria; the United States, North Vietnam?

Nuclear weapons are developed and placed in delivery systems out of fear and mistrust and to feed the war machines we have created. Even a first strike can only be a defensive measure. Can there be any conceivable justification for the use of nuclear armaments? There is no greater test of the capacity of man's reason to affect his destiny than his efforts to ban the production and use of all nuclear weapons. The cost of developing and deploying them has been enormous in terms of economic outlay, human anxieties and our assumptions as to what civilization is and can be.

In the quest for peace, the highest priority must be given

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to neutralizing the means of mass destruction. Nuclear powers must agree to stop production and begin dismantling. They must act under law, realizing with Grotius that "This care to preserve society . . . is the source of all law." Governments through international law can prevent production, effectively police nuclear weapons development and provide opportunities for inspection to satisfy others. No increment in the offensive or defensive nuclear systems of a nation large or small can offer protection. Finally, if international agreements cannot be obtained, unilateral deëscalation of the arms race can change the course for all. The balancing act is over, for the weight of weaponry created by technology has crushed the scales.

Nothing in our experience indicates it is possible or even desirable to impose some seemingly preferred political, social or economic concept on a foreign culture. People remain much as they were. They do not suddenly start playing the game of life by a completely new and strange set of rules. But they do sense whose spirit is generous and whose selfish; whose character is violent and whose benevolent; what builds and what destroys. While an international police can reduce international violence, the underlying causes must be addressed directly by massive economic efforts that afford the opportunity for human dignity, for health, education, employment, housing and other basic human needs. Such efforts must be made by the rich nations without seeking to gain influence or control in return. At this time the United Nations remains the major institution for distribution of technical assistance and economic aid that will be generous, benevolent and constructive in purpose.

III

World law will have to begin with some manifestation by the world powers of their ability to abide by the rule of law both national and international. Vietnam has placed enormous strains on America's adherence to constitutional law. The power over war and peace was delegated by the people to the Congress in the Constitution. Vested in the lawmakers was authority "to lay and collect taxes . . . to provide for the common Defense"; "to define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations"; "to raise and support Armies . . ."; "to provide and maintain a Navy"; "to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; "to provide for calling forth the

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Militia"; "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia" and "to declare war."

Congress, however, has not adequately exercised its powers or fulfilled its responsibilities for the conduct of war or the quest for peace. During this century, it has slowly relinquished these essential functions while the executive branch has assumed them. And when it finally endeavored to perform its constitutional duties through a Cooper-Church resolution or a Hatfield-McGovern amendment to end the war, it met the opposition of the Executive. But each branch should endeavor to assist the others in the performance of their constitutional duties. We now find, as Justice Robert H. Jackson told us 18 years ago, that "only Congress can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."

The executive branch, on the other hand, has manifested no significant capacity to question its own actions in Indochina. At both the Defense and State Departments it is so captive of interests committed to military containment that executive leadership has hardly questioned our course. From the vantage point of 1961 and 1965, what presidential leadership possible under our system would have been likely to avoid war in Vietnam? Was there anything inherently more bellicose in the characters of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson than of Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater that might have caused the latter to avoid the conflict the former became immersed in? Once a course is taken those who participated in its choosing, and persons who identify with them, are unlikely to doubt and quick to defend.

Government must exercise powers over peace and war in accordance with constitutional directions and separation of powers. Nor may we hope for salvation from the judiciary. It can interpret constitutional standards, but it can only act after the fact, and that is too late. Courts cannot end unconstitutional wars by fiat any more than they could end unconstitutional racial segregation. All institutions must act responsively, swiftly and forcefully to fulfill judicial decisions, but this will not be enough. Wars will be ended only by a comprehensive effort on all fronts.

Ultimate power indeed rests in the people. In a mass society sheer numbers dictate this. And it was from the people that the realization of the tragedy of Vietnam first came. Our representative system did not work—the legislative branch failed to scrutinize the actions of the Executive and check them. We entered

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South Vietnam with little awareness by the public of what was happening. The views of our people were formed after we were deeply involved and were presented as protest. The First Amendment, guaranteeing free speech and the right of assembly, gave Americans the chance, with youth in the vanguard, to communicate their opposition to the war. They did, and their voices multiplied until the entire nation became aware of the intensity of their concern. Doubt as to the wisdom of our course in Vietnam grew from small protests until a substantial minority came to view it as tragically wrong.

Through participatory democracy the power of the people can be exercised directly on the political system. Inclusionary politics that seeks to involve all Americans in the selection of leadership will quickly alter the constituencies of elected officials, vitalize government and make it responsive to the needs and wishes of people who have had little or no power: the poor, the young, minorities, women. Universal voter enrollment by which government seeks to register every eligible voter and encourages him to vote, can bring the 47 million Americans who did not vote in 1968 into the system. The eighteen-year-old vote will make politicians more responsive to the young. Democracy will then work and all will benefit.

There was not enough skepticism in the executive branch to alter our purpose in Vietnam. Except for the protest of the people, U.S. policy in Indochina would have proceeded right on. A course of action seeking a violent solution was changed by young America to one of withdrawal—though our government still unwisely relies on violence. The First Amendment may have saved us from the ultimate disaster promised by our earlier purposes in Vietnam because it made dissent easier to communicate, and dissent is the principal catalyst in the alchemy of truth. But Vietnam imposed heavy burdens on our adherence to the First Amendment itself. A people who speak constantly of the rule of law placed many barriers in the path of this constitutional right. We did not want to hear how strongly people felt or see how many they were.

The ultimate test of our willingness to follow the rule of law arises from conduct that only slowly comes to light in the Green Beret case, the My Lai incident, the Con Son prison discovery. Is law more than power? Do we believe in it to the extent that it will be enforced wherever it falls? From the American stand-

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point, the allegations of atrocity do not raise the issues of Nuremberg, though a nation that presided at the Nuremberg trials should be meticulous about enforcing its rules in such situations. Killing prisoners or noncombatant civilians is murder. Inhumane treatment of prisoners is a crime, and if a nation knowingly makes it possible for an ally to engage in such conduct, it shares in the responsibility for the crime. Without thorough, public vindication of the rule of law when such allegations arise, the world can only assume that war remains a lawless hell whoever the participants. Others will conduct themselves accordingly; violence will remain their technique for solving international problems. America must provide strong moral leadership by firmly enforcing its laws and leaving no doubt that it will never condone atrocities.

Adherence to just rules of law will not, however, be possible if we cannot know and face the truth. We still shield ourselves from the enormity of the tragedy of Vietnam by obscuring facts. We barely perceive what we have done and are doing to ourselves. The increment of violence in our national character is immense; the loss of faith and goodwill throughout the world profound. Few people in Asia, Africa or Latin America can identify sympathetically with well-fed representatives of a rich society journeying ten thousand miles to pilot multimillion dollar B-52s and drop death and destruction on underfed Indochinese in miserable villages or along jungle trails. The racial implications of Vietnam internationally and within the United States are also inescapable. When Dr. Martin Luther King, the apostle of nonviolent change, called for an end to the war and incurred the opposition of much of the civil rights movement, it was because he saw not only violence, but a diversion of national energies, conflict between races, and young black Americans killing and being killed for white America. The body count has marked us as a nation that judges success by the number of foreign human beings it kills.

In terms of the human spirit, the world sees an impoverished people waging a ceaseless war over decades; perhaps a million deaths; little men and women jogging for weeks over dangerous trails with 50 pounds of rice or ammunition on their backs. They wonder, as we all must, what motivates such determination? They see our conduct tearing a great and wealthy nation apart because it will not admit to itself that it is wrong. Are these

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nations dominoes? If so, why then do they not send soldiers to Vietnam to defend it and therefore themselves? Does the Thieu-Ky government represent any appreciable segment of the South Vietnamese? Is it supported, feared, or hated by its own citizens? How rich are its generals? How many have wealth and family outside the country? How pervasive is corruption? How brutal is conduct? Did the North Vietnamese and Vietcong gain more food and arms from Cambodia after the American incursion than was lost to our forces? Are we systematically shielding our leaders and the nation from knowledge of the My Lais, of the defeats, and creating the illusion of imminent military victory? Must our invasion of Cambodia be defended and the truth strained because we lashed out there? Until we seek facts fearlessly and act openly on them, we cannot hope to proceed wisely or gain the confidence of thinking people at home or abroad.

Vietnam is only symptomatic of the inadequacy of violence in mass society and its peril for technologically advanced nations. Military victory would have been far more disastrous than military failure for the United States. The apparent lesson of victory would have been that force and violence were still possible as solutions of international problems. Force and violence would be relied on again. It is a terribly expensive lesson, but if we learn from Vietnam that we can no longer use military force to coerce the conduct of others, we can survive and flourish.

Vietnamization of the war is ignoble as an end in itself. The effort began within several years after the present conflict started on December 19, 1946, when the French, in the last vestiges of colonialism, sought to extricate white boys by substituting yellow ones. Our earliest presence through technical advisers was intended to create new Vietnamese military capabilities to resist or overcome the natural dynamics that sought to change inadequate institutional structures. In the present context, Vietnamization says to the peoples of Southeast Asia, let's you and him fight. The Cambodian incursion manifests as clearly as does the continued and increasing bombing that American leadership still seeks to solve problems by violence. But while it may show we have a flexible and fierce striking power, it also demonstrates that we have no knockout punch. We can only go on fighting. It tells us American leadership has learned nothing from Vietnam. We want to walk out the victors by killing, by leaving a prolonged war in our wake. We cannot win that way.

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IV

Our purpose in Vietnam now must be the end of violence. We should immediately act to remove our military presence. All bombing should halt. For Vietnamese who want sanctuary, it should be offered. The most ardent and relentless effort possible directed at Moscow, Peking, Paris and Hanoi should seek a political solution—a government reflecting the interests and needs of the people as comprehensively as possible. We should announce a firm, speedy schedule for complete military withdrawal and adhere strictly to it. Six months is ample. We should announce now that there will be no offensive, aggressive military action. We will return fire when fired upon and protect our evacuation by military action as necessary, but we will not initiate military engagements.

Simultaneously, we should offer rehabilitation and development: billions for food, health, construction and economic assistance. Nonmilitary technical advice and labor should be extended as needed, in ways and places best designed to end violence. Supervised through the United Nations, the International Red Cross and other groups, it should offer a swift and massive improvement of the lot of the people of Indochina. Plans for such programs exist. We owe this effort to ourselves, to the Vietnamese and to future generations. We must show that we can learn, that we do not believe in violent resolutions of problems, that our purposes as a people are generous and humanitarian.

We cannot be deterred by fears of blood baths or loss of face. The bath of blood in Vietnam has already nearly drowned humaneness. Deaths far exceed those of our Civil War among a people numbering a fraction of our population at that time. There is no easy choice in Vietnam. We can simply offer sanctuary and let those whose lives are at stake either way make their decision.

Americans hate this war. It divides us and corrupts our character. We have an obligation as a great and powerful nation to overcome weakness that will neither admit wrong nor do right. We cannot expect others to agree to every move we make toward peace and we cannot wait until they do. But by word and deed America must move directly and fearlessly toward peace. The world will see our strength when we who have six percent of its people and half its wealth manifest a clear, steady, single purpose—peace.

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Real strength can change institutions and attitudes and improve the quality of life for all. This is the strength of a helping hand that does not strike out in anger, fear or hatred: a hand that is nonviolent and humane. We must recognize the newness of our situation and disenthrall ourselves from outworn attitudes and leisurely adaptations. We must act boldly and massively. Clever statements characterized by sporadic violence and continuous threats and outbursts cannot offer safety, freedom or fulfillment. It is for America to liberate its generous spirit, its gentle regard for every individual, its will to live together on this earth with dignity, respect and love. We must end violent responses. We must inspire a passion for justice and reverence for life.

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GERMANY IN THE ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS

By Helmut Schmidt

THE rationale of West German foreign policy is very simple: the postwar era has ended. Its hallmarks were high hopes for Western political structures on the one hand, and high tension between East and West on the other. Now a new epoch is in the offing. In the West it is going to be characterized by less ambitious objectives and more pragmatic approaches. The achievements of the fifties and sixties will not be dismantled, but the aims for the immediate future will be lowered. Dreams of "Atlantic Union Now" or "Instant Europe" must give way to expectations more closely geared to realities: wider and deeper coöperation, without necessarily institutional perfection. Between East and West the new era could be one of diminished tension and growing détente, of more coöperation and less confrontation. Not unlike President Nixon, the Bonn government is also trying to "build agreement upon agreement" without in any way deluding itself that this could be a process easily or speedily accomplished.

There is no conflict between these policies. They are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they complement one another. The Federal Republic of Germany is firmly rooted in the West—both in the Atlantic Alliance and in such European institutions as the Western European Union and the Common Market. These Western ties are beyond question.

II

It is an undeniable fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has fully served its purpose during its 20 years of existence. In Europe, it has created a military balance vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc, and thus maintained the peace through grave international crises: first Korea, then Berlin and Cuba, finally Prague. And there has been more reasonable reform in recent years than many critics are willing to admit.

In the seventies as well, NATO will retain its lasting value as a safeguard against any revival of communist aggressiveness. After all, the lesson of Czechoslovakia in 1968 has been that the era of East-West crises is not yet a thing of the past. By means of

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the Brezhnev doctrine, Moscow has brutally collectivized the sovereignty of the East European nations. At the same time, the Soviet military are coolly debating the question whether war has really ceased to be an instrument of politics in the nuclear age.

Without the North Atlantic Alliance, there can be no security for Europe. Without it, the main threat to the West cannot be eliminated: namely a political stranglehold which could suffocate individual areas such as West Berlin, or bring pressure to bear on the Federal Republic or the NATO countries located on Europe's northern and southern flanks.

By the same token, without a firm foundation in NATO, there can be no sensible policy of détente in Europe. The maintenance of an effective defense depends on the continuity of a balance of power as does the improvement of East-West relations.

From all this, three conclusions can be drawn: for Germany, for Western Europe and for the relationship between Europe and its two North American allies, especially the United States.

For Germany, an exclusively national policy of deterrence would lack both credibility and effectiveness. As Chancellor Willy Brandt said in his policy statement on October 28, 1969, "for our security we need friends and allies, just as they need us and our contribution for theirs." Let me repeat here what I said recently before the North Atlantic Council: "The new German government will continue the previous policy, both within the Alliance and toward the Alliance. We will not diminish the German defense effort, either in quantity or in quality, but will improve our contribution by a program for modernizing and reforming our armed forces. . . . Our defense contribution of 460,000 men under arms will remain unaltered."

For Europe, the necessity remains to keep up an effective defense. The build-up of the Soviet fleet, and of a Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, is growing at an undiminished rate. The military potential of the Warsaw Pact is continuously being reinforced and modernized in the western part of the U.S.S.R. and in communist Eastern Europe in such manner and strength that we have no alternative but to maintain NATO forces now in Western Europe, in sufficient strength and of adequate quality. In this context, one has to at least *raise* the question whether Europe could not do more than it has done in the past to combine its various national efforts in the fields of de-

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fense, of arms procurement and of technology, and to make them more effective by streamlining them without an increase in expenditure.

For the United States, given the strategic implications of the military potential of the Soviet Union and its continued effort in this respect, it remains an unquestionable fact of life in our time that there is no substitute for the role and function of the United States in the balance of strategic power.

Against this background, we actively support European efforts which would facilitate the continued and unquestioned presence of sufficient U.S. troops in Europe. The Euro-Group in Brussels and some other coöperative ventures are first steps on the road to what may, in time, become the consolidated defense establishment of a politically united Western Europe.

But we are still far from that goal. And we know too well that the alliance with the United States continues to be indispensable for maintaining that balance in the defense and deterrence capabilities which lead the other side to a rational handling of its foreign policy. The alliance with the United States is kept alive by the military presence of the United States in Europe and must remain so for some time. Also during this decade the fundamental asymmetry between East and West in Europe has to be brought into balance by a U.S. military presence in Europe itself.

It is only this presence, by the way, which underpins the strategy of "flexible response." It has taken the members of the Atlantic Alliance many years to reach agreement on this strategy. It is reasonable and credible. There is no alternative to it. A return to massive nuclear retaliation would be incredible, as would be a fallback on purely "tactical" nuclear defense—the former being unimaginably cruel to the Americans, the latter to the Europeans. The strategy of flexible response is the only one which combines credibly effective deterrence with non-suicidal defense, sharing the risks of warfare in a fair way between North Americans and West Europeans.

This fact is not accepted with happiness—either on this or on the other side of the Atlantic. However, it must be taken into account with all the implications it carries in many fields. It is with intense concern that we follow the course of events in the United States and Canada, and the development of thoughts suggesting a lessening of foreign policy commitments of the United States, in particular concerning Europe. Past experience gives

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rise to the hope that notwithstanding the pressing domestic issues a wide consensus will emerge to reaffirm the responsibilities of the United States as a vital and fundamental backbone for the strategic balance.

Certainly, substantial changes in the international environment would justify a reassessment of the number of American troops necessary in Europe. It is not Holy Writ that U.S. forces will have to remain in Europe at present strength forever and ever (already the American garrison in Germany has been reduced by 20 percent over the past four years). We are hopeful that future conditions will allow for modifications of their role. Major changes, however, have not yet occurred. They may be looming on the horizon, but they may never become palpable political reality if the West throws away its cards before going to the conference table or before getting agreements on mutual force reductions.

There are many convincing arguments against precipitate or premature American troop withdrawals from Europe. In the first place there is the conventional military argument. U.S. ground troops man one-fourth of the European dividing line; the U.S. Air Force furnishes between 70 and 80 percent of all flying units in the 4th ATAF covering southern Germany, and about the same percentage of HAWK and NIKE batteries in that area. Were any of them thinned out or pulled out, grievous gaps would be created and the concept of forward defense turned into a shambles. Moreover, substantial U.S. withdrawals would sorely undermine public confidence not only in the reliability of the American commitment but also in the basic feasibility of European defense. An opinion poll recently conducted in West Germany bears this out. Sixty-six percent of those polled—and 79 percent of all Bundeswehr soldiers—felt that without American troops Germany would be overrun in the event of a communist aggression. Thus, an American pull-out might indeed cause a psychological landslide and impel a despondent Western Europe toward its first major reorientation since the end of World War II.

Finally, nobody can deny that Western Europe, even if it were willing and able to put a European soldier in place of every GI withdrawn, could never make up for the deterrent effect inherent in American troops and their immediate link with the strategic deterrence. In the balance of power that obtains between the two

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superpowers one cannot replace the soldiers of the American superpower by French, British or German soldiers. This is true for the Seventh Army; it also goes for the Sixth Fleet. Unilateral American withdrawals would accentuate rather than attenuate the structural imbalance of the present situation.

For obvious reasons, West Germany could not man the breach. By the same token, increased German payments for continued undiminished American presence offer no way out, because they would have to come from the German defense budget. The best way to help the Americans stay in Europe lies therefore in a joint European effort to facilitate the presence of U.S. troops here and I hope that sufficient agreement can be effected among our European partners in this new venture.

III

The political unification of Western Europe continues to be a principal goal of our foreign policy. But the desire for institutional perfection is now tempered by a decade of sobering experience. Too many high-flying plans and projects have foundered on the mountains of national self-interest. The European Defense Community, a European Political Community, European Union along the Fouchet pattern—all of these projects were eminently sensible and desirable, yet they failed. The European nation-states were not ready for them. Each failure, however, caused a grievous loss of dynamics and confidence and threw Europe back by several years. The lesson is obvious: West European unification is jeopardized if its architects aim for the unattainable. Pragmatism and gradualism offer better chances.

West Germany still wants to see Western Europe unified. It was, after all, Chancellor Brandt who engineered a decisive breakthrough when, at the Hague Conference in December 1969, he convinced France's President Pompidou of the necessity to get Europe moving again. Meanwhile, talks about the entry of new members—first and foremost the United Kingdom—into the Common Market club have begun. They will no doubt be protracted, but they are off to a felicitous start. The Europe of the Six is evolving into a Europe of the Ten. And the Community is now moving toward increased integration as well.

Though some would argue that more members and more integration are incompatible aims, we have learned the hard way that integration takes time. If we cannot have all, at least we should

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work for all that is possible—for strengthened consultation procedures in the first place, for less-than-perfect forms of union in the second. The Common Market nations must consider themselves lucky if they can complete their economic and currency union by the end of the seventies. So why not include in that process those willing and able to join? Why not take them along on the road to political union that lies beyond the horizons of 1980?

Others contend that you cannot simultaneously pursue integration in Western Europe and rapprochement with Eastern Europe. But these are not the fifties any longer. Then it was possible to plan for a Carolingian Western Europe for which Eastern Europe was nothing but a heathen adversary. But now, the Carolingians have passed away; the East has been put on the map. Whatever structure the West Europeans are going to create, it will certainly not be one without windows, doors and passageways to the East Europeans. President Pompidou put it very bluntly in his Strasbourg speech last June: Western Europe would not come into existence unless it developed its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe; France, at any rate, would not go along if it were otherwise. Seen in this light, an active Eastern policy would appear to be a prerequisite of a West European renewal.

IV

Three preliminary remarks must be made about our *Ostpolitik,* the Eastern policy of the new West German government.

(1) It is not the result of a radical break with the past but rather the logical outcome of an evolution that started in the mid-sixties under Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder; it found a first expression in the Peace Note of March 1966 and was assiduously developed by the Grand Coalition.

(2) It is firmly embedded in the fabric of a strong Western alliance. It is in no way an attempt to break away from that alliance, but rather an attempt to engage the political strength of the alliance in order to overcome the sterile confrontation of the past decade. The Paris Treaties of 1954 and our commitments to NATO are beyond question—and so is our Constitution. West Germany will not become a "wanderer between the two worlds," as Chancellor Brandt has repeatedly stated. It is no "floating kidney."

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(3) Bonn's Eastern probe fits into the wider pattern of Western policy vis-à-vis the communist powers. Its basic aim is to find out what room and readiness there are in the East for compromise and conciliation. Like other Western probes—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), for instance—ours is also governed by the basic consideration that if it fails we must not find ourselves in a worse position than before. We shall not embark on any adventure from which our friends will have to bail us out.

The impelling motive of our Eastern operation was the recognition that security through deterrence is only one essential element of stabilizing the framework of international relations and that security through lessening tension is a supplementary one, no less essential. The ultimate goal of this undertaking is the healing of the rift that has divided Europe for more than 20 years. Since the partition of our continent and our country cannot be overcome, at least we must want to overcome the separation of the peoples; since borders cannot be shifted about any longer, we must bend all our efforts to render their presence more tolerable. This, basically, is what *Ostpolitik* is all about.

Our method is that of patient, persevering, matter-of-fact diplomatic dialogue, carried on in a spirit neither euphoric nor frustrated. That dialogue is being launched simultaneously with the Soviet Union, with Eastern Europe, and with East Germany.

We see the situation realistically, as it is. Nothing important can be accomplished in Eastern Europe that Moscow does not agree to; it would be foolish to try to drive wedges among the members of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, Warsaw, East Berlin, Prague, and the others are not mere satellites without a will of their own and without any influence. We recognize that they are not. Therefore, we started an exchange of opinions with Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), at the same time that we opened talks with the Soviet Union. We hope that later there will be conversations with other member states of the Warsaw Pact as well. In each case, we consider the proposal to conclude an agreement on the renunciation of force a useful organizational framework for addressing the different bilateral problems.

With Moscow we have had and still have intensive and serious talks and negotiations. At the time of this writing, the outcome so far has been a preliminary agreement on the substance of a re-

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nunciation-of-force agreement. In addition, several points of understanding relating to matters of mutual interest were put on record. The Soviets refrained from insisting on their previous maximalist positions. "Recognition" of all existing frontiers was no longer demanded, "respect" accepted instead; they were declared "inviolable" but not necessarily "unalterable." Moscow accepted the German view that treaties previously concluded with third parties should not be affected; this is especially important with regard to the Paris Treaties, our membership in NATO and our European Community ties. Moreover, the Soviets showed themselves willing to accept a letter from the Federal Government to the effect that self-determination for the entire German people remains the goal of our policy. While Berlin is not an object of talks or arrangements between Bonn and Moscow, the Soviets took note of our view that a general détente must include and is intimately linked with a satisfactory settlement of the situation in and around Berlin. The ultimate result remains still to be seen. At present one can at least say that the Soviets are negotiating as seriously as in SALT.

The dialogue with Warsaw has also taken an encouraging turn since the Brandt administration took office. The Federal Republic does not feel able to recognize formally and finally the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border; this is a decision which even the architects of present-day Poland reserved to a peace treaty with Germany. But we are willing to do everything possible short of an eventual peace treaty. We have made the Poles a twofold offer: first, to concede in no uncertain terms that, in its view, the Oder-Neisse is the western frontier of Poland; and second, to commit itself to the inviolability of this frontier. There is real hope that an agreement can be reached along these lines.

The third area in which we aim at normalization is the relationship between the two German states. Here it is our primary goal to end a development that, in the past 20 years, has ever more deepened the rift between the two Germanys. This will not be made possible as long as they adhere unequivocally to maximalist claims and arguments. The people in both parts of Germany want practical solutions that would permit the nation to live together more easily than it can at present.

The communist leadership of the GDR obviously finds it difficult to budge from its formalistic position. It demands the final

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and definitive recognition of East Germany in terms of international law as a prerequisite to any negotiations over normalization. And it leaves nobody in doubt that the relations between East Berlin and Bonn should be no different in character from those between, say, Belgium and Poland.

Bonn, in turn, has made it clear that it is ready to adopt a sensible, forthcoming attitude. We think it is useless to continue pretending there is no GDR; not that we approve of the régime or of the social system it has imposed on the East Germans, but neither do we call its existence in question any longer. We are eager to talk with East Germany, as the Erfurt and Kassel meetings between Chancellor Brandt and Chairman Stoph have proved. We shall coöperate with them wherever they are ready for it. There is one thing, however, which we refuse to do: recognize the other part of Germany as a foreign country. The Germans are one nation and will remain so. If the GDR should one day be ready to normalize its relations with the Federal Republic on the basis of this principle, then we on our part will no longer object to the GDR establishing relations with third countries or participating in the activities of international organizations on the basis of equal rights. But such an attitude cannot be taken prior to an agreement on a modus vivendi between West Germany and East Germany. It could be aimed at in the wake of détente, but cannot precede it.

In all of this, of course, Berlin plays a crucial role. It is still an international tinderbox. All our efforts to achieve détente can remain futile if the situation there continues insecure and unsecured. Berlin (East and West) cannot remain an island of the cold war in a Europe of coöperation. To be sure, it is primarily a responsibility of the Four Powers, and the Federal Government clearly recognizes the special rights and responsibilities which these powers still hold with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. At the same time, however, West Berlin is in many important ways a warden of the Federal Republic, tightly interwoven, as it is, with the social, economic, monetary and legal fabric of West Germany. For this reason, the Federal Government cannot fail to make its voice heard whenever the fate of Berlin is at stake. Our point of view is very simple: as developments have confirmed the existence of the GDR, so developments have confirmed as a fact the special relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Both of these

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realities are equally real. If this is not recognized by both sides, confrontation cannot be replaced by coöperation.

V

The vast implications of the endeavors to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on strategic armaments are not only widely understood in the United States but also in the other allied countries. Corresponding with these endeavors, which among other things envisage a continued nuclear deterrence sufficiency for the West, we should seek Western efforts to engage the Soviet-bloc countries more deeply in the policy of Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) which would, if implemented correctly, reduce the burdens of defense without increasing security risks.

The Federal Government attaches high importance to this topic. We would like to see it introduced as a priority issue into East-West relations and also make it an important point on the agenda of any international conference on the security of Europe, if and whenever such a conference comes about. Within NATO, we have favored an early Western MBFR initiative; and we are pleased to note that the démarche decided upon at the Rome Council meeting in May 1970 has met with a less unsubtle and more forthcoming response on the part of the Warsaw Pact than might have been expected.

There are, of course, still plenty of snags ahead, but in the face of ever more pressing Asian preoccupations and growing internal demands the Soviets might now indeed be more favorably inclined to balanced force reductions in Europe than at any other time. Paradoxically, the Czechoslovak tragedy may have helped them to come around; for in August 1968, they proved to themselves as well as to their unfortunate allies that presence on the ground is not absolutely necessary for controlling an area —potential presence, quickly able to be mobilized in a crisis, weighs just as heavily on the scales. Remote control can function as effectively as control on the spot.

The important point is that we treat mutual and balanced force reductions not as a narrowly military exercise but as an eminently political operation. It might well be the European way of lowering the levels of uncertainty, cost and potential violence in the East-West confrontation, comparable to SALT on the strategic plane. Mutual balanced force reductions would

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make it possible to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Europe without changing the correlation of forces and without diminishing Western Europe's confidence in the American commitment. The Americans would neither leave Europe completely nor loose themselves from it; the part of their forces to be withdrawn would depart under circumstances which would minimize the probability of their having to return in order to meet a major contingency. American troop withdrawals would not come as a retreat but rather as a contribution toward the evolution of more coöperative and less confrontational patterns of relationship in Europe.

This, in my view, would also be the chief difference between the disengagement ideas of old and the more recent MBFR project. Then the Americans were to be crowded out of the Old World, in which case the balance would have been tipped in favor of the East; now they will retain a foothold. This is important, for peace in Europe can only be preserved, and efforts to achieve détente will only be successful, if the relative balance of forces which we have today continues to be maintained. The point of MBFR is that the balance would be lowered, not changed.

In all of these fields, West German policy is characterized by a combination of persistence and realism. We know what the goals are but we are flexible when it comes to mapping out the routes that will take us there. It is no longer all or nothing, take it or leave it. Nobody is waiting for spectacular acts to change the world overnight. The important thing is to get processes started which will, in due time, lead either to solutions of our unsolved problems or to agreed-upon non-solutions which the world can live with more easily than with the dangerously unstable status quo.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: AN AMERICAN POLICY

By John C. Campbell

THE purpose of recent American diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East is simply stated. It is to stop the fighting and bring the peace effort back to the point, now nearly three years ago, when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring was setting out on his mission to help bring about an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement on the basis of a unanimous U.N. resolution. It is a measure of the deterioration since that time that these modest proposals, the results of which are uncertain as these lines are written, have generated optimism by their initial success in breaking the fixed pattern of reliance on force alone. For they came at a time of gloom over the prospects for settlement and of alarm over military events which could bring major Soviet gains or grave risk of war. Participation of Soviet pilots and missile crews in military operations had already limited Israel's mastery of the skies over Egypt and might in time shift the balance of power which now favors Israel. Once that balance is upset, President Nixon has said, the United States "will do what is necessary" to restore it.

This is, many have said, a time for urgent American decision if we are to avoid bolder Soviet moves and a worse crisis later, or a desperate Israeli decision to launch a preventive war with incalculable consequences. In the background looms Israel's actual or potential atomic capability, not to be ignored even if it bears a "last resort" label. Precipitate action spurred by a sense of crisis may serve neither peace nor the national interest. But is the present initiative for Arab-Israeli negotiations enough? Weighing policies in the present atmosphere of mixed hope and alarm requires at the very least a perspective relating the past to the future.

Ever since the war of 1948 in Palestine there has been no peace between the Arab states and Israel, so it should be no surprise if peace cannot be found now. At no time have the Arab governments been able, even under the shock of defeat, to bring themselves to the point of talking directly with Israel. At no time has Israel been willing to make concessions which might induce the Arabs to make the peace that Israel wants. Each side has chosen

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to interpret the ambiguous U.N. resolution of November 1967 in accordance with its own views. So also in their gingerly acceptance of U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' proposals made last June the U.A.R., Jordan and Israel took care not to retreat from basic positions which they have long preferred to the political risks lurking in substantive concessions for the sake of compromise.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a peace, Israel finds retention of the territories conquered in the 1967 war a military necessity, wholly aside from considerations of their political future. Abdel Nasser holds a door open to political settlement but will not give up recourse to force unless he finds that the kind of settlement he wants, including full satisfaction on Israeli withdrawal, can be won by other means. The more radical Arabs of Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian organizations will be looking for ways to discredit not only the effort for peace through diplomacy but also any Arab leader who goes along with it.

Thus the attempt to get a negotiated political settlement in the near future, encouraging as the initial indications may be, will probably have but an outside chance of success. Perhaps it makes more sense to concentrate on more immediate measures to contain the conflict and reduce the danger of further Soviet gains. In any case it will be necessary to have a sound estimate of the prospects for both sides, and of the aims and policies of the Soviet Union.

II

Israel's leaders count on the continuing success of their present strategy. If the Arab states will not negotiate peace, then let them suffer the consequences of the absence of peace. Israel's margin of military superiority, so runs the argument, can be maintained and even increased because the gap between Israeli and Arab technical proficiency will grow with time; whatever the quantity and type of weapons obtained by the Arabs, it will make no difference because they will not know how to make proper use of them. The Israeli reply to the question of when the Arabs may be able to reverse the military balance is a confident "Never."

This strategy depends for success, however, on factors outside Israel's control. First, Israel must be able to replace its advanced equipment, especially aircraft, and for the foreseeable future it must get such items from abroad, mainly from the United States.

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Second, introduction of Soviet combat forces into the U.A.R. or other Arab states can cut down Israel's margin of superiority. Israeli strategy, accordingly, must rely heavily on American support both to retain its superiority over Arab enemies and to counterbalance the weight of Soviet intervention.

In the longer view, even if the Arabs prove unable to threaten Israel's security or to win back the lost territories, other serious questions will pose themselves for Israel. The prospect of unending war will compel spending a large percentage of resources for military purposes, a strain that will distort the economy and weigh heavily on the population. It may be a cliché to say that Israel will become a garrison state, but there is little doubt that its citizen army will be increasingly sacrificing civilian pursuits in favor of training for and waging war; that the demand for unity and full popular support for the nation in time of peril will limit the free atmosphere necessary to the working of the democratic political system; and that the great stress on military considerations will tend to inflate the power of those leaders who have the responsibility for the country's military security.

More serious for Israel, perhaps, will be the problem of handling the Palestinian Arabs now under its control in the occupied territories, plus predictable new difficulties in dealing with its old Arab minority. Caught between the Israeli authorities and the militant fedayeen, the Arab inhabitants are likely to be pushed into resistance, with the result that the cycle of violence and reprisal within the occupied territories will match the cycle of military operations across the borders. Even if Israel can control the Arabs fairly well by security measures, their mere presence under its jurisdiction will constitute a threat to the Israeli national state by the weight of their growing numbers. Unless they are allowed self-determination through Israeli withdrawal, Israel's choice lies between incorporating them into its political and social life or keeping them under control as a subject people. Neither choice is without grave forebodings for Israel's future.

Israel faces another dangerous prospect—increasing international isolation. Some of the admiration and goodwill in the world community gained at the time of its spectacular military victory under threat of extinction is no longer extended to a state which has taken on the role of a conquering and occupying power. Israel's uncoöperative and often contemptuous attitude toward the United Nations and its reluctance to coöperate with

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outside powers seeking ways to move toward a political settlement have disillusioned and alienated public opinion in the West. Even in the United States, the one power on which Israel depends, enthusiasm for its cause has cooled outside the American Jewish community. Despite the heavy support for Israel in the Senate, the general mood of turning away from foreign involvements, in the popular reaction against the Indochina war, makes no exception for the Middle East.

All these factors, which are known to Israel's leaders and people, have had but slight effect on their current policies. They are either given an optimistic interpretation or pushed aside as not convenient to talk about at the present time of struggle. The few who have opposed the hard official line may some day win more adherents to their thesis that total dependence on force as the way to surmount growing dangers and reach the ultimate goal of peace with the Arabs is self-defeating, and that the very process of unending war is changing the character of Israeli society in directions far from its original concepts. The recent flurry over Nahum Goldmann, whose differing approach to Israel's future was made manifest in these pages[1] and in his plan for a dialogue with Nasser, raised the issue of the merits of conciliation at a time when Israel has considerable bargaining power. But it was U.S. diplomacy, rather than a change of heart in Jerusalem, that brought acceptance of the Rogers proposals.

III

That the future prospects for Israel are clouded with doubt does not mean that Arab prospects are correspondingly bright. Time is not working for anybody. The theory that Arab numbers, economic growth and increasing competence in the use of arms will eventually overwhelm Israel has no real substance, at least not in this generation. If Arab leaders see a future more favorable than the bleak short-term outlook, that is because they persist in coloring the future with hopes and illusions.

The Arab states directly involved in the conflict are under pressure from militant Palestinians and from their own public opinion (which they did much to create) to look to force rather than conciliation. They are reluctant or unwilling to establish any durable ceasefire though they get the worst of the fighting. They concentrate their thoughts and resources on the armed

[1] "The Future of Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970.

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struggle at the expense of many things which need to be done at home. The result is that they fail in both areas. King Hussein in Jordan and the government of Lebanon are unable to control the Palestinian fedayeen movements, with which they must negotiate as with sovereign powers. Even Nasser, though not directly threatened by the fedayeen, feels pressure to carry on the fight because he has clung to the role of leader of the Arab world.

What we are likely to see among the Arabs as time goes on is a turning of the forces of frustration and violence inward, into internal revolutions and intensification of inter-Arab strife. New governments appearing on the scene cannot be expected to be more moderate than those they replace. Certainly they will not be in Jordan and Lebanon if present trends continue. In Syria and Iraq it is established practice that each new revolutionary government promises ever more intense prosecution of the struggle against Israel. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cannot be regarded as immune to these trends, especially after what has happened in Sudan and Libya. Their oil wealth and their economic relations with the West have given them a relatively high level of prosperity, and their financial support of the U.A.R. and Jordan and the Palestinian fedayeen may give them some insurance against radical forces, but over time they are bound to be vulnerable for the same reasons.

The Palestinian resistance organizations, judging by their methods and their ultimate aims, will only magnify the difficulties and increase the tension within the Arab world. The more radical of them are working to "liberate" not only Palestine from Zionism but Arab countries from their "reactionary" régimes, including Nasser's. These organizations feel they have nothing to lose from violence and turmoil; they gain encouragement from the continuing impotence of Arab governments and from increasing unrest among the Arabs under Israel's control.

It is often said that only the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli can settle the Palestine problem, and this proposition may ultimately prove true. If a binational or federal solution was at least a possibility before 1948, however, it appears to have been buried under the events of the intervening years. Recently, similar ideas have been discussed in Israel and among Arab intellectuals in places like Tunis and Beirut. But the only effective leadership the Palestinian Arabs have lies in the fedayeen organizations. Probably it would take a series of cataclysmic events to make

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possible a real search on both sides for a basis for compromise. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Arabs have proved that they exist as a nation, or as a branch of the Arab nation, which will have to be taken into account by the Arab governments, by Israel, and by outside powers.

To sum up the Arabs' general plight, while they may take comfort in contemplating Israel's present and potential difficulties, they cannot expect alone to defeat Israel. So long as they cannot gain equality of military capability but continue to base policies on the illusion of doing so, they cannot break out of the cycle of thought and action which is self-destructive as well as inimical to reconciliation and peace. Probably it will take positive action on the part of others stronger and less tortured than themselves—say Israel, or the international community, or the Soviet Union—to turn them in more constructive directions. Of these the Soviet Union, which has fed Arab hopes but also at times restrained them, may have the crucial role to play.

IV

The Soviet role in the Middle East is indeed the question of the day. The commitment of Soviet combat personnel to the fighting in Egypt came as a rude shock to the United States. Coming on top of the build-up of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, the massive arms deliveries to Nasser, the sending of military advisers in the thousands to the U.A.R. and Syria, the use of naval facilities in those two countries and perhaps in Algeria, and the signs of Soviet interest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean, it added force to the arguments of those who had been pointing to those events as proof of a firm Soviet strategy to dominate the Middle East and as signs of forthcoming disaster for the United States and Western Europe if they did not wake up.

The remedies proposed range from massive aid to Israel, in order to keep the Arabs and Soviets at bay, to the virtual abandonment of Israel, in order to preserve and regain positions in the Arab world rapidly falling into Soviet hands. Mr. George W. Ball has advocated a showdown with the Soviet Union not unlike the Cuban affair of 1962, to call a halt to their recklessness and compel the withdrawal of their combat units from Egypt.[2] Israeli advocacy and inspired stories from Washington

[2] "Suez is the Front to Watch," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 28, 1970.

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have harped on the same theme. Any proposals for American policy, particularly such drastic ones as these, should rest, of course, on the best estimate we can make of Soviet policies.

After the Six Day War, Moscow made the decision to restore its shaken position in the Arab world by rearming the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq, and by giving all-out political and diplomatic support to the Arab campaign for the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. The main purpose behind that decision was the same that lay behind Soviet policy before 1967: to build a political base for influence in the Arab world and for the growth of Soviet power in the Middle East, taking advantage of the sapping effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the American position there. Soviet willingness to see a political settlement, as evidenced by support of the U.N. resolution of November 1967, by participation in later negotiations with the Western powers, and by many public statements, should be interpreted in the light of that purpose. The Soviet leaders have ideas of their own on what a reasonable settlement would be and are willing to talk about details but not to press on the Arab states (and particularly on Nasser) terms which the latter find objectionable. It is significant that Soviet terms include the two vital points of Israeli withdrawal and Arab acceptance of Israel's existence, but the withdrawal must be total and the nature of the acceptance is left vague.

Moscow's attitudes toward the Palestinian fedayeen organizations expose a Soviet dilemma. When the fedayeen leapt into the spotlight through raids and bombings and their growing influence in Arab countries, the Soviets gave them public praise but clearly preferred to see them under the control of Arab governments rather than acting as a freewheeling force unconcerned with Soviet interests and more inclined to look to Peking than to Moscow. More recently they have given greater recognition to the fedayeen movements, talked of support, established communication with some of their leaders, and may be dealing with them through communist channels, but they have neither established a program of direct arms aid nor backed the political aim of destroying the state of Israel. The ambivalence remains. The Soviet Union is conservative in wishing to base its influence on reasonably stable Arab governments rather than risk entanglement in the revolutionary and factional struggles of the unpredictable Palestinians. But it does not want to be left behind if

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the latter carve out for themselves a significant role in determining the Arab future.

For the Soviets the main front in the Middle East is the battleline between the U.A.R. and Israel; that is one point on which their view is in accord with Israel's. The entire Soviet position in the region rests on the U.A.R. and the Nasser régime. Thus in the situation of last spring when Israeli aircraft were ranging at will over Egyptian territory, bombing within a few miles of Cairo, the Soviet leaders on receiving Nasser's desperate plea must have felt they had no alternative to use of their own combat units to prevent his total humiliation and possible fall. Was this an essentially defensive move to stabilize a worsening situation or the first of a number of moves aimed at shifting the military balance, turning the tide of war against Israel, and forcing the United States out of the Middle East? Their going along with the ceasefire proposal is no solid proof either way.

Soviet policy since 1967 has been successful in that Soviet influence is stronger than ever in the U.A.R. and has made inroads in surrounding Arab countries, all without great risk of a crisis or threat of war with the United States. Yet the future holds no assurance that events will move only in that same direction and at no greater risk. The Soviets have used the Arabs but have also been used by them, and have come to depend on them. They have made heavy political and economic investments in Egypt, in Syria and Iraq, and in radical and socialist elements in general. They do not, however, dominate any Arab state. They have to negotiate with Abdel Nasser, not just give him orders. They cannot control the upheavals of Arab politics; they cannot be sure that pro-Soviet régimes or individuals will stay in power; they cannot hope for immunity from the forces of Arab nationalism which can assert themselves against Russia as they have against the West; they may find themselves blamed for economic failures despite the aid they have provided. They may also see their involvement gradually, almost unwittingly, deepened to the point of placing them at the mercy of decisions made not in Moscow but in Jerusalem or Cairo. Above all, they do not wish to be faced with the dilemmas another all-out Arab-Israeli war would pose.

Soviet foreign policy, moreover, does not exist in isolated geographic compartments. The Middle East is not the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union, to borrow the language of the

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abortive Nazi-Soviet negotiations of 1940 often cited to prove that it is. It is important for security reasons, being located on Russia's doorstep, and as a route to the expansion of military and political influence to the regions beyond. But the Soviet régime throughout its history has been more vitally concerned with Europe and East Asia. It would not be likely to engage its power in the Middle East without regard to aims, risks, and possible setbacks on those other two fronts, any more than it would do so without regard to crucial aspects of the relationship with the United States.

As yet we have seen no specific evidence to the effect that the dispute with China or events in Europe or the status of relations with the United States on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or Southeast Asia have put limits on Soviet activity in the Middle East. Yet such developments as a heightening of the conflict with China, a new challenge to Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, or a crisis with the West over Berlin should lead to greater caution in Soviet Middle East policy. At the least the need for a secure rear in coping with China weighs heavily in Kremlin thinking.

The Soviet leadership will change and Soviet policy in the Middle East will not be immune to change. Though we cannot predict such matters as the factional line-ups, the record of the past justifies the following conclusions on how Soviet political leaders have seen and probably will continue to see the situation in the Middle East: (a) they will take opportunities, and even make some, to reduce American positions and influence, and will push ahead with the expansion of their naval presence in the region and their political footholds in Arab countries; (b) they will play the game of competition, however, in the knowledge that they have neither local military superiority nor overall strategic superiority; (c) they will be sensitive to American moves which affect the local balance and the relative positions of the two great powers; and (d) while polarization of alignments has brought them benefits, they are wary of its passing the point where they are deprived of freedom of choice, and they will continually reassess their support and commitments to the Arabs in the light of Soviet rather than Arab interests.

At a time of apparent American uncertainty the Soviet leaders may not be inclined to show caution until events persuade them to do so. But it is hard to see any absolutes in Soviet policy—any

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imperatives derived from Leninism or the heritage of the tsars —driving them to the goal of domination of the Middle East. They have a sounder sense of their own limitations in coping with Middle Eastern nations and with rival powers than do observers in the United States who speak of imminent Soviet mastery of the Mediterranean, of a joint Soviet-Arab assault on Israel to destroy its independence, of the danger of Soviet control of all the oil of the Middle East and North Africa, and of Soviet domination of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean once the Suez Canal is reopened. Could the Soviets control the Arab world after a victory over Israel any more than they control it today? We should not underestimate Soviet gains, actual and potential, but the picture of a Middle East in which Turkey, Iran and all the Arab states are serving as docile instruments of the U.S.S.R., with no other power on the horizon, belongs in the realm of fantasy.

V

Putting the Soviet threat into realistic perspective does not mean that the present situation is not full of danger or that the United States can afford a policy of complacency or indifference. The present moment, because of the bold Soviet move in using its own combat forces in Egypt, requires a firmness and a specificity of policy which the United States has not previously shown. But it also requires a long-range approach in which current moves and proposals will logically fit.

First come the elements of a declaratory policy, points which the United States should put on the record as its views and positions for the future peace and security of the region. They have to do with the framework of an Arab-Israeli settlement, establishing an American position that will be there for both sides and for the world to see. It may seem paradoxical to admit that an early settlement is not likely and then in the same breath propose that the principles of a sound settlement guide our current policies, but it is the only way to avoid foreclosing the future and to take account of our interests on both sides. Some major points have been put forward in the Rogers speech of December 9, 1969, and elsewhere. With due regard to the state of negotiations under Jarring's auspices, they should be completed by new statements so that the picture would look something like this:

(a) Arab acceptance of Israel as a sovereign state and Israeli withdrawal

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to agreed state frontiers described below, set forth in binding obligations (the two points being inseparably linked but with some flexibility in timing to make it easier for both sides to carry them out).

(b) State frontiers to be the lines of June 4, 1967, with certain specific exceptions: minor adjustments in the border between Israel and the West Bank (whether the latter is Jordan or Arab Palestine); special international status for East Jerusalem, the detailed legal and other aspects of which would be left to consideration among the many parties concerned; special status for the Gaza Strip (*e.g.* U.N. administration) for a period of about 10 years; the Golan Heights to be returned to Syria, but only after Syrian acceptance of the U.N. resolution of November 1967 and of the other points of settlement.

(c) Demilitarized zones on both sides of the frontiers, including total demilitarization of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the Sharm-el-Sheikh area; U.N. observers and peacekeeping forces in all demilitarized zones, subject to withdrawal only with the consent of the Security Council.

(d) Acceptance of Israel's right to navigate the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran on a basis of equality with other states.

(e) Recognition of the right of the Arab people of Palestine to existence as a nation and to compensation for their privations as refugees, within the framework of a peace settlement as outlined here, but with no unlimited right of return to Israel.

(f) International guarantees of the settlement, within the framework of which there would be a U.S. guarantee to Israel.

By taking the role of advocate of a fair settlement not tied to either side and obviously not based on tactical considerations, the United States would be presenting to Israel, the Arabs and the Soviet Union an alternative to their present policies. Let these terms sink into the minds of the respective leaderships and of those in their societies who may make themselves heard in the future. The vital points among the terms are the first and the last. The first gives us the best basis for decisions, policies and actions on such specific issues as cooling off the conflict, arms deliveries to the parties, and forward movement on disputed questions such as the Arab refugees. The last point stresses the international framework necessary to any settlement, including the close involvement of the United Nations as has been the case since 1947; and the added factor, an American guarantee, may be the one thing that would make possible Israel's acceptance.

So far as an approach to the Arabs is concerned, America has less chance of influencing them than any of the other parties, but a primary task is to keep in communication with them. It must approach them against the background of a position on Israeli withdrawal which is clear, is not tied to a set of known or unknown Israeli conditions and procedures, and depends only on

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explicit Arab acceptance of Israel. That last point is the one which Arab governments have found so difficult to swallow, although they admit they have accepted the existence of Israel de facto since 1949. Some flexibility on how their formal acceptance is expressed is possible, but there is no getting around the basic requirement. On the other side of the equation, the U.S. position on Israeli withdrawal should help put to rest Arab charges and fears concerning past or future American support of Israeli expansion. Except for areas with special international status, Arab rights to all territories conquered in 1967 would be accepted; the "minor adjustments" would be reciprocal concessions to straighten the line as at Latrun, not cession of large pieces of territory on grounds of military security. And the United States should leave no doubt, while the question of withdrawal is pending, of its total opposition to any extension of Israeli occupation into territory beyond the present ceasefire lines.

These considerations will make no impression on Palestinian resistance leaders and others dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel. Yet it is important to see that the message gets to them and to all Palestinian Arabs, especially those living in the occupied territories. The message is a double one, half encouraging and half limiting: the United States recognizes their right to self-expression as a people, but it does not accept the proposition of the disappearance of Israel. The implication is that the Palestinian Arabs are entitled to find their future on that part of the territory of Palestine which was not part of Israel before the war of 1967.

While declarations will not present the Arabs with the fact of Israeli withdrawal, such a clarification of its position might enable the United States to widen and deepen its contacts in the Arab world and to discuss such matters as economic coöperation without raising the charge that it is trying to bribe the Arabs into acceptance of Israel's occupation or Israel's terms for peace. It is a way of giving Arab governments which may be looking for it some counterweight to overdependence on the Soviet Union.

The danger is that revolutionary turmoil and general frustration will deny to any outside power the ability to control the situation, with the result that Arab irresponsibility will provoke heavy use of Israeli force and possible further outside intervention. We will not gain by encouraging strife or mixing into inter-Arab struggles, such as by backing the conservative Arab

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régimes against the radicals, a strategy which has been tried and found wanting before. It is not in our interest to see the Arab countries, including those whose governments now denounce us, sink into disorder. They should know that American coöperation toward a fair settlement and in coping with economic ills will be available to Arab leadership prepared to face up to those problems.

If the United States has to show the Arabs it is not 100 percent on the Israeli side, it also has to get the same point across in Israel. Israel's leaders regard the Arab governments (especially Nasser's) and the Soviet Union as pursuing a common policy aimed at undermining and probably destroying the security and even the existence of the Israeli state. Feeling the need of American support, they have an interest in polarization of the conflict, so that Israel and the United States stand on one side opposing the Arabs and Russia on the other; not wanting America to fight but merely to hold the ring. A strong case can be and has been made that this country can best serve peace and its own interests by accepting that situation as reality, like it or not, and providing Israel with the arms it needs to keep its superiority.

The main points of the argument are the following: it is hopeless to try to appease the Arabs or the Soviets, both of whom are trying to get us to put pressure on Israel to make concessions, which will only be followed by more pressure for further concessions; Israel is capable of keeping the present favorable balance and can continue to do so with American arms aid; in playing this role Israel blocks the U.S.S.R. and its Arab clients from expanding their power and dominating the Middle East, while it encourages pro-Western states like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to hold their own; Israel is friendly to the United States and a democracy, thus a stronger reed to rely on than the Arab states are for anybody.

Such a policy, however, has pitfalls which far outweigh its possible advantages; sharp polarization of the conflict, leaving the Soviets little choice but further commitment and escalation on the Arab side; loss of control over decisions which could bring us to the brink of war; setbacks to the chances for agreement with the U.S.S.R. on arms limitation and other matters; loss of positions, interests and contacts throughout the Arab world; increasing international isolation on this issue and alienation from NATO partners, who are disturbed about Soviet penetration in

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the Mediterranean and Middle East but do not see all-out support of Israel as the answer to it.

Not that past policy is an infallible guide to the requirements of the future, but undivided support for one side in the conflict, especially in a phase of warfare of indefinite duration, would be a departure from the past quarter-century of American policy. It would forsake the approach not only of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the Eisenhower-Dulles "impartiality," but also that of 1967–68 when we took Israel's side against those insisting on unconditional return to the status quo, taking it as a means of promoting a more durable settlement, not of establishing an alignment with Israel to protect its gains.

The crucial points of American policy toward Israel have to do with what kind of support and for what purpose. There is no denying that a balance exists in the Middle East in which Israel's power plays a part. The fact that a state friendly to the United States holds military superiority over states which have become clients of the Soviet Union has left us better off than if the balance had been reversed. Moreover, the United States has an interest in—some would say a commitment to—the independence of Israel, and if the latter's military position deteriorates, we may be confronted at a later time with desperate decisions on military intervention to rescue Israel which could have been avoided by timely support to enable the Israeli to hold their own. Faced by these factors and also by those counseling against a one-sided policy, the United States has not been sure of the principles and standards against which to measure its actions.

The soundest guidelines for that purpose are two: first, to keep in the forefront of thinking the basis on which a peaceful settlement in the Middle East must rest; and second, to move the level of military conflict downward and not upward. Thus, the United States will continue to be concerned about Israel's security, but it need not and should not give uncritical support to whatever Israel does to maintain it. Such actions as bombing close to Cairo or Damascus or heavy raids into Lebanon and Jordan achieved little other than increased Arab hostility, greater Soviet involvement, and alienation of world opinion. We are in a false position if we do not differentiate between support for Israel's survival and support for its existing strategy, between the need for a durable settlement and support of policies which by freezing the status quo make it impossible.

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If the United States wishes to discourage Israel from a strategy aimed only at keeping existing advantages while trying to force the Arabs into making peace, which is but a vain hope, it has to be discriminating in its decisions on the supply of weapons. To fill Israel's periodic requests merely perpetuates a situation in which Israel finds no reason to modify its political line or its military strategy; the result is to bring the Soviets into the field to redress the balance, and that in turn brings Israeli requests for more effective weapons to contend with the Russians as well as the Arabs. This cycle of escalation must be stopped short of disaster. To check it requires American influence and pressure on the Russians and the Arabs, to the degree it can be exercised, but also influence on Israel, which can be exerted through policy on requests for arms. The United States can make some different choices of weapons to be made available: for example, fewer Phantoms and more shorter-range aircraft, antiaircraft missiles, and equipment for defense on the ground. It has already begun to relate decisions on arms requests to its own estimates, rather than Israel's, of the military balance in the area. There is no reason not to relate them to general policy considerations as well.

Similar considerations apply to the effectiveness of a ceasefire. It would certainly be desirable if the opposing forces will hold their fire and cool off a bit. But a fundamental difficulty confronts any attempt to build a stable situation or a peacekeeping structure on the inviolability of the ceasefire lines. Agreement to stop the fighting on the basis of the status quo, unless there are signs of progress in the peace talks, is bound to appear to the Arabs as a confirmation of Israel's presence in the occupied territories for an indefinite period. The sound argument to be made to them is not to accept formal stabilization of the status quo, but to accept the existence of Israel as the only way they can get back the occupied territories.

On the political side, matching a shift to a more defensive military strategy, a turn in the direction of Israel's policy could make a great contribution to the chances for settlement. It could begin with an indication of willingness to withdraw from the occupied territories (with certain specific exceptions and safeguards such as those mentioned above), on condition of formal recognition and acceptance of Israel by the Arab states. Israeli attitudes to date should leave us in no doubt as to the reception such a suggestion from the United States would have in Jeru-

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salem. But if our government can take the inevitable domestic pressure, Israel would surely have to take full account of American views whatever they may be. More important in the longer run may be a growing discussion in Israel itself about the wisdom of the current hard-line policies.

In its approach to Israel the United States must take full account of Israel's deep attachment to self-reliance and its lack of faith in the international community when it comes to security and survival. Experiences with armistice arrangements and with the United Nations have been totally disillusioning to Israel, and the crises of 1956–57 and of 1967 have left its leaders highly skeptical of counting on the United States. That is why they put such value on the present "strategic frontiers," even though it seems to others that Israel has less security now than it had with the old pre-1967 borders. And that is why this country, in urging a settlement in which Israel would go back roughly to the old borders, should be prepared to extend a treaty guarantee to defend Israel's independence and integrity within those borders. Neither a blanket guarantee of the settlement by the U.N. Security Council nor an elaborate U.N. peacekeeping structure, both of which are necessary and desirable, would be sufficient. The U.S. government has long considered itself to have a moral guarantee to Israel's independent existence. It is quite likely that this vague commitment carries a greater risk of dangerous military involvement than would a solemn specific obligation clear to Israeli, to Arabs, and to Russians alike.

VI

These considerations on dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict are obviously pertinent to the larger question of the threat to American security from the intrusion of Soviet power into the Middle East, and to the thesis that we are faced with a possible shift in the global balance of power, perhaps even a 1962 Cuban crisis in reverse. The United States has three kinds of objectives in dealing with the Soviets in the Middle East. One is to limit the growth of their power and keep a balance which prevents their dominance. The second is to limit their participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict so that it does not threaten Israel's independence or dangerously widen the war. The third is to preserve the channel for negotiation and the search for areas of agreement. We should not put aside any of these objectives.

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It is a natural reaction to see in Soviet military moves proof that the era of negotiation is over and the era of confrontation has begun, and to reply with positive action in order to preserve or right the balance. But it seems wiser to continue the attempts to establish priority for the common interest in avoiding wider war. The aim should be to combine warnings of what the United States cannot tolerate—Soviet participation in the war on the Arab side to defeat and destroy the state of Israel—with efforts to create a pattern of restraint by both powers that will temper the extreme aims of the local disputants.

We know that the Soviet Union has not filled Nasser's every request, just as the United States has limited its support of Israel. The Soviet government says that it favors a political settlement and that it accepts Israel's right to exist. That position should continue to be tested and not summarily dismissed. If the main difference between Soviet and U.S. positions lies in the exceptions and conditions surrounding Israeli withdrawal, that surely is a reasonable subject for discussion rather than a "breaking point." If it is necessary to give the Kremlin a sign of American seriousness and determination, the way to do it is not by directly pushing up the level of the Middle East war by large new deliveries of arms to Israel, but through independent and joint moves to strengthen American and NATO positions in nearby areas such as southern Europe, the Mediterranean, Turkey and the Indian Ocean. And Turkey, incidentally, holds the power to block the Straits to Soviet ships.

When we consider what to do to hold down the fighting if the ceasefire runs out or fails, the limits of diplomacy are obvious unless the two powers are able and willing to put pressure on the belligerents. If the United States can show that its attempts to persuade Israel are serious and will have some effect, it can argue strongly to the Soviets that reciprocal moderation must come from the Arab and the Soviet side; that there is no call for the use of Soviet combat personnel in defense of central Egypt when Israel has abandoned its attacks there; and that the restriction of the warfare in the Suez Canal area to essentially defensive operations, with no decisive struggle for control of the air and no attempt by either side to cross the Canal in force, will keep the situation tolerable for both great powers and for the disputants as efforts are made to move further toward political settlement. No formal agreement is necessary for such an

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understanding. Indeed, limitation of fighting by tacit agreement of all concerned may be more effective than a formally accepted ceasefire, which is almost bound to be violated by one side and then by the other amid general recrimination.

If and as negotiations go forward on ways of controlling and containing the conflict, the United States can buttress its arguments for Soviet disengagement by continuing to take the line that both powers should follow a policy of restraint in the supply of weapons, either by agreement or by reciprocal unilateral action. Past efforts to get Moscow to discuss the question have evoked nothing beyond statements that Israel must first withdraw from all Arab territory, and it may well be that the Soviet leaders must be faced with unpleasant alternatives before they will talk seriously. They have, however, even while maintaining the flow of arms to the U.A.R., held back on most weapons which could be called strictly offensive. The warnings and the talk should come first; increased deliveries of American aircraft for Israel or stronger demands in Moscow can come later if they prove necessary.

All these considerations essentially have to do with stopping hostilities short of the point of a big explosion while efforts toward a political settlement go forward. It is difficult enough in view of the interlocking of the local war with the big-power rivalry. It becomes almost impossible in the absence of a reasonable chance of progress toward a settlement. The idea of a comprehensive settlement, a package deal covering boundaries, guarantees, refugees, navigation rights and all the rest, has taken such firm root that governments give little thought to possibilities for partial settlement. One such possibility concerns the Suez Canal, on which a successful initiative might change some of the dimensions of the problem and jolt it out of the present impasse.

The Canal lies at the center of the conflict on the main front. Israel regards it as an essential strategic frontier, and the U.A.R. as the focus of the battle of attrition and a jumping-off place for regaining lost territory. Yet it remains symbolic not as a battlefront but as a closed international highway still important to the commerce of many nations. There has been talk of a mutual withdrawal of forces from the Canal to buttress the new ceasefire. So much the better if that can be accomplished. But why not go further and seek agreement on carrying out the clearance

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and rehabilitation of the Canal under international auspices, with a demilitarized and internationally controlled zone some 30 miles wide on each side, the reopened Canal to be administered by the U.A.R. (which would get the revenues after the costs of rehabilitation had been met), and Israel to enjoy guaranteed freedom of passage along with other states?

The fact that the Soviet Union would gain the means to move ships easily from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean is hardly a strategic change of such magnitude as to outweigh the general benefits to many nations, not to mention the more important factor of a reduction of the fighting and stabilization on the most critical front. Israel would not lose the Canal as a defensive ditch since the Egyptian army would be withdrawn from it on the other side. Egypt would have the satisfaction of seeing a limited pullback of Israeli forces, one which might be the start of a process.

Regardless of its merits and its chances of acceptance, which may be minimal, such a proposal focuses attention on the main question of the American approach to the Middle East. Is Suez our Thermopylae? Is the United States to move to a showdown with the Soviet Union on such a point as maintenance of Israel's air superiority over Egyptian territory west of the Canal as the key to blocking Soviet domination of the Middle East? Or is it going to use the present critical situation to push toward widening areas of agreement between the Arab states and Israel and between itself and the Soviet Union? If the showdown comes, let it be because the Soviets chose to wreck the chances of reconciliation and fair settlement.

Diplomacy has had a chance and has not succeeded, but it needs more chances. Egypt's and Israel's acceptance of a temporary ceasefire and a new round with Jarring, difficult decisions which meant a break with extreme elements on both sides, may provide some. In any case it is quite possible that some of the parties involved in the Middle East tangle—Israel and the Soviet Union above all—may be near or at the crest of success gained by their policies since the Six Day War. It could be somewhat different when they look down the other side.

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SOVIET POLICIES SOUTH AND EAST OF SUEZ

By T. B. Millar

WHATEVER objectives the Soviet Union may have in the eastern Mediterranean, they must be presumed to be part of wider policies, and inevitably the effects of activities there extend far beyond the states immediately concerned.

The sizable Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, coupled with access by the Soviet air force to bases in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere in North Africa, has changed the balance of forces in the region, making it quite quickly an area of confrontation comparable in many ways with that in continental Europe. Perhaps it is more dangerous because less easily delineated, and because it is tied into a passionate gladiatorial contest which neither the Russians nor the Americans can be wholly confident of controlling. The Israelis obviously, but also the Jugoslavs and Turks, must sleep less soundly in their beds.

An examination of Soviet foreign policies since World War II suggests a readiness to take advantage of Western weakness wherever it occurs, both to further specific Soviet interests and to improve the Soviet-Western ratio. Concessions and mutually helpful arrangements are almost invariably accompanied by pressure exerted or tension generated somewhere else. While some observers saw the American intrusion into Cambodia as a "signal" for Moscow's Middle East policy-makers that the United States is prepared to take strong measures if necessary, it is hard to see how this could have been convincing, especially in the light of the subsequent American withdrawal back into Vietnam and the delayed and limited American reaction to Soviet installation of surface-to-air missiles near the Suez Canal and to Soviet pilots flying MIG 21s in the same area. Surely these Soviet actions constituted a much stronger signal in the other direction, advising the United States post hoc of a new level of Soviet involvement in an area which has become—by accident, evolution, circumstances or design—of more significance to Moscow than to Washington, except perhaps in terms of a highly unlikely (because mutually undesirable) ultimate superpower confrontation.

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Diplomatic advantage with the Arab states, political leverage with their most charismatic and influential leader, an improved military position, an opportunity to discomfort the West—these do not seem sufficient to explain the immense military and psychological commitments that the Soviet Union has made in the United Arab Republic. It cannot be a coincidence that the line dividing the combatants, the rectification of which the Russians are making possible, is along the world's most important man-made waterway, which reduces by several thousand miles the trip between the Black Sea and the northwestern Indian Ocean. It is not, of course, the most important waterway for the Soviet Union, currently or potentially. Before its closure in 1967, only a small fraction of Soviet trade went through the Suez Canal; this would not significantly increase if the Canal were reopened in the near future, although Russian fishing vessels and merchant ships carrying other people's trade are increasingly operating in the Indian Ocean. From the Soviet viewpoint, it must be seen primarily for its strategic value, and this raises the whole question of Soviet policies in the Persian or Arabian Gulf and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean area.

The Canal is only part of the passage between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—100 miles out of 1,200. Nowhere along the Red Sea are the Russians as involved or as influential as they are in the U.A.R., except perhaps in the Red Sea's southeast corner. Soviet arms—even for a time Soviet pilots—have made possible the republican ascendancy in the Yemen, and the port at Hodeida was rebuilt with Soviet assistance. Continued Soviet access here, at Aden and at Berbera on the opposite coast where the harbors and docks are being or have been improved by the Russians, must be assumed. Back in Egypt, they are building a new fishing port in the Gulf of Suez. They have become the principal supplier of arms to the Sudan. Relations with Saudi Arabia, the only other Arab state in the area, have been less cordial.

The Russians have thus not replaced the British in any formal sense. Their presence is more precarious; they are invited guests, resident or nonresident protectors, money-lenders: they have no constitutional authority or power. This makes them less an object of nationalist antagonism, but equally makes their tenure less secure. They have nevertheless replaced the British to this extent, especially due to their assured access to Egyptian air and naval

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bases: they have become the predominant external power from Port Said to Aden and Somalia.

That situation will probably although not necessarily continue if or when the Canal is reopened; presumably it is designed partly to *get* the Canal reopened. But whatever local resistance there may be to Soviet involvement, no other major power is likely to intervene. All have managed to adjust reasonably comfortably to the closure of the Canal. Unlike the Soviet Union, none believes it has a major interest in it. None is near to it. None is expanding its interests or activities in the Indian Ocean. Only France has a residual presence, in French Somaliland, opposite the southwest tip of the Arabian peninsula. It is important, in present circumstances, that this remain in French hands.

II

Strategic interests and commitments, like trash, do tend to accumulate rather than to be deliberately acquired—to derive from many small decisions or events rather than a single grand initiative. Activity does not always denote intent. Traders go off on their own looking for markets or raw materials and end up with colonies which require protection; forces may be created for one purpose and when that is served may be employed, because they exist, for another. An innocuous acquisition in which someone else becomes interested assumes strategic importance. And so on.

While with the Soviet Union we can discount the individualistic merchant mariner, we cannot discount the idea that a part of a large navy created to meet the cold-war situation in the North Atlantic may be diverted to other areas as the European climate improves and as opportunities occur elsewhere. Taking this further, it seems likely that the Russians have finally come to see the possibilities of deploying power, envisaged and created for the defense of their continental interests, in more remote maritime areas, from which the British or the Americans are withdrawing.

What are the Russians actually doing in the Indian Ocean area? It is not easy to be sure either what or why. If we consider simply naval activities, there seems to be a small continuing presence, although the number of ships has risen to at least 25 on occasion. There has been one space recovery in the Ocean, and other special space-monitoring operations. There have been

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several extensive flag-showing tours by a small group of surface ships and submarines. During the large Soviet naval exercises earlier this year, most of which took place elsewhere, a destroyer flotilla was deployed in the Indian Ocean. Oceanographic, hydrographic and intelligence vessels are reported from time to time. All this does not amount to a major naval effort, and is less than the British have had or the French still have at times. The ships are without air cover. They could of course be reinforced, but most easily when the Canal is reopened. One can hardly credit that an Australian foreign minister should have lost his seat and office after saying, just before the federal election last year, that Australians should not panic at the sight of Russians in the Indian Ocean.

Yet modest though the Soviet naval presence may be—and we cannot be certain it is not larger than reported—its significance lies in four facts: (a) it represents a new initiative begun less than three years ago, and thus a new policy; (b) quite modest naval forces, judiciously used, can have quite substantial political effects; (c) there will apparently be decreasing competition from Western powers and their navies;[1] and (d) the Soviet naval presence must be considered in conjunction with its other activities in the region.

The most significant of these have been in the subcontinent which dominates the Ocean and after which it is named. India cannot want to depend unduly for its security on any single external power, but must feel it has had little alternative to Soviet support. Prior to the war with Pakistan in 1965, it drew arms from both Western and communist countries; when the Western supplies were cut off (from both India and Pakistan), India turned more solidly to the Soviet Union, and Pakistan to the Chinese People's Republic. Britain was unable to provide submarines on terms apparently as favorable as those of the Soviet Union, and thus India became a client of Russia not only for submarines but for escorts, torpedo boats and patrol boats, and for the training of their crews and the refurbishing and expansion of the base at Vishakhapatnam, on the east coast. The Indian air force is now predominantly supplied with Soviet aircraft, including MIG 21s made in India, and is considered the Indian service most oriented toward the Soviet Union. There is some

[1] The presence of a few American Polaris submarines and a small surface squadron does not explain the variety of Soviet activities indicated here.

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Soviet equipment in the army, and senior officers have attended training courses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Behind this situation lies what is for India an inescapable reality. The 1965 war demonstrated that the Indian armed forces could meet Pakistani attacks, but did not eliminate the humiliating memories of China's successful if limited invasion three years earlier. Since then China has become a nuclear power of growing sophistication. The principal external threat to India's security, as it sees it, is from communist China, either on its own or in conjunction with Pakistan. The British, however sympathetic they may once have been, are no longer capable of rendering significant help in the event of a second Chinese attack. The United States is reducing its commitments in Asia, and is seeking better relations with China. Only the Soviet Union seems able to supply aid in the desired quantity, prepared to give assurances, chronically antagonistic to Chinese policies, and ready at least along its own border to engage in conflict to contain the Chinese. And the stronger military relationship with the Russians satisfies elements in the Indian parliament whose support the Congress Party needs at times.

Since the Tashkent meeting in January 1966, the Soviet Union has increasingly participated in the management of relations between India and Pakistan, and has done so more successfully than Britain, the United States or the United Nations. This is partly because it has a more direct interest; partly because the two states—and particularly India—have nowhere else to turn; and partly because Soviet pragmatism is less affected by moral doubts and less ruffled by subcontinental passions. Soviet military aid to Pakistan, which was negotiated by the present Pakistani president in his previous position as commander-in-chief of the army, was not pressed upon an unwilling Pakistani government. It suited Pakistan because it filled gaps in Soviet-type arms (including spares and replacements) obtained from China,[2] and because it discomfited India. It suited the Russians because it made Pakistan less dependent on China, and gave the Soviet government increased diplomatic leverage in Rawalpindi. Indians objected, but with far less volume and stridency than was ever the case with American military aid to Pakistan.

[2] The cultural revolution affected Chinese production of military equipment, as of other industrial goods, and export deliveries have been and still are far behind contract in many items.

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So long as the Soviet government is able to maintain its influence in both states, presumably it will do its utmost to prevent intracontinental conflict, which weakens both vis-à-vis China, and severely damages their economies, thus destroying most if not all of the value of foreign aid received. But influence is not usually a sufficient return on investment. Have the Russians received a more tangible quid pro quo from India or Pakistan? Neither of them nor the Soviet Union would be likely to acknowledge it. Suggestions that the Soviet navy has been given "bases" in India in Bombay, Goa, Cochin or the Andamans—or at Gwadar in Pakistan—have been strongly denied. But it is not denied that Soviet ships have access to some Indian dockyards and associated facilities in ways they did not have until recently. Soviet help to improve Gwadar, located near the Gulf of Oman, may be related to its use as a fishing port, but some Soviet fishing vessels are known to be used for military purposes, especially intelligence. Indians—one suspects with tongue in cheek—have certainly been vocal about this new Soviet "base." While there are no Soviet bases as such in the subcontinent, the strategic changes are dramatic compared with only a few years ago, when American reconnaissance aircraft flew out of Peshawar, when Western powers supplied or sold the bulk of all arms used in both countries, and when Soviet naval ships were never seen in the Indian Ocean's warm water ports.

III

A third key area is the junction between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Soviet and East European arms aid to Indonesia made possible its "confrontation" with Malaysia and Singapore in 1963–66, and made certain the collapse and continued weakness of the Indonesian economy. Whatever Soviet objectives were at that time, they failed. Sukarno's objectives, using Soviet weaponry, included the dismemberment of the Malaysian federation and Indonesian domination of the area, including the vital Strait of Malacca. Soon after the collapse of confrontation, the Soviet Union began to mend its fences with Malaysia and Singapore. It established trading missions, then embassies; it negotiated trade, shipping and airline agreements. It offered arms to Malaysia on favorable terms; it obtained access to Singapore's ship-repair yards, and apparently sought but failed to obtain the right to build its own facilities in the area. Again, the

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change in four years is dramatic. In Indonesia the Soviets have not regained the position they enjoyed before Sukarno began flirting with the Chinese, but neither have they sought to do so, perhaps believing that the political climate is too unfavorable, or that instability is endemic and there is no point in sending "good money after bad." By concentrating on the army and leaving sophisticated Soviet naval and air equipment to rust, President Suharto has virtually eliminated any dependence on Soviet goodwill other than to "reschedule" inherited debts.

The British Conservative government's decision to retain forces in the Malaysian area after 1971 may have affected Soviet plans (if any) for naval or military involvement there, but they will not greatly ameliorate the economic difficulties caused by Britain's retrenchments in the two states. Here the new trade agreements, Soviet purchases of Malaysian rubber (it is the largest buyer) and use of Singapore's repair and replenishment facilities, are tangible gains. When the British finally go home, perhaps accompanied off the peninsula and island by the Australians and New Zealanders, Singapore may well find the Soviet Union the only major power interested in paying for the services the small nation has to offer, built up by the British and by local industriousness over 150 years, and now suitable for an expanded Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.

Like the Suez Canal when open, the Malacca Strait is used for the passage of naval and mercantile shipping between the eastern and western Soviet Union (other than during the brief summer period when the northern route is open), and for Soviet supplies of arms and equipment to the communist forces in Vietnam and Laos. It will not have escaped the Soviet Union that about 90 percent of Japan's oil also travels through the Strait.

A fourth key area, especially as long as Suez is closed, is the region of sea lanes around South Africa, used by some 24,000 ships each year. In this respect, the Soviet "fishing" agreement with Mauritius, negotiated in 1969 and signed this year, is of special interest. The agreement provides for Soviet assistance to the Mauritian fishing industry and the creation of a joint enterprise. In return, Soviet fishing vessels are entitled to use Port Louis for loading and unloading, replenishment, repairs and replacement of crews brought in by the Soviet airline Aeroflot.

This appears a fairly thin end of an uncertain wedge, but should be seen less in the context of the present situation, when

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Mauritius retains close links with Britain, than with the situation possible in a few years' time. The Mauritian economy, and especially its export income, is heavily dependent on sugar. The greater part of this is sold to the United Kingdom at preferential (inflated) prices under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Most of the rest is sold, at world prices, to Britain and Canada. The agreement runs until 1974, but before then Britain could have entered the European Economic Community and had to forfeit Commonwealth preferential arrangements.

On Mauritius there is a British naval radio station, covered by an agreement that also runs until 1974 and thereafter until terminated by either party on one year's notice. Whether or not Britain will have a need for such a station by the mid-1970s, and whether or not Sir S. Ramgoolam's successors in the Prime Ministership will be agreeable to Britain's remaining, the Russians can scarcely fail to be interested in this very useful equipment or site.

Soviet naval ships, including a helicopter carrier, have been reported taking an interest in the Mauritian-owned islands of Saint Brandon, 250 miles to the north, and the Chagos Archipelago, the British islands in the central Indian Ocean which are available for use by the United States. Soviet mooring buoys have been laid in the Mozambique Channel and elsewhere, perhaps to facilitate submarine refueling. Further north, Soviet technicians have expanded and modernized the port of Mogadishu, in Somalia. The Soviet Union is the principal supplier of arms to Somalia, and has also given military aid to Tanzania, Uganda and militant African nationalist groups.

The two helicopter carriers, *Moskva* and *Leningrad,* the recently created naval infantry, and a developing "fleet train," or float support capacity, have made the Soviet Union able, to an extent at least as great as the United Kingdom, to intervene at a distance. Presumably there will be more carriers built, some of which might take V/STOL aircraft. Access to a range of port facilities around the Indian Ocean has helped with problems of replenishment and crew recreation. If land-based air supply or support ever seem requisite, the groundwork has already been laid for access to appropriate airfields.

IV

The one area where we might have expected the Russians to

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be especially active, but where they have not, is the Persian or Arabian Gulf. There could be a simple explanation: the British have been there for many years, and under the Wilson government had decided to leave by the end of 1971. There was no point in raising suspicions of Soviet intentions while there were British forces there, suspicions which might induce them to remain. Another conceivable explanation is that the Russians are not especially interested in the Gulf and the Persian and Arabian oil wealth. This is only just conceivable, although some observers believe that the Soviet Union has an abundant supply of oil for the indefinite future. Even if this were true, which is disputable, it would not affect the worldwide strategic importance of the Middle East oil industry,[3] the desirability of obtaining access to the world's cheapest oil and so conserving national resources, and the fact that many of the Soviet Union's new oil discoveries have been made thousands of miles from its industrial West and from the oil-importing countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union has by no means ignored Iran and the Arab oil states in recent diplomacy. It has long had more than a diplomatic interest in Iraq and Iran, and Soviet forces left the latter after World War II only reluctantly. Oil and natural gas are being supplied by overland pipes from both states, and both are the recipients of Soviet economic and military aid, as well as straight investment. Soviet naval ships have shown the flag in the Gulf. Among the smaller Gulf states, Britain's political patronage and modest military presence have maintained internal and international peace. Perhaps one of the most unfortunate acts of the Wilson government was to announce the end of this relatively inexpensive operation, long before there had been any local demand for it. It is too early to see how much British presence and influence Mr. Heath can salvage. The Labour policy appears to have been based on two assumptions: that any British presence in the Gulf is bound before long to stimulate nationalist sentiment and anti-British feeling; and that investment which cannot be protected by local indigenous governments cannot be

[3] The development of new oil fields, especially in North and West Africa, have reduced Western Europe's dependence on Middle East oil, but it still amounts to 45 percent of all oil imports. If the Suez Canal had not been closed, most of this would have gone through the Canal. An Israeli pipeline from the Gulf of Aqaba has been constructed and the U.A.R. is in the process of building one from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean. But even if the Canal were reopened, supertankers would still make it profitable to use the Cape route.

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protected by a remote and alien one. There is just enough truth in these propositions in general to make them almost wholly misleading in particular cases. As the Shaikh of Dubai said to the London *Times* correspondent, "Who asked them to leave?"

The federal proposals made by Britain for the small states of the area appear as precarious as they have been elsewhere. In view of the substantial and highly profitable British and other Western oil investment in the region, and the various irredentist and chauvinistic claims by states at present restrained by Britain, a precipitate British withdrawal would be unfortunate, leaving openings for alternative protection and political management, and local expropriation of Western assets.

This might not significantly affect the flow of oil to the West. It is in any case by no means under British control, and as is often said, you cannot drink it: it is the overwhelming source of income, but to earn income it must be sold, and there are limits to the additional amounts the Eastern bloc could take. Western organizations control all the marketing and much of the processing of Middle East oil throughout the West and in many third-world countries as well. If necessary, other suppliers could meet temporary interruptions to the oil flow. Yet the diplomatic, strategic and economic leverage which could come from increased Soviet influence over the principal oil producers is not something which the West can lightly concede.

How likely would the Soviet Union be to seek to replace Britain in the Gulf, or to stimulate local nationalist activities against Western interests? The precedents in the area and elsewhere are not comforting, and no other state would be powerful enough, near enough and interested enough. Yet likelihood is not certainty, and there would be local resistance; there would be competition from other states, notably the U.A.R. and possibly communist China or even Japan, not to mention Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. In view of so many claimants for influence in so rich a region, and fortified by its success in the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet Union might be tempted to undertake the same kind of management operations here. What Britain did for so long, surely a socialist superpower can do.

This is speculation, but it is not thereby frivolous. As to Sino-Soviet antagonism and rivalry, this could become a real factor, as it is in many places far away from their tense common border. It is not simply a contest for leadership among the communist

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or nonaligned states: it is a public and declared conflict. Chinese support for Palestinian guerrillas and other local revolutionary movements runs counter to Soviet policies and complicates the whole Middle East situation. In black Africa, rivalry is keen in Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and the two Congos, and among liberation movements; only in Tanzania do the Chinese appear to be ahead. There have been reports of Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean: ships were sighted in May near the Andamans, and China is helping Tanzania build a small naval base near Dar-es-Salaam. However, China's navy is not large enough to provide a significant presence in the Indian Ocean, and its impact there for some years can at best be psychological.

In India and Pakistan, in its sympathetic attitude to Burma, as in its activities in Indochina, the Soviet Union is patently motivated in part by an attempt to contain, restrain or out-influence the Chinese People's Republic. The Brezhnev kite-flying suggestion in June 1968 for a Soviet-backed "system of collective security in Asia," while ostensibly not excluding Communist China, was clearly directed at it (and only secondarily at the United States) and was accordingly not taken seriously by the countries before which it was flown. It is difficult to believe that Soviet help to Southeast Asian states will ever include combat forces sufficient to resist Chinese aggression. The massive Soviet arms, economic and psychological aid to North Vietnam has made possible the continuation of the war and Hanoi's relative independence from its giant neighbor.[4] The Soviets are going to retain for as long as they can this position of influence, so important in their triangular relationship with China and the United States.

One cannot easily add up what all this amounts to, any more than one can add up American policies into a single coherent whole. The Soviet Union has built itself a modest capacity for long-range intervention, but would be quite incapable for many years of major operations far from home. Universal pragmatism has tended to replace universal ideology, providing some strange bedfellows which national interest has not easily reconciled. Periodically, the Kremlin has shifted or lifted its vision, seeing new openings, new opportunities. South and East of Suez, the lengthening Soviet influence is more shadow than substance, but the shadows give warning of more substance to come.

[4] That it also led to enormous destruction within North Vietnam is presumably not lost on neighboring peoples.

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"WHAT IS TO BE DONE?"

GIGANTISM IN WASHINGTON

By John Franklin Campbell

AMERICAN foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.

In 1902 Lenin asked, in an essay on the organizational problems of Russian Social Democracy, "What is to be done?" and offered this curious answer: "Liquidate the Third Period." The advice is timely, though in a different way than Lenin intended. America in 1970 also confronts an unsatisfactory third period which it wants to liquidate. We are living out the three-part drama of our postwar foreign policy, which opened with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, continued in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years with a global elaboration of these policies, and reached its tragic climax in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. Though our last President was hissed from the stage, the third act of the play continues in anticlimax. It is being "liquidated" slowly as troops come home from East Asia and commitments are reduced elsewhere. It has even received official burial, for President Nixon reported to Congress last February 18 that "the postwar period in international relations has ended." But it will be hard to turn that truism into effective action as long as rigidities built into the bureaucratic process undercut the President's announced policy.

Washington has not one but many foreign offices, autonomous organizations chartered in the late 1940s to wage the cold war on separate fronts. Besides the State and Defense Departments, there is a United States Information Agency (USIA) for propaganda work, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for clandestine operations and research and an Agency for International Development (AID) for economic subvention. Four dozen other units of the executive branch have foreign staffs and pro-

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grams. A National Security Council tries and generally fails to coördinate the competing offices beneath. Another presidential office, the Bureau of the Budget (recently renamed the Office of Management and Budget) apportions money among the welter of agencies. Fragmented authority makes government policies inflexible and unstable. When delicate diplomacy is needed in the Middle East and in the strategic arms talks with the Soviets, false starts and conflicting directives show the difficulty of obtaining agreement within the separate American bureaucracies. Diplomatic initiatives occur in spite of rather than because of our institutions at home, a situation reminiscent of the weaknesses of the Fourth French Republic.

Beyond interagency chaos there is the problem of sheer size. Twenty-two thousand Americans, only 15 percent of them employed by the State Department, man our diplomatic missions abroad. A cross-agency census has never been taken, but Washington boasts at least another 50,000 workers in the foreign affairs complex. Inside this mammoth machine it is hard to locate authority and assign responsibility. Communication within and between departments is time-consuming and imprecise, and it is nearly impossible to change ingrained outlooks and procedures. Because the system is difficult to manage and hard to rely on, a modern President is tempted to bypass it completely and develop his own more informal methods of decision. In times of crisis he may turn to a closed circle of top advisers who have little knowledge of the subject being discussed, and are unable to consult expert opinion lower down in the government because of fears of a breach of secrecy. When considering whether to intervene in Cambodia last April, President Nixon isolated himself from his State Department and depended almost entirely on military advice and White House staff work. His decision, when announced, led several officials to resign, while 300 others in the State Department signed memoranda of protest. These evidences of internal dissent, which have no precedent, indicate a growing malaise among insiders about the method and competence of the present decision-making apparatus.

It is within the President's power to undertake a major reform of his foreign affairs departments. Piecemeal tinkering will not do; the nature and size of the entire system need to be reconsidered. The way to begin is to separate two conflicting strands of diplomatic theory which have been interwoven in the fabric of our postwar foreign policy.

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II

The first, more traditional theory holds that power is the main engine of international relations, and ideology is a secondary force. Foreign policy, therefore, proceeds by rules different from those which govern the domestic policies of a democracy. Peace is thought to depend on negotiation that respects the sovereignty of separate states and works to maintain balances of power among them.

This theory was shared by most of the men who made foreign policy in the Truman administration. They believed that the government should be organized not to conduct a crusade against communism, but rather to maintain a defensive balance of power with the Soviet Union. They favored simplicity and economy of structure and staffing in Washington, primacy for the Secretary of State as the President's number-one adviser, and centralization of foreign expertise and authority in the State Department. Creating giant new bureaucracies with divided duties, they foresaw, would make American foreign policy more interventionist, for the programs of each separate agency would generate their own self-justifying momentum. Political judgment and diplomacy would come to be regarded as the handmaiden of something called "national security policy," rather than as the directing purpose and controlling agent of our foreign affairs. Transferring authority from the State Department to a large White House staff would divide responsibility further, undercut a Secretary of State and isolate a President. In Dean Acheson's view, these organizational mistakes are what "blighted the high promise of President Johnson's administration" and have now begun to damage President Nixon as well. Acheson also recalls in his memoirs that he had "the gravest forebodings" about the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, and warned President Truman that "neither he, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or control it."

The State Department, in this view, is too big, too weak and too overshadowed by other departments to do its job. Acheson, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau have separately suggested that State be cut down to about half its present size, with other foreign affairs agencies even more severely curtailed. As Kennan puts it, "Excess people in the government cause a kind of damage that multiplies throughout the system. The damage

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caused by unnecessary people is equal to the square of their number."

A rival theory emerged early in discussion of the more active foreign policy we commenced in 1947 and the reorganizations which accompanied it. Ferdinand Eberstadt of the Navy Department, who drafted the plan for a National Security Council, urged the need for "waging peace, as well as war." His NSC plan was championed by military men who felt that the United States had entered a revolutionary new age which rendered traditional diplomatic methods obsolete. They thought that World War III was imminent and would be decided by the same techniques that turned the tide in World War II. Massive mobilization of resources, weapons technology and a "battle for men's minds" were the keys to the future of world politics.

The military-ideological theorists have been Washington's main organizational planners for the past two decades. In each administration they have proposed new foreign policy superstaffs. An NSC Psychological Strategy Board created in 1951 was father to the Operations Coördinating Board of the Eisenhower years, a Special Group-Counterinsurgency under Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor's Senior Interdepartmental Group and his unrealized plan for a "Cold War Strategy Board" under Johnson. General Taylor argued in a speech in 1966 that "There are many troublemakers creating for us many trouble spots around the world," and that the main need of our foreign policy apparatus was for "watchful eyes looking constantly in all directions and giving warning before we are surprised."

This approach focused particularly on the emerging third world, which by the early sixties had come to be regarded as an important "battleground" of ideology. The Herter Report of 1962, "Personnel for the New Diplomacy," suggested that American diplomacy should bring about "rapid social, economic, and political progress in developing countries," and that the ideal "new diplomat" must be skilled in such fields as: "intelligence; political action; technical assistance and various types of foreign economic aid; military aid programs; information and psychological programs; educational exchange; cultural programs; trade development programs; and . . . measures to counter insurgency movements."

Like the authors of the National Security Council, the authors of the Herter Report rested their case on the assumption that a

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new epoch in world politics had begun. The main feature of this epoch was "conflict between the free countries, struggling to build a world of free, independent, peaceful, and progressive peoples, and the communist world." The report concluded: "Our interest in every part of the world is today extensive, and our commitment to the pursuit of growth and progress among the free nations is well-nigh total."

Today Vietnam has made the New Diplomacy seem more a transient fad than a wave of the future. The global ideological concept of an American policy to bolster non-communist governments everywhere and stimulate "modernization," "stability," and "progress" in the third world appears costly, unwise and impossible. It is also a highly ambiguous policy. (What do "progress" and "stability" really mean? Are they mutually exclusive?) More recent formulations such as the Nixon doctrine propose the beginning of the end of "well-nigh total" commitments.

Sheer numbers of personnel working in the New Diplomacy fields have swamped the preëxisting organizational structure. In the seventies, however, we shall have to operate programs abroad more modestly and less massively, eschewing interference in the internal affairs of other states where it is not wanted or not likely to accomplish an agreed objective. If no more convincing rationale for foreign aid can be found than the old anti-communist "national security" argument coupled with a generalized American "responsibility" to raise the living standards of poorer states, then AID appropriations will continue to go down. These arguments offer no guidelines for the apportionment of limited U.S. resources, and no yardsticks of accomplishment. They are essentially ideological arguments, and they have been used not only for economic aid, but also to justify U.S. military, intelligence and propaganda programs.

It is time to reconsider the tools of the New Diplomacy as a modest adjunct rather than a major organizational competitor to the more settled traditions. If we are indeed at the end of a period of ideological confrontation and hope to nurture negotiation, then events are pushing toward a rediscovery of the need for traditional methods. Some of the cold war agencies formed two decades ago may have to be disestablished or severely cut back in a program that improves the quality but diminishes the quantity of our overseas representation.

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III

We are heirs in 1970 to an extraordinary process of birth and growth that has changed the nature of our foreign affairs institutions since World War II. The pre-Pearl Harbor State Department, located next to the White House, made do with a staff one-seventh the size of today's State. The 21 personnel who comprised Secretary Cordell Hull's office staff in 1938 have grown to 336 staff members serving Secretary William Rogers and his deputies. Over the same three decades the geographic and functional offices of State have expanded from 499 up to 2,625 personnel, while administrative overhead has risen from 443 up to 3,307 employees. Overseas, the prewar U.S. representation at 323 embassies and consulates was below 2,000, while today we employ 22,000 Americans at 263 diplomatic missions. The White House national security staff of Dr. Henry Kissinger now numbers more than 100, about four times larger than the staffs of McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. When new other-agency jobs in intelligence, aid, propaganda and military programs are taken into account, the postwar expansion in U.S. foreign affairs personnel has been more than twenty-fold.

We have acquired our bureaucracy, like some of our foreign commitments, in a fit of absentmindedness. Postwar studies of government organization have regularly criticized overstaffing and diffusion of authority. But little corrective action has been taken. Our past four Presidents have cursed the State Department while at the same time presiding over a 20-year decline in its authority, abetting the process by building an intermediary foreign office in the White House. Though every President needs his own staff and each will impress on the government his own personality and habits of work, it has been forgotten that *any* President stands to benefit from having a strong and able State Department. For State's stock-in-trade is a kind of expert knowledge and judgment and international negotiating skill that has no other institutional home in Washington. The stronger and abler the Department, the better the chances for wisdom in foreign policy, or, put another way, the higher the "reality input" into presidential decision-making on the foreign side. Paradoxically, the way to strengthen State may be to cut back its size drastically, as Messrs. Acheson and Kennan (and most of our recent Presidents, in private utterance) have proposed, while

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at the same time giving it new executive authority over other agencies.

Could it be done? There is no reason why not. The cutbacks should appeal to Congress, and the attempt to introduce more orderly procedure should help attract abler people into government. These proposals are not new. They have much in common with recommendations made in 1949 by the Hoover Commission Task Force on foreign affairs organization.

Twenty-one years later, the questions addressed by that Task Force continue to haunt Washington policy-makers. How can the State Department, "cast in the role of the specialist in foreign affairs," stay on top of the economic and military and intelligence departments which showed, even in 1949, "an increasing tendency to establish policies . . . which are not coördinated with the foreign policies or interpretations of the State Department?" The Hoover body answered this question only indirectly. It pointed out that the National Security Council, then less than two years old, was already straying into "matters of foreign affairs which are strictly not its business" and warned that the "NSC can easily slip into a highly improper role." It suggested that the President establish small cabinet-level committees, as the need arose, to advise him on any foreign policy questions having important domestic aspects.

But the main burden of the Hoover recommendation was to strengthen State by cutting it down to size. A radical restructuring would be needed to do this, centering authority in four geographic divisions responsible for the main areas of the world. There would be left within State only one other major official outside the regional scheme, as "Assistant Secretary for Multilateral Affairs," who was to handle U.S. diplomacy in international organizations, supervise small groups of economic specialists and attend to several "matters transcending the spheres of the regional assistant secretaries" as well as interdepartmental coördinating chores. State's large economic, intelligence and public affairs offices were to be disbanded. To prevent diffusion of authority through a committee system that would compromise issues at the bottom rather than forward them up to the top, the Task Force insisted that action "should be assigned in each case to a single officer . . . who must consult (but never be required to secure concurrence of)" the other offices affected, "and then report their consultation and comment with his recommendation."

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The Hoover proposals remain the beginning of wisdom about foreign affairs organization. Only part of the wisdom, to be sure, for the symptoms first detected in 1949 have gone untreated for two decades and the illness has spread. Major changes are required today in the internal structure of the State Department, our embassies overseas and the other executive branch agencies.

IV

Size is the first problem to attack and bureaucratic surgery is the answer. There should be a Five Year Plan of personnel reductions to bring the 6,800-man State Department of 1970 down by more than 50 percent to a ceiling of 3,000 by 1976. Restructurings and transfers to other agencies might account for nearly half of the cuts. The remainder can come from normal attrition (now running about 10 percent per annum, but subtract five percent for new recruitment), specific job-abolitions following a study that sets ceilings on the numbers of officers and clerical workers in each bureau, continuation of present incentives for early retirement, more serious application of the statutory selection-out principle to Foreign Service officers (at least five percent, or 160 per year rather than the present 70 per year should be eliminated) and cutbacks in the Foreign Service "Reserve Officer" category. (Seven hundred and fifty "FSRs," statutorily defined as employees having "special skills" not otherwise available to the Department, now work in State; at modest estimate, 250 of the positions are Congressional patronage jobs.)

At the same time, nine of the present 16 bureaus headed by Assistant Secretaries (or equivalents) could be usefully abolished, leaving a new total of seven. This, in essence, was the Hoover Task Force plan. The five main geographic bureaus for Europe, Africa, East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (with 980 personnel in all) should be retained as the basic core of the policy machine. They should be supplemented by a sixth Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, combining the staffs of the present Economic, Scientific and International Organizations bureaus. The new multilateral office might start with the 483 employees presently in its three components, but reduce itself considerably over time. Its task should be mainly advisory and liaison, including coverage of international conferences and the kinds of multiregional work specified in the Hoover study. Six other of the present bureaus, now comprising more than 1,000

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employees, could be abolished by stages. These are the offices for Congressional Relations, Public Affairs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, Intelligence and Research, Politico-Military Affairs and the Legal Adviser's staff. Much of their work duplicates the work of others, and the portion of it that is not duplicated should be brought into the regional and multilateral system and up to the Secretary's office. Another 500 personnel in the consular offices could be transferred out of State. The visa office, as Hoover recommended, should be transferred into the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. The passport office could have many of its functions decentralized and routinely performed at post offices around the country, as is now being tried experimentally in several cities.

These reductions should help to improve internal communications and decision-making, while fixing responsibility more clearly. But just to make sure, State's present procedure of requiring elaborate "lateral clearances" among all interested offices before a proposal for action can pass up the line should be abolished.

Substantial reductions must come as well in the administrative half of State. More personnel—3,307 in all—work in personnel, security, communications, general services and like offices than in all of the 16 other divisions combined. Extra administrative staffs, not included in the above total, exist within each policy bureau, where they comprise as much as 20 to 30 percent of the manpower. In the African Bureau, for example, 44 of its 166 employees administer budget, personnel assignments, procurement of supplies and processing of official travel. Separate department-wide administrative offices do the same job. Hence much of the work is duplicated and "coördinated" between two distinct offices. Time and efficiency could be saved by abolishing these redundant positions and centralizing the work under the Assistant Secretary for Administration.

The most important administrative task of all is currently not performed by anyone in Washington. The government has no unified foreign affairs budget. Like the three armed services in the 1950s, each agency negotiates separately with the Budget Bureau and then with Congress. This reinforces the impression that we have not one but many conflicting foreign policies. State's annual budget of $400 million is the lowest of any cabinet department, but former Budget Director Schultze has estimated

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that the cost of *all* U.S. programs overseas (excluding CIA and troop costs) would total $5.6 billion. Expenditure of all government funds abroad should be centrally planned in one place, and the logical place to do it is the State Department. Otherwise there is no assurance that the money serves a coherent national purpose. With other-agency coöperation, this task could be performed by transferring into State the present staff of the international division of the Bureau of the Budget, some 50 personnel in all. Ambassadors in the field and regional Assistant Secretaries in State should have a hand in recommending (and reducing) budget levels for the entire spectrum of U.S. foreign activities. The central budget staff could usefully be centered under the fifth ranking officer of the Department, now known as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, who could spend full time on budget management on behalf of the Secretary of State.

At the top of the ladder, there is no simple way to ease the burdens of a modern Secretary of State. Recent Secretaries have spent about half their time testifying before Congress, traveling abroad to conferences and advising the President, with only a remainder of the schedule free for superintending the day-to-day business of their department. They can no more delegate leadership to their deputies than Presidents are inclined to delegate work to Vice Presidents. But there *are* ways of helping a Secretary make better use of his time and exert clearer control over the sprawling bureaucracy beneath him. At present, some 336 staff aides and advisers and office helpers comprise the personnel of the State Department's seventh floor, where the Secretary's office is located. These men and women are not organized in a coherent way, but perform overlapping tasks with confused mandates. A large Executive Secretariat (120 strong) competes with a smaller Policy and Coördination Staff and with miscellaneous personal consultants and assistants to serve the needs of the Secretary, the Under Secretary who is his deputy and alter-ego, another Under Secretary whose duties are ill-defined, and a number-four man called the Deputy Under Secretary, whose job is also that of a vague extra helper. These latter two officers should be given specific tasks and they should not clutter the chain of command between Assistant Secretaries on the one hand and the Secretary and his deputy on the other. One of them might be denominated Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign Economic Policy, acting as chief economic adviser to the State

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Department and as its main point of contact with the Treasury, Commerce and other economic departments. The other could be styled Deputy Under Secretary for Coördination, acting as the Secretary's monitor and watchdog of CIA, the Defense Department and the military establishment, with his own representatives on the staffs of the military and intelligence agencies.

In a smaller State Department, a single secretariat of modest size should continue to organize the meetings, appointments and papers of the Secretary and Under Secretary. It should also be able to give them independent advice on pending business, should formulate their decisions in writing and should communicate on their behalf with the President's staff. The Secretary needs a small policy planning staff as well, detached from day-to-day responsibilities and empowered to conduct such studies as he may require.

As reorganization and reduction proceed, the Department ought to move its main offices back into the Executive Office Building next to the White House, its pre-1948 home. Closer proximity to the President should, of itself, eliminate the need for a major buffer in the form of a large White House foreign office between the President and his Secretary of State. Even at State's present size, the total number of personnel in the geographic bureaus (980), the "heart" of the policy machine, is barely larger than the entire Department of prewar vintage (963). If a President wants his Secretary close at hand (as Eisenhower once proposed to Dulles), then the logical solution is to move his office back to Pennsylvania Avenue.

Questions of the quality and ability of personnel remain. Who belongs in a leaner, fitter State Department? Do changes in organization really accomplish anything without changes in people?

The answer to the last question is yes and no. Of the four broad categories of personnel in State today, 1,700 are Foreign Service officers, about 750 functional specialists, between three and four hundred political and patronage appointees, and the balance of 4,000, clerical workers. This staff could do a better job in a streamlined structure, but its present level of competence has been criticized. State has a reputation for cautious conformity that may in part be a reflection of historic decline: it has lost some of its drawing power for able young men and women as it has lost authority to other agencies in postwar Washington.

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Much of its present weakness stems from Senator Joseph McCarthy's attacks 20 years ago. The Department of the early fifties acquiesced in a purge of a number of its professional diplomats, who were accused of disloyalty because they had accurately predicted the coming of communist revolution in China and had advocated Realpolitik rather than ideological warfare in our relations with the Soviet Union. The purge was followed by the Wriston Program, which trebled the number of Foreign Service officers in 1954–56 by bringing in 2,500 new personnel at the middle grades. The atmosphere of that period is best recalled by the motto of Security Chief Scott McLeod: "An ounce of loyalty is worth more than a pound of brains." Most of State's senior career men today are veterans of that era; and if honesty and brilliance are in short supply, it is partly because honesty and brilliance were not rewarded in the fifties.

History cannot be repealed, but some of its effects are self-liquidating as older men retire. The way to build for the future is to commence a Fifteen Year Program to improve our career diplomacy. High academic standards should be stressed rather than downgraded, as specialists in foreign areas and languages and economics are recruited from American universities in some rough relation to the estimated representational needs of the United States over a period of years.

Meanwhile, there must be an attack on the inverted pyramid shape of the Foreign Service hierarchy. Two-thirds of our 3,100 Foreign Service officers today are in the top four ranks, with the remaining third spread among the bottom four ranks, rather like an army with twice as many brigadiers as captains. This bizarre condition stems from the Wriston bulge of 15 years ago and the inability of administrators in the sixties to enforce tough promotion standards with some view to the future. Most jobs have been inflated by two or three ranks in the past decade, and need to be reclassified downward. Other steps can be taken to reëstablish the merit system envisaged by the Foreign Service Act of 1946. That law made provision for annual selection-out of the Foreign Service of low-performing officers and, at the opposite extreme, accelerated promotions for exceptionally meritorious work. Today, 24 years later, there has not been a single meritorious promotion, and selection-out has occurred at the low rate of about two percent. Here is evidence of the dead hand of seniority. The simple solution would be for the Secretary of

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State, annually, to direct the promotion boards to eliminate a fixed number of officers—about five percent—for low performance, and to give accelerated promotions to a similarly fixed number.

Besides officers skilled in foreign diplomacy, a strong State Department requires a separate cadre of men and women to control and manage the Washington machine. It is not easy for transient Foreign Service officers, whose careers are pointed to overseas diplomacy and whose home tours of duty are generally only two to four years at a stretch, to stay on top of their opposite numbers in the Defense Department, the Treasury and the other home agencies. State badly needs what these other agencies already have—a permanent home staff. Such a staff of civil servants, working side-by-side with Foreign Service officers and presidential appointees, could give the Department a strength and continuity that it now lacks in interdepartmental dealings. As a corollary, the heavy majority of FSOs ought to be deployed abroad, and should remain at their posts for longer periods of time than the present two to three year average. Since 1969, for the first time since the Wriston report, there have been more FSOs assigned to Washington than outside the country. The ratios, compared with those of 20 years ago, are startling:

DEPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

Year	*At Home*	*Abroad*
1948	185	1,147
1969	1,700	1,500

Though this skewed concentration is largely an accident, it demonstrates how unplanned State's personnel policy has become.

V

Size is also a problem at our 263 diplomatic missions in 115 countries overseas. American embassies are ostentatiously bigger than those of other nations, but over 80 percent of our diplomatic staffs are not employees of the State Department. In Vietnam, the U.S. mission has 4,000 Americans, only 357 of whom are on State's payroll. Several years ago Henry Villard reported that our embassy in Rome, with 800 employees, was 10 times larger than the French and British missions, while in the small African nation of Burundi, American officials outnumbered the entire

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colonial administration that had run the country before independence. Today there are more than 1,000 U.S. officials at our embassy in Thailand, 495 in Germany, 460 in Turkey, 275 in Columbia. Wives and children and alien clerical workers bring up the total size of each American diplomatic community to a figure three to four times greater than these data would suggest.

Our embassy staffs should be cut by more than 50 percent over the next five years, down from 22,000 to 10,000 personnel. This can be accomplished without closing down consulates, our 133 diplomatic branch offices away from capital cities, which are important adjuncts to our embassies. Indeed, a number of the three dozen consulates closed for economy reasons during the sixties could be usefully reopened. The heaviest cutback should come in agencies other than the State Department, particularly Defense, which sends 68 percent more people than State to our embassies, and CIA, whose personnel figures cannot be publicly discussed because of their security classification. At present our largest diplomatic posts employ 500 to 1,000 Americans from all agencies and only our smallest embassies have fewer than 50 to 100.

It has not occurred to Washington that sending large numbers of official Americans to small and poor countries can have negative side-effects on our relations with those countries. Large U.S. missions create an impression of massive American interference. When those large missions are compartmentalized among separate government agencies, with each agency's staff competing for the time and attention of foreign officials, we convey the impression of a diffuse and unfocused policy that lacks seriousness. Though the Secretary of State does not now control (nor does anyone else) the numbers of personnel sent by other agencies to our embassies, he can be given that power by the President, along with control over their foreign budgets. Fixed manpower ceilings should be set for each of the four categories of our missions, for example, 150 personnel for Class I embassies (London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, etc.), 75 for Class II, 35 for Class III, 15 for Class IV. The non-State Department staff generally ought not to exceed 50 percent of total mission personnel.

All personnel should serve "at the pleasure of the Ambassador." To enhance an ambassador's authority, the ownership and operation of embassy coding and communications equipment should be transferred from the CIA to the State Department.

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All other-agency personnel serving at embassies, military and civilian alike, should be "seconded" into the State Department and made subject to its internal discipline for the duration of their tours. Finally, ambassadors should be accountable for all U.S. government funds expended by all U.S. agencies in a given country.

One reason why past Secretaries of State have not pressed for greater reductions of non-State Department staffs abroad is that their department receives $120 million annually in fund transfers from other executive branch agencies. These so-called "administrative support costs" give State important funds above and beyond its annual Congressional appropriation. By tying itself to these funds and to a pattern of large embassy staffs, State perpetuates what some have called "the PX Culture."

The administrative sections of our embassies, which account for the largest part of State's foreign staffs, could be measurably decreased in size, with the bulk of the work performed by alien clerical workers. Special food and clothing stores, post exchanges, and housing compounds administered directly by the embassy or by military members thereof on a "non-appropriated fund" basis should be phased out, leaving individual staff members responsible for administering themselves in matters of personal housing, food, clothing, and education for their children. It is no longer necessary to continue practices dating from our postwar military occupation of Germany and Japan: provision of pre-packaged administrative services to our personnel abroad, including U.S. government furniture for houses, U.S. government-constructed housing compounds, and PXs and schools. Unusual personal expenses, which are invariably a part of running a diplomatic household, should be compensated for by cash allowance, as is the practice in every other major diplomatic establishment.

VI

Slimming down the bureaucracy also requires rethinking the purposes of propaganda, intelligence, economic aid and military programs. Four agencies—the Defense Department, CIA, USIA and AID—today account for more than two-thirds of the population of our embassies. All operate large programs abroad and all, from their birth in the late 1940s, inherited an organizational vested interest in ideological conceptions of inter-

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national politics. Each of the four is not unnaturally inclined to recommend that the special techniques at its disposal be used actively to promote "change" in other countries and that its mission be defined in a broad interventionist way. CIA in particular, and the other agencies to lesser degree, operate with wide freedom and without very close daily scrutiny from the President or the National Security Council or the Secretary of State.

Three of these four institutions—CIA, AID and USIA—need not continue to exist in their present form. Proposals for disestablishing them are not new, since plans to do just this have existed within the government for a number of years. After the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and again after the National Student Association disclosures of 1967, presidential study groups considered dismantling CIA, but concluded that it was not politically opportune to do so then. The most commonly suggested plan is to split the Agency in two, transferring the bulk of its employees into an overt Government Research Institute and leaving behind a much smaller and genuinely secret operational arm under the close control of the Secretaries of State and Defense. But a major intelligence shakeup continues to pose political problems for any President, and probably cannot occur except in the wake of another fiasco like Bay of Pigs or *Pueblo*. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State should at least begin to review CIA's budget and to set low ceilings on the number of people it sends abroad.

With respect to USIA, the need to employ 11,000 Americans and spend $175 million annually in foreign propaganda and cultural work was questioned by the Rusk Commission in 1967. Among other alternatives, that body considered turning over the job to a quasi-public corporation. More recently Bruce Oudes, a journalist and former USIA official, has proposed a more thorough dismantling of the Agency. National chauvinism in cultural fields and a massive projection of government propaganda in peacetime are not consistent with the values of a free society. USIA programs are in competition with our private communications media. In the seventies is time to replace USIA with subsidized but politically independent public corporations for broadcasting and cultural exchange, modeled on Britain's successful BBC and British Council programs.

Our foreign aid agency, which has been reorganized seven times over the past two decades, is about to be reorganized again.

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The Peterson Task Force on International Development recommended to President Nixon last March 4 that most of the 5,234 U.S. AID employees abroad come home and that their agency be abolished. The large AID missions currently in fourscore countries are to be dismantled and we are to adopt the simpler practice of most other aid donors, which is to administer bilateral programs directly through embassy economic sections. For Washington, the Peterson Report envisages a modestly staffed development bank and an institute for technical assistance, which would channel most of our future foreign aid through international institutions. This approach, though it is not certain to commend itself to Congress, would remove foreign aid from its cold war context of political expediency. Whether adopted now or a few years hence, the Peterson recommendations promise a more serious aid program which is in accord with the realities of development.

The foreign role of the Defense Department poses separate problems. A more fruitful collaboration between State and Defense is needed, and the first step is for the Secretary of State to reassert his senior partnership over the military authorities in all foreign questions. For Defense has come to play an independent role in foreign affairs. One symptom of this is evident in personnel statistics: at the start of the 1970 fiscal year there were 8,264 Defense Department personnel serving at our diplomatic missions, or 3,100 more than the State Department total. In his annual posture statement the Defense Secretary now insists as a matter of course on propounding a foreign policy independent of the views of his colleague at State.

The Pentagon has its own little foreign office, the 321-man Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), organized on geographic desk lines which imitate those of the State Department. To complement ISA, State has created a 90-man Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Thus there have emerged two essentially duplicative liaison bodies, each of which mainly exists to negotiate with and give clearance to the work of the other. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three services also have separate foreign affairs staffs, and a large Defense Intelligence Agency collects and disseminates duplicated versions of diplomatic and CIA information in addition to military intelligence.

A strong Secretary of State would undoubtedly propose that,

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if the Defense Secretary felt the need for having foreign policy advice within easy reach, he be assigned a senior State Department adviser with a few assistants rather than forming and recruiting his own separate foreign staff. In asserting his senior role, the Secretary of State could assure that coördination occurs at the top rather than the bottom of the chain of command, and could end the spreading confusion and duplication of effort that now exist in both departments. Above all, he could re-right a balance of authority that has shifted ominously in the past 20 years toward military technologists and away from foreign policy planners.

VII

The President and the Secretary of State can, with some cooperation from Congress, accomplish all of the reforms that have been suggested above. New legislation is needed to shake down CIA, AID, and USIA, but major cuts in personnel throughout the government and an internal reorganization of the State and Defense Departments can occur by executive action alone. If such action is not taken early in the seventies, Congress will be all the more tempted to propose its own solutions. The power of the purse gives it at least a negative means of forcing changes by cutting budgets. At this late date it would be an evasion for Congress or the President to appoint yet another commission to re-study the organization of our foreign departments. There have been studies by the dozen already, from the two Hoover Commissions of 1947 and 1953 to the Herter Committee of 1962 to the recent Peterson Task Force of 1970. By now the dimensions of the difficulty should be evident to all.

They were long ago evident to the President's assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who remarked in 1968 that there is a "sort of blindness in which bureaucracies run a competition with their own programs and measure success by the degree to which they fulfill their own norms, without being in a position to judge whether the norms made any sense to begin with."[1] In an essay written two years earlier, Kissinger criticized Washington's "elaborate and fragmented" administrative machine and observed that "the staffs on which modern executives come to depend develop a momentum of their own." What begins as an aid to decision-makers, he wrote, "often turns

[1] "No More Vietnams?" (Richard M. Pfeffer, ed.). New York: Harper, 1968, p. 11.

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into a practically autonomous organization whose internal problems structure and sometimes compound the issues which it was originally designed to serve."[2]

Kissinger's analysis is as accurate in 1970 as it was in 1966. What has been lacking thus far is a plan of reform designed to correct the known deficiencies of the system. Although the postwar period of foreign policy has come to an end, the institutional forms that emerged in that earlier era are still very much with us. The continuance of those forms, devised in haste and accident more than 20 years ago, undercuts the announced purposes of President Nixon's foreign policy. We are still organized more to engage in a clash of ideologies than to negotiate a balance of power, and the voice of diplomacy has become weak within the structure of our government. If an era of negotiation is ever to get off the ground, policy changes abroad must be accompanied by bureaucratic reform at home.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus* (Spring 1966), reprinted in H. Kissinger, "American Foreign Policy: Three Essays." New York: Norton, 1969, p. 20.

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OVERCOMING INSULARITY IN JAMAICA

By Michael Manley

IN the long run it may yet transpire that the differences between stages of economic development as between various nations and regions of the world are a more important determinant of history than differences in ideology or systems of government. Religious wars are contested with fervor at the time; so are wars to make the world safe for democracy. But sooner or later, the economic historian presents an alternative analysis which seems to put the hysteria of yesteryear in a more realistic frame.

And so today, press, pulpit and politician would have us believe that a new ideological focus is at the heart of the uncertainties, tensions and conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century. Once again, I suggest that tomorrow's historians will point out that behind the hysteria lay economics and that the real battleground was in that largely tropical territory which was first the object of colonial exploitation, second, the focus of non-Caucasian nationalism and more latterly known as the underdeveloped and the developing world as it sought euphemisms for its condition. It has now proclaimed itself the third world to mark its transition from an age of apology to one of assertiveness.

To the extent that all this is true, any development in any part of the third world has an importance that far outweighs the size, wealth or power of that particular part of that world. And so, recognizing that this explanation may be required, I do not apologize for writing about Jamaica with its 4,000 square miles and two million people and its relationship to the English-speaking Caribbean which covers many more square miles but still adds up to only a little more than five million people.

Because Jamaica and the Caribbean are a part of the third world, they are best understood if one first isolates certain basic features that are common to that world and its general condition at this moment of history.

I think that four factors can be distinguished. First of all, the third world has joined the other two worlds in one feature that is common to both: nationalism. Basic to attitudes in the third world is the fear of foreign domination. Inevitably, in the

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second half of the twentieth century, foreign domination is understood in economic terms just as clearly as it used to be understood in political terms. And no consideration of third-world politics can proceed unless this is borne clearly in mind.

The second factor, in the area of economics, is the adverse movement in the terms of trade between the third world and its highly industrialized and developed neighbors of the North, encompassing not only price trends as they relate to exports and imports between groups but also the terms on which capital is exported from one world to the other.

The third factor inheres in a paradox: the fact that the new taste of nationalism and political independence coëxists with a need for external capital. Common to every former colonial territory is a shortage of internal capital resources, a release of popular expectation and an urge toward complete national independence. The paradox consists in the fact that popular expectation cannot be satisfied without capital, and capital cannot be generated from internal sources alone. Thus, the urge for independence and the need for capital come into conflict.

The fourth factor which I contend is common to the third world is that in its dealings with the industrialized nations, the third world desperately needs the strength that can come from regional economic groupings; and, more generally, the development of a common economic diplomacy. This obvious need, however, conflicts with the tendency of all "new" nations to be separatist and insular.

It is against this background that Jamaica's recent history, present posture and future possibilities must be judged.

II

The recent past has been remarkable for three things. A Crown Colony within the British Empire up to 1944, Jamaica became a part of the colonial revolt in 1938. Riots precipitated a trade union movement on the one hand and the island's first mass political party on the other. Alexander Bustamante was the charismatic focus for a unique brand of mass trade unionism and Norman Manley was the equally charismatic force behind a movement dedicated to political independence and social and economic reconstruction. In time, the trade union group formed a political party and the political group began to organize in the field of trade unionism. Less surprisingly than might appear

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at first blush, the trade union group, which later formed a political party, became the conservative focus and the nationalists who later became union organizers became the radical focus. The net effect was a polarization of the island's politics and the most effective two-party system among the countries then fighting for national independence.

This two-party system, driven by the two astonishing personalities mentioned, embarked upon what is probably the most orderly transition from colonial status to political independence in modern history. In fact, the transition was so orderly, was handled with such sophistication and poise that many young Jamaicans today feel cheated by history. Deprived of the psychological rallying point of an heroic episode, they feel that they entered upon the estate of freedom so silently, with so little drama, that many question whether it has happened at all.

The formation of this deeply entrenched two-party system, along with the orderly transition from political colonialism to political freedom, are two of the three significant features. The third is Jamaica's part in the West Indies Federation which was launched with more doubt than fanfare in 1958 and collapsed by the end of 1961.

The English-speaking Caribbean is effectively bounded by the Bahamas to the north, British Honduras (in Central America) to the west, Barbados to the east and Guyana (on the South American mainland) to the south. However, the area has hitherto been dominated by its largest island, Jamaica (population, two million), just south of Castro's Cuba, and its second largest island, Trinidad (population, one million), just north of Guyana. Jamaica consists of the city of Kingston with half a million people, an entrenched plantation system mainly centering on sugar, a booming bauxite and alumina industry and a burgeoning tourist trade, all of which coexist with the country's rural peasant majority whose small-scale hillside agriculture is falling further and further behind the progress achieved by the rest of the country. Kingston itself is a classic example of urban life in a developing country, with beautiful suburbs, a growing and expert middle class, a skillful but restless industrial proletariat and huge, smoldering slums all packed together around a port which boasts one of the greatest natural harbors in the world and rests on a plain surrounded by mountains of spectacular beauty.

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Trinidad is like Jamaica except that it has no rural peasantry to speak of, and whereas Jamaica has a new bauxite industry, it has a much older oil industry. Like Jamaica, it has extensive sugar plantations, massive unemployment and a growing but more recent investment in tourism. Jamaica has, however, in a subtle but real way, a more practical population. Trinidad, with its carnival tradition and stronger Latin influence, tends to be more volatile.

These, along with the smaller islands of the Leeward and Windward chain, share a predominantly African ethnic origin and a common political and institutional history as ex-British colonies. However, the area consists of eight clearly defined sub-regions, at least one of which has a thousand islands and all of which have separate senses of identity. All this adds up to one of the most tantalizing political problems in the world today.

It is in this regional focus and within the broad perspective of third-world politics that one must now consider Jamaica's part in the abortive West Indies Federation. During the 1940s and 1950s the question of such a Federation was much talked about in Caribbean politics; but however central it was in the rest of the Caribbean, it was always an afterthought in the dialogue of Jamaican politics.

The truth is that Jamaica all along had been preoccupied with its internal problems which were, and are, legion. Once in the Federation, which was not independent in 1958 and whose central government was then largely impotent, the issue had to be faced: "What sort of constitution shall we have when we become an independent nation shortly and how shall the powers of a central government ruling over many separate islands compare with the power remaining with the government of each island?" In the event, geography defeated political logic; Jamaican nationalism proved too strong for the federal principle. The two parties which dominate Jamaican political life failed to agree on federation and in a referendum insularity won. Jamaica voted herself out of federation, and without Jamaica the Federation collapsed.

But federation is a technique. It is a means rather than an end, a point of departure rather than of arrival. Behind this particular federal experiment, which collapsed in 1961 (the vote was approximately 230,000 against to 210,000 for the federation), lies the still larger question of regionalism. Do Jamaica

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and the Caribbean stand to lose or gain by regional coöperation?

III

Becoming an independent nation in 1962, Jamaica has nonetheless remained a classic example of what is sometimes described as a "two-tier" economy. Equally important, our economy has remained firmly cast in the colonial mold. The bauxite and alumina industry is entirely North American owned. More than half the tourist and sugar industries are under foreign ownership. Foreign trade continues to grow faster than internally consumed production and remains oriented toward traditional lines of exchange with North America and Great Britain. And those who manage the economy continue to look outward for ideas and expertise.

In spite of dramatic expansions in the bauxite and tourist industries, a balance-of-payments situation in surplus, the rapid development of a sophisticated network of financial institutions and a basically sound civil service, Jamaica remains a prey to many of the evils which beset it in colonial times.

Unemployment runs at a dangerous 20 percent, and is believed to be over 30 percent in the 16 to 25 age group. Agriculture lags badly and is virtually stagnant in an otherwise booming economy. Since approximately half the population depends upon agriculture, either as small farmers or as agricultural workers, this means that half of the population are condemned both to a total defeat of their expectations ever to become independent and to a growing awareness of the widening gap between their condition and that of the rest of the population.

Inevitably, this has led to growing tensions in the society. The older peasantry tends to be bitter, but resigned. The youth, on the other hand, are increasingly disillusioned but by no means resigned. Instead, the anger of the youth tends to focus increasingly on the presence of a dominant structure of foreign capital and contends that we have not altered the equation of our problems in spite of the considerable sacrifice of sovereignty involved in the acceptance of foreign capital. In short, they feel that we are sacrificing economic independence for the explicit purpose of solving our internal problems, but that in the event, since the problems are growing worse, the sacrifice is in vain.

Of course, both the perception of the problem and disappointment with the result involve dangerous oversimplifications

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in economic terms. Basically, the economy needs to be restructured. This should involve land reform, import substitution in relation to food consumption and the planned use of inter-industry linkages so as to ensure a growing measure of internal viability to the economy. A largely agricultural country, Jamaica is exporting J$62 million of sugar, bananas, citrus and coffee, while it imports J$60 million of food; and this in a context where some 20 percent of its arable land is either totally idle or seriously under-used. In addition, much of the industrial development of the last 20 years has been of the last stage assembly "screw-driver" type, while virtually no attention has been paid to agro-industrial development, which is the most obvious area for establishing inter-industry linkages. The total result has been that agriculture, while supporting more than half of the population, contributed 13 percent to the gross national product in 1960 just before the attainment of independence but only nine percent in 1969.

Broadly speaking, Jamaica has fallen into the same trap as many other developing countries by thinking that the indiscriminate granting of tax incentives to foreign capital—regardless of the contribution which the particular capital can make to development, or of the posture of that capital in the society—will necessarily contribute to progress. Even in recent times, when experiments in forms of joint ownership ventures between foreign and local capital have become the vogue in response to nationalist pressures, there is still no evidence of realistic national planning as to the sort of ventures that are needed and, in particular, industries which seek to exploit local raw materials and by-products. If unemployment is to be significantly reduced and the dangerous gap between the agricultural population and the industrial élite is to be narrowed, radically different policies have to be pursued. These will have to involve new thinking about the use to which internal resources are to be put; a complete reëxamination of the sort of foreign capital which should be invited to participate, and the relationship between foreign capital and the national interest as regards ownership and control.

The question arises as to the frame in which these objectives can best be secured. As a consequence of the federal experience, Jamaica is undergoing a period of ambivalence toward the rest of the Caribbean. In less fanciful terms, the party in power, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), is hostile to regionalism partly

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in response to the parochial instincts which lay behind its anti-federal fight and partly because it is a prisoner of its success in that fight. The opposition People's National Party (PNP) tends to be afraid of regionalism because its own loss of power was attributable to its support of federation in the 1961 referendum. And yet history has its own inexorable logic. In spite of all these factors which seem to conspire against regionalism, Jamaica has already joined the Caribbean Free Trade Area and is a founding member of the Caribbean Development Bank.

Exploratory talks are already under way as the region makes the first tentative approaches toward a formula for a common external tariff and common policies toward foreign investments. Although many counsel caution—and indeed, this may be the price of ultimate success—one wishes that a greater sense of urgency attached to the whole exercise. Where gross disparities in wealth, massive unemployment, showpiece industries and conspicuous consumption coexist in one overpopulated island, violence and even revolution must lurk in the wings. Clearly, regional economic development provides a more ample prospect in a situation where peaceful progress cannot be more than a marginal possibility. Yet, although the aisle is clearly marked, we seem to come to the altar of history like a reluctant bride with faltering step and lowered gaze.

What is needed, I suggest, is a tough-minded recognition that national survival, like business survival, is a matter of margins and that regionalism can provide the framework in which internal markets are increased, external bargaining power enhanced and international recognition maximized. The fact that all these differences may be marginal, far from disproving the case, represents the limit of what is possible in any event and should be pursued relentlessly in a world which does not offer more than marginal opportunities at best. Perhaps, then, we might now consider what Jamaica stands to gain from regionalism.

IV

As indicated earlier, Jamaica cannot hope to provide the basis of a decent society unless it substantially restructures its economy. The plantation system condemns those who depend upon it to a life of insecurity and is a constant focus for hostility and tension for any society which it dominates. Hence it is almost a

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precondition of progress to reduce dependence on fly-by-night foreign capital which will come in briefly for a "quick buck" while wages are low and the conditions for exploitation ideal. But the search for alternatives is no easy matter and a regional economic bloc unquestionably provides a larger frame within which to pursue the restructuring of the Jamaican economy along with those of its Caribbean neighbors. Apart from the obvious advantages of size that come with regional coöperation, there are four other major areas that must be considered.

The English-speaking Caribbean will not benefit from its size until its territories learn to act in unison in matters of common concern. Thus, it is urgent that its governments develop techniques for handling trade and other relations with the outside world on the basis of a common policy. Beginnings have been made in this direction with an annual Heads of Government conference and in certain areas of trade, such as sugar, which are handled collectively. These tentative beginnings have to be pursued with vigor so that the region speaks more and more to the outside world with one voice.

Secondly, the region would benefit enormously if it could learn to handle major foreign capital interests secondary to a common policy. A classic example is the bauxite and alumina industry. The Caribbean region, including the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Surinam (which is next door to Guyana), produces 52 percent of the bauxite consumed in the Western world and 43 percent of world consumption. As the raw material of the aluminum industry, bauxite has a critical part to play in the economic future of Jamaica and certainly of Guyana and Surinam. But it is a wasting asset, which has to make its contribution to general development as rapidly as possible. Interestingly enough, the workers of the region have been much quicker to recognize this than the politicians.

Perhaps because bargaining power is "the name of the game" in trade unionism, the Bauxite Workers Union in Jamaica (a section of the National Workers Union and affiliated with the PNP) pursued a more than ordinarily aggressive wage policy against the giants of the industry—Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds of the United States and Alcan of Canada—from the very outset of bargaining in 1952. Later, when the companies began quoting wage rates in Guyana and Surinam against Jamaican union claims in the mid-1950s, the Jamaican Union responded by form-

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ing the Caribbean Bauxite Mining and Metal Workers' Federation. In the last ten years, this body has played a significant part in bringing regional strength to the collective bargaining process, and this in turn has led to spectacular gains in wages and fringe benefits for the region's 15,000 bauxite and alumina workers.

Clearly, this is a lead that the politicians and governments of the region would do well to follow. In terms of royalties, taxes and general contributions to infrastructure, the aluminum companies can do far more in the Caribbean region. The ability of the region to bargain, however, to increase the contribution of the industries to general welfare, has been considerably affected by the fact that no coherent policy within a united political front exists. And here, let me make it clear that I am not talking in the spirit of wreaking some sort of spiteful vengeance on the aluminum industry; rather, I am concerned to find by legitimate bargaining that point at which the conflicting interests of the industry and the region may be reasonably resolved.

So long as this and similar industries remain exclusively owned by foreign, multinational corporations, the search for this point of "mutual justice" will be virtually impossible. The very presence of such economic power in foreign hands represents a threat to the sense of independence of a country and a serious obstacle to its freedom of action in economic planning. On the other hand, the corporations have made large investments and provide access to markets and technology. The key, therefore, must lie in joint ownership. It is only when control and ownership are shared reasonably between those who supply the initial capital and know-how on the one hand, and those who supply the raw material and the labor on the other, that mutuality of interest can exist. There is perhaps no greater challenge to man's capacity for wisdom than this. Indeed, the future of the world may be profoundly influenced by the ability of the third world to pursue this goal with calmness and with skill and equally by the ability of the metropolitan world to comprehend the aspirations that lead to the claim for joint ownership and to coöperate wholeheartedly with the process. Where the metropolitan world and its overseas corporations have not learned this lesson in the past, expropriation has often sooner or later been the result. If the world refuses to learn from the past, the old device of revolutionary expropriation may continue to be invoked, not as dogma, but out of practical necessity.

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And so to the third proposition. As I said at the outset, it is my conviction that the fundamental problem of the world today is not so much a question of conflicting ideologies as of the economic relationship between the developed economies of the metropolitan world and the less developed economies of the third world. This is not the place to attempt to outline the argument. Suffice it to say that for a variety of well-understood reasons the terms on which trade and capital move between the two worlds do so constantly to the disadvantage of the developing nations and make the problem of real economic progress for small independent countries crushingly difficult.

Clearly, therefore, the ability of the Caribbean to achieve progress goes beyond regionalism to the necessity for the developing world as a whole to evolve a common strategy with regard to its economic dealings with the metropolitan nations. The fundamental rationale of third-world politics is economic. The imperative of the future must be the search for a common economic diplomacy in which, to put it at its simplest, the Caribbean must be as concerned about the fate of Ghana's cocoa as Ghana should be concerned about the fate of Caribbean sugar. And both should be concerned to see that they do not act in such a manner as to undermine each other's possibilities as they trade with the metropolitan world. When we consider the inherent economic power of the United States, Great Britain, the European Common Market and Russia, we see what India, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are up against. What is not recognized is that fundamentally they are all up against exactly the same thing. To the extent that the Caribbean region can proceed more coherently and more cogently in acting not only as a part of the third world, but as a sophisticated leader in the development of relevant third-world policies, to that extent can it help to underwrite its own survival.

Obviously, a Caribbean voice will carry more weight in the third world than the sum total of the area's separate voices. And so, therefore, regionalism is important to Jamaican development because it is the natural avenue through which it can enter and influence the stream of third-world politics. What is more, I suggest that third-world politics would benefit enormously from the tough-minded pragmatism which characterizes Jamaican political leadership.

I turn finally to an idea that is not often in general discussion

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at all. Because it has something to do with human psychology and a lot to do with attitudes and the scars left by past wounds, it is not an easy one to present with clarity. I begin with the premise that national power and success tend to breed a confident man and that lack of power and success tend to have the reverse effect. Obviously, this will not operate where two societies are unaware of each other. However, colonialism and technology have combined to make all the societies of the world acutely aware of each other. To be a member of a small struggling nation, isolated within the difficulties that beset small struggling nations, puts the ordinary citizen at a psychological disadvantage. And I mean by this something quite different from the straightforward problems that arise from poverty and lack of economic opportunity. There is a sense in which the reality of metropolitan power invades the feeling of security and dignity of members of a fragmented third world.

It is clear that the youth of the metropolitan world are increasingly concerned with the moral quality of life in wealthy countries in spite of the growing economic power of their system. On the other hand, the youth of the Caribbean are increasingly uncomfortable with a situation in which they feel trapped in a helpless isolation and yearn to be part of a system that has a chance because it can face the world from a position of strength. I suggest that not all of the brain drain is a response to higher salaries. Nor is all of it merely discontent with the lack of progress at home. If you talk to young migrants you sense behind and beyond these obvious problems a deeper feeling of futility, as if they are tired of belonging to something which does not amount to much in the world. I believe this tendency to despair will grow in the future unless we wake up to the harsh facts of life and grapple with them. Jamaicans must learn to see beyond the narrow focus of insularity and realize that self-interest must be organized in the wider world because it is there that the battle is going to be won or lost. Jamaica's problem is to organize the conditions for its own survival now and it must do so in a context where the revolution of rising expectations, a revolution that is necessarily intolerant of failure, is the dominant reality of politics. The choice, therefore, in the long run of history lies between a low road of self-imposed, insular impotence and a high road of adventure into Caribbean regionalism leading on to the wider possibilities of third-world strength.

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TRIBAL POLITICS HARASS KENYA

By Stanley Meisler

BEFORE the murder of Tom Mboya in July 1969, Kenya politicians could mute and obscure their country's tribal tensions. The tensions, of course, were always there, straining the fragile unity of the new country, but they did not pervade every side of political life. Personal rivalry counted; so did ideology. The assassination changed all that.

For more than a year, Kenya was torn by a dangerous and blatant tribal conflict that colored all political activity. In a sense, this only followed what had happened elsewhere in Africa, where crisis invariably heightens tribal hatreds and suspicions. The results, as Nigeria showed, can be terrifying. But Kenya is not another Nigeria. In recent months, the fury has diminished, giving Kenya a time of calm to deal with its tribal problem. Its future depends on whether its politicians learn to do so.

At stake is a land of 10.5 million people led by pragmatic men who have nursed the old white settler economy so well that Kenya has one of the highest economic growth rates in black Africa. No other black African country has anything to compare with its fertile soil and energetic farmers. Its wildlife and incredible and varied beauty have made it the tourist center of black Africa. But all this is threatened by the instability inherent in tribalism.

Before analyzing the tribal problem, it makes sense to recount the excited political events of the country since the death of Mboya. They rushed on Kenya in a breathless way, moving so swiftly that they seemed part of a novel or a film rather than a real political story. Stark, dramatic events sometimes have a way of oversimplifying the complexities of a political and social problem. In this case, however, they helped to reveal the intensity and urgency of the problem, demonstrating how tribalism can suddenly take hold of an African country and blot out all else.

II

Mboya, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development, was gunned down by an assassin on a crowded shopping street in downtown Nairobi. Unlike almost all other politicians

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in Africa, Mboya had never appealed to tribal chauvinism. He was an urban man who had come to power through the labor unions. In Parliament, he represented a Nairobi district, where few of the voters came from his Luo tribe.

Mboya had never had the support of most of the Luos, the second largest tribe in Kenya with 1.3 million people. The majority were behind Oginga Odinga, a Luo tribal elder who was the leader of the leftist opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), a former vice president of the country, and a bitter personal enemy of Mboya. A large minority, however, joined Mboya in supporting the government of President Jomo Kenyatta, a leader of the Kikuyu tribe, the largest in Kenya with two million people. As long as the Luos divided this way, Kenya politics could stay above tribal conflict.

But the assassination united the Luos behind Odinga. The Luos assumed immediately that the Kikuyus, who dominated the government and were the best-educated people in Kenya, had murdered Mboya. In death, Mboya became a great tribal hero to the Luos. Since they believed the Kikuyus in government had murdered him, they decided they must now support the Luo leader who was a proven enemy of that Kikuyu government. The years when Odinga schemed against Mboya were forgotten.

The Luos went on an emotional rampage. They stoned and threw shoes at the Mercedes of President Kenyatta while he drove to the memorial services for Mboya at the Roman Catholic cathedral in Nairobi. At the burial by the family home on Rusinga island in Lake Victoria, Luos chanted, "War with the Kikuyus." A medicine man cursed, "May the wombs of all Kikuyu women dry up." "Where is Jomo Kenyatta?" another mourner shouted. "If he were here, even if he were guarded by one hundred thousand soldiers, I would kill him." The chanting also revealed the new political alignment. "Tom, why did you join with them?" several wailed by the coffin. Another mourner chanted by the graveside, "When things get worse, there is only one man who can save us. That is Jaramogi (Odinga's Luo title). Where is he? I am looking for him in the crowd." When Odinga did show up, he was lifted in the air and carried around the grave.

The Luos believed their anger justified when Nahashon Isaac Njenga Njoroge, a young Kikuyu tough in Kenyatta's ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was

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charged with the murder. When arrested, according to police testimony at the trial, Njoroge told them, "Why don't you go and get some big man? We did what we were told." But the big man was not identified at the trial. In fact, the prosecution never attempted to establish a motive for the crime. Njoroge was convicted and hanged.

Njoroge's remark and the failure to establish a motive lent support to the Luo suspicion that some official in the party had ordered the assassination. But it is hard for an outsider to believe that the "big man" could have been very big. The Kikuyu ministers did feel threatened by Mboya in the continual Kenya politicking for a good position in case of Kenyatta's death; and while Mboya had little tribal support and had made too many enemies, he was the most intelligent, ruthless and capable politician in government. Yet his assassination unleashed so much anti-Kikuyu hatred that a Kikuyu's chances of succeeding Kenyatta may have become weaker because of it. It would have made little political sense for a Kikuyu minister to have ordered the assassination.

The fury and unity of the Luos after the death of Mboya frightened the Kikuyus. When threatened in the past, the Kikuyus have often resorted to oaths as a way of strengthening themselves. They had done so during Mau Mau days when they wanted to unite against the British colonial government and the white settlers. In those days the mysterious and bestial nature of the oaths had shocked both other tribes and outsiders. The Kikuyus went back to oathing this time and shocked outsiders and other tribes again.

In an oathing ceremony, Kikuyus, after drinking goat's blood or undergoing some other ritual, swear allegiance to a tribal cause. Whether they oathe voluntarily or are forced to take part, many Kikuyus believe they will be struck dead by sacred spirits if they break the pledge. In this case, according to reports in parliament, the Kikuyus would stand naked in a dark room in a house on the grounds of the home of President Kenyatta and take an oath that they would never allow the flag of Kenya to leave the "house of Mumbi," as Kikuyus call their tribe. Other tribes believed this meant that the Kikuyus wanted to keep the presidency indefinitely and dominate them forever. The other tribes were angered and frightened even more by the seeming acquiescence of Kenyatta.

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In October 1969, with elections only a few weeks away, Kenyatta decided to show the country that he was still its national leader. He drove to Kisumu, the main town of Luo land, to dedicate a Russian-built hospital there. From the first, he was received with anger. Luos held up signs asking, "Where's Tom?" Some threw stones. Many shouted the slogan of Odinga's opposition party. This enraged Kenyatta. In Swahili, he shouted at the crowd at the hospital, "I can assure you, my brothers, that anybody who brings trouble . . . will be taught to know that Kenya has a government." He cursed at his opponents and boasted, "We are going to crush you into flour." The crowds grew disorderly again after the speech. As the President's motorcade drove out of town, the Luos threw rocks and surged toward the car of the President. This panicked the bodyguard, and they fired into the crowd. The toll was 11 dead and many wounded.

Kenyatta blamed Odinga for both the insults and the carnage. He banned the opposition party and detained Odinga and the other seven opposition members of parliament. With their two leaders gone, the Luos dropped to the low point of their fortunes. On the eve of elections, the party that most represented them was banned.

III

This was probably the most critical moment in Kenya's history since independence. The plight of the Luos seemed desperate. To outsiders, it appeared that Kenyatta and the Kikuyus had gone too far. The horror of Nigeria was on everyone's mind, and many waited for an explosion. Instead, Kenya dropped into a calm. It is not exactly clear why this happened, but several reasons can be suggested.

First, Africans live in tribal societies that respect authority. Kenyatta asserted his authority in an uncompromising way and made it clear he would continue to do so. This shocked the Luos and sobered their rage. They withdrew like a child slapped by an angry father. Second, the Luos, though emotional, have a tribal personality that allows them to accept adversity in a fatalistic way. Their grievances were bitter, but this did not provoke them into acts of revenge. Instead, they bemoaned their fate. Third, they realized how little they could do. Western Kenya was not Eastern Nigeria. Unlike the grieving Ibos, the Luos did not have a government or even a radio to rally the people. In

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centralized Kenya, these instruments of secession belonged to Kenyatta in Nairobi. The Luos could not have broken away even if they had wanted to.

Finally, the detention of Odinga allowed a group of younger, better-educated and more moderate Luo leaders to come forward. They had long felt that Odinga was leading his people astray. In their view, the Luos needed to align themselves with the government, not to fight it. The young men counselled patience.

The government helped the calm by allowing a remarkable election in December 1969. Ironically, with only one party, the election turned out to be far more democratic than it probably would have been with two. The election became a free-for-all primary within the ruling party much like the old statewide democratic primaries in the American South. Anyone could vote in it, even members of the banned opposition party. In addition, the government allowed Mrs. Grace Onyango, a lieutenant of Odinga in the banned party, to stand for office in the government primary. It was a shrewd political move by Kenyatta. The election became a way for all peoples of Kenya, whether Luo or not, to demonstrate their grievances and hostilities. They defeated 82 incumbent members of parliament, including five ministers. In one of the most sweeping turnovers in any African election, the voters sent newcomers into two-thirds of the seats in parliament.

If there had been a two-party election, fewer incumbents might have lost. With two primaries, many people who voted against the incumbents in the government KANU primary probably would have voted instead in the opposition KPU primary. This would have reduced by a good deal the number of incumbents beaten in the KANU primary. In a general election, the KANU candidates probably would have had an easy time defeating the KPU men everywhere except in Luo land. A two-party election probably would have been less a reflection of the general mood of dissatisfaction in Kenya than this single party primary was.

The government chose not to interpret the election as a vote of no confidence or as an expression of hostility to Kikuyu dominance. Spokesmen for the government noted ingenuously that everyone had run on the same party platform and therefore could be considered supporters of the government. Moreover, the pri-

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mary machinery did not allow an opponent for Kenyatta as president. He was reëlected automatically.

The results, however, did lay bare the disquieting tribal problems of Kenya. In Luo country, the voters elected Mrs. Grace Onyango decisively and rejected every Luo incumbent. Ironically, the defeated included two old friends of Mboya, Sam Ayodo, the Minister of Tourism, and Joseph Odero Jowi, the successor to Mboya as Minister for Economic Planning and Development. They and every other Luo incumbent were looked on as traitors for having remained with the Kikuyu-dominated government after the assassination. Elsewhere, general dissatisfaction and personal pique probably accounted for most defeats, but a case could be made that at least a few lost because the voters resented their close ties with the Kikuyu government.

The government, however, was probably right in not panicking over the results. The election, in a sense, had given Kenya a reprieve. There was a feeling that a fresh start was now possible. Kenya now had a chance to deal with its awesome tribal problem without crisis; Kenya had time and calm.

IV

What, in fact, is the awesome tribal problem? It has two sides, the domination of the Kikuyus and the disaffection of the Luos. This, of course, seems obvious from the events of last year. It is easy, in fact, for an outsider to come up with a simple formula: Kenya will be sure of stability with the decline of Kikuyu power, and its corollary, anti-Kikuyu resentment, and the increase of Luo influence and loyalty to the central government. Unfortunately, the issues are a good deal more complex and emotional.

Kikuyu dominance can be documented easily. The President and six of his 22 cabinet members are Kikuyu; and the six ministries include the two most prestigious, Finance and Foreign Affairs. In the civil service, Kikuyus have nine of the 22 permanent secretaryships, the highest nonpolitical position in the ministries. Of the seven provincial commissioners, the civil servants who administer the provinces for the President and the central government, four are Kikuyu. Kikuyus also head the police, the Central Bank of Kenya, the University of Nairobi, and the two most important government agencies involved in the private sector of the economy, the Industrial and Commercial

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Development Corporation and the Kenya National Trading Corporation.

The Luos and the Kambas (the fourth largest tribe in Kenya) fill a number of the other significant positions, though they are far less influential than the Kikuyus. Three cabinet members and the head of the labor movement are Luo, while two cabinet members, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and the commander and many of the top officers of the army are Kamba.

The Kamba dominance in the 4,700-man army comes from colonial days when the British looked on them as favored recruits and the Kikuyus, who led the Mau Mau rebellion, as suspicious and disloyal. The lieutenants and captains in the army these days, however, are heavily Kikuyu, and in a decade or two the army could come under Kikuyu dominance. In addition, the general services unit, a 1,200-man paramilitary unit within the police, is run by Kikuyus.

In a survey of the Kenya élite in 1967, Michael Chaput and Ladislav Venys of Syracuse University's program of Eastern African Studies concluded that the Kikuyu were preëminent. "In terms of both number and percentage they are disproportionately represented," they wrote; "have more inhabitants in Nairobi; are better educated; possess more individuals educated outside East Africa; are more frequently employed by government or in the professions, private business and teaching; have more members in voluntary associations; are more widely represented in local and national government than all other Africans and most non-Africans in this survey."

There has been a good deal of resentful criticism of Kikuyu dominance by backbenchers in parliament recently. No doubt some tribal bias is at work. Throughout Africa, politicians and civil servants feel more comfortable with associates from the same tribe and therefore tend to favor them in appointments and promotions. This is probably true in Kenya. But the critics of Kikuyu domination try to ignore a fact which they find difficult to face. The Kikuyus are the most educated, experienced, resourceful, energetic, adaptable and modern tribe in Kenya. If all promotions and appointments could be controlled strictly by an objective, computerized test of merit, the Kikuyus probably would still hold almost all the positions they have today.

The great advantage of the Kikuyus comes from the role of

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achievement in their traditional society. Unlike many other tribes, they give a relatively great deal of status to a man for what he has achieved rather than what his fathers did. Wealth counts far more than genealogy. The society also is fairly egalitarian and not authoritarian. In short, there is a good deal of social mobility and competition among the Kikuyus. In this regard, they resemble the Ibos of Nigeria, probably the most energetic and modern people in West Africa. People like the Kikuyus and the Ibos are quick to adopt new ways if they feel the changes will bring them the wealth that is so admired in their societies. If it strikes them that Christianity and education and modern ways can lead to status, they will accept them all. This, of course, gives them an advantage over other tribes that are satisfied with inherited status and adopt new ways with less fervor.

The Kikuyus also have other advantages. They come from an area of fertile land and cool, healthy climate. Malaria does not sap their energy, and arid or rocky land does not cheat them of production. In addition, a shortage of land has made them aggressive in their drive to compete and achieve. They also have benefited from having closer contact with the white settlers than other tribes in Kenya, for the whites settled on Kikuyu land. The Kikuyus have been closer to modern ways than other tribes and more eager to adopt them.

Education statistics demonstrate their drive. In Kenya, the number of schools and pupils are good indices of a community's desire for education, because the community usually must put up the school itself or contribute heavily to it, and the parents must make sacrifices to pay tuition. Central Province, the heartland of the Kikuyu people, has 15 percent of the country's population but 25 percent of its primary school children. Primary school enrollment in Central Province was 312,000 in 1969—21,000 more than the estimated population of children aged six to twelve in Central Province. In short, it is probable that all children of primary school age attend primary school in Central Province, plus a good number who are over-age. In Nyanza Province, the home of the Luo people, primary school attendance is only 53 percent of the estimated primary school age population.

The Harambee secondary schools of Kenya tell the same story. These schools, named from the Swahili word for "Let's pull together," are built by communities without any government

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assistance. Under the plan, the schools become eligible for government control and financing after they have operated on their own for several years. It is a way for an energetic, resourceful community to forge ahead in secondary education. Of the country's 431 Harambee schools, 110, or more than a quarter, are in Central Province.

It is nearly impossible to stem this drive of the Kikuyus. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the government of a developing country should make any attempt to dampen the enthusiasm of its most aggressive people. The drive of the Kikuyus is what development is all about.

V

The Luo litany of grievances need not be repeated here. In the first years of independence, Odinga was vice president of the government and Mboya its best-known and most brilliant cabinet member. Now the Luos do not count at the center of power. The great question is whether they can swallow their bitterness, try to establish new ties with the Kikuyu-dominated government and regain some of their lost influence.

The young, moderate and well-educated Luos who came to parliament after the last election have been trying to lead their people in this direction. They feel that the Luos have to help themselves. But the government has been slow to support them. A massive development program in Nyanza, for example, might persuade the Luos that they are better off with their new leaders than they were with the old firebrand Odinga. Yet the government has refused to start any new special projects in Nyanza.

Some of the new Luo leaders believe their task would be made easier if Kenyatta released Odinga. He has become a martyr, and his detention seems to dwarf all other issues for the Luos now. The Luo leaders believe they could assert their influence more if he were removed as an issue. At the same time, they believe he could be kept on the sidelines as a free man. The government also has failed to make small gestures that might placate the Luos, like paying homage to the memory of Mboya.

It is probable that Kenyatta believes that porkbarreling Nyanza or releasing Odinga or making gestures about Mboya would be interpreted by the Luos as a sign of government weakness and persuade them to demonstrate again or cause some kind of trouble. Of course, he may be right. After all, his massive

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show of authority did quiet Kenya at the end of last year. But the task of drawing the Luos back into the mainstream of Kenya seems to have been made more difficult by the government's refusal to take some initiative to welcome them.

VI

Tribal conflicts could flare again when the time comes to choose a successor to President Kenyatta. He is an extraordinarily strong man, who projects an image of power; but he is eighty years old. His era will come to an end in the near future. Under the constitution, the vice president, now Daniel arap Moi, a leader of the small Kalenjin tribe, would act as president for 90 days. During that time, his powers would be limited while the government prepared for a national election. The constitution insists, however, that a candidate for president must be nominated by a political party. If there is only one party then, as is true now, the KANU nominee would be elected automatically. The president thus would be selected either by the executives of the party, a primary open for all, or a limited primary in which the executives allow only a few select candidates.

Whatever the case, tribal manœuvring probably would be paramount. The Kikuyus would present the most difficult problem. The country cannot do without them; yet they are probably too weak numerically to rule without the support of a good number of other tribes. Any form of Kikuyu isolation, as a result either of the Kikuyus trying to rule without popular support or of the other tribes trying to form a government without the Kikuyus, would make governing difficult. The Luos probably are too weak, disaffected and leaderless to expect any candidate of their own to have a chance for the presidency. But they can be an unsettling force if they decide to resist any Kikuyu or Kikuyu-supported candidate. The best insurance for stability after Kenyatta would be some kind of an agreement between the Kikuyus and the Luos about his successor.

The next president, if selected by constitutional means, probably would come from one of these four groupings:

(1) The Kikuyu establishment. These are the ministers around Kenyatta, the ablest and most experienced men in government. Kenyatta probably would like to see one of them succeed him. Their best chance would come if the KANU candidate for president were selected by the party executives rather

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than in an open primary. Even then, they would have the difficult task of overcoming the resistance of the Luos and other tribes that resent Kikuyu domination. They are too closely identified with the present government.

(2) The Kikuyu outs. These are the younger Kikuyus, often wealthy and popular in their home districts, who have not been brought into Kenyatta's inner circle. Their ties with other tribes are far stronger than those of the establishment. In a primary, they might have a better chance of winning national support than members of the establishment. Most likely, they would do away with tribal identification in their campaigning and paint themselves as militant socialists determined to bring a better deal to all common men, no matter what their tribe.

(3) A small tribe. If anti-Kikuyu resentment becomes too strong, the Kikuyus, as a compromise, might support the leader of a small tribe in exchange for his pledge to keep the Kikuyu establishment in power. Vice President Moi is a strong contender for this kind of position.

(4) A larger tribe. The Abuluhya, the third largest tribe in Kenya, and the Kamba, the fourth largest, are pivotal tribes in the confrontation between the Kikuyus and the Luos. At the moment, both are in alliance with the Kikuyus in government. But, in manœuvring for a successor to Kenyatta, they might throw their support either way. This is particularly true of the Abuluhya who live near the Luos in western Kenya. Their price for support might be the presidency. But this is more likely to come in an alliance with the Luos than the Kikuyus. The Kikuyus probably would not pay such a high price. But any Abuluhya president, with only a Luo-Abuluhya-small tribe majority behind him, would have a difficult time ruling with the Kikuyus in opposition.

All this, however, should not suggest that turmoil is an inevitable result of the tribal manœuvring for succession. The Kenya politicians are aware of the need for stability and for tribal compromise; they intend to bargain and trade. They do not intend to let the tribal conflicts get out of hand. But they will face a hard task. Of course, if time eases the tribal antagonisms, other issues could rule the selection of a new president. Dissatisfaction about unemployment and the uneven distribution of wealth, for example, could create more important issues. But Kenya is unlikely to have that much time.

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THE PEACE CORPS: MAKING IT IN THE SEVENTIES

By Joseph H. Blatchford

TEN years ago this fall John Kennedy first spoke about sending Americans overseas in voluntary service. By the following summer the idea had a name—the Peace Corps—several hundred Volunteers were in training, and even as Congress debated the program it became clear that the idea was catching on. The Silent Generation was ready to be heard from and young Americans were flooding the Corps' makeshift headquarters with thousands of applications. The public saw in it an opportunity to "show what Americans are really like" and redeem the image portrayed in Eugene Burdick's best-seller, "The Ugly American." Surveys revealed thousands of jobs to be done abroad. It seemed obvious that the most modern nation in the world could provide the needed manpower. Despite misgivings, Congress baptized the experiment by overwhelming votes.

The original plan proposed to the President by Sargent Shriver envisioned a role for Americans of all ages, skills and backgrounds and Kennedy responded by calling for all kinds of Americans to volunteer. It was, however, almost exclusively the young who answered the call. They were ready, willing and available in such numbers that it became an immense task to find enough assignments for them abroad.

But the times were propitious abroad as well as at home. In Africa the beginning of the Peace Corps coincided with the first few years of freedom from colonial rule. Many new governments, uncertain of their needs, signed up for anyone who could help. The Peace Corps was invited to send hundreds of teachers for rural schools as young governments expanded an élite colonial school system, trying to reach more of their citizens and educate its own civil service. At one time the Peace Corps provided half of all the secondary school teachers in Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.

The Peace Corps was Point Ten of the Alliance for Progress and thus part of President Kennedy's assistance package for Latin America. Living there at the time, I recall the early sixties as an era of renewed promise. The greatest number of demo-

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cratically elected governments in Latin America before or since had great schemes for rapid social change, such as a sixth-grade education for every child by the end of the decade. The Peace Corps was to be part of the peaceful revolution; its Volunteers poured in by the thousands.

The agency grew in almost geometric progression. In 1961 there were 750 Volunteers and trainees; in 1963, 6,500; and by 1966, 15,500. The number of countries grew from 8 in 1961 to 44 in 1964. Volunteers were sent in large groups. For example, there were 1,133 in India in 1967, 716 in Nigeria in 1966, 720 in the Philippines in 1968, 625 in Micronesia in 1968 and 639 in Brazil in 1966.

Americans felt genuine excitement and pride when it was discovered that, contrary to our affluent image, Volunteers could live in the villages or barrios and love it. They proved to be popular with the people, and the best of them made remarkable impressions. The American people, in a public opinion poll, declared the Peace Corps to be the best investment among our foreign assistance programs. The agency opened a massive community development program in Latin American avowedly to bring "social revolution" through "agents of change." Great faith was placed in the ability of a young American to mobilize a rural village without substantial training, supervision and support. By the middle of the decade Peace Corps officials were speaking of the possibility of 100,000 volunteers. The idea also caught hold in Europe where a half-dozen countries started smaller groups of their own.

However, problems beneath the surface, ignored in the early excitement, soon began to emerge. Governments became disturbed by the presence of foreigners in schools which transmitted their history and culture. They therefore reduced the number of Volunteer teachers, restricting them to less sensitive subjects and to rural areas. In Ethiopia the Peace Corps seemed to have helped educate a revolution. Students opposed to the Selassie government and the American support of it demanded the withdrawal of Volunteers from education. Student agitation also led to withdrawal of Volunteers from universities and capital cities in several countries, most notably Turkey and the Philippines.

In Latin America the community development venture almost disappeared. It had been founded on the belief that a young

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American college graduate could mobilize *campesinos* to build up their communities and to demand their full rights as citizens. The Volunteers were thought of as superpioneers, new frontiersmen for a new society. But, as it became clear, this means of setting the Volunteers out on their own (which came to be called "parachuting") failed because of a lack of extensive training, thorough supervision and substantial prearranged local support. At the same time it was found that other projects throughout the world were not sufficiently oriented to the immediate needs of the country.

In 1967 Pakistan decided not to request additional Volunteers "because it has determined that its needs were for technicians and specialists of a more sophisticated level than the Peace Corps generally provides." The Peace Corps left nine other countries in the late sixties, most of them for reasons of domestic or international politics, as in Libya and Somalia, where military governments came to power in 1969.

As the decade came to a close, pressures of this kind, plus a growing suspicion within the Peace Corps of the "numbers game" which emphasized the quantity of Volunteers overseas, steadily reduced the number of Volunteers. The press no longer found it exciting. If the public had any thoughts on the subject they could be summed up in one query: "Whatever happened to the Peace Corps?" The Senate Foreign Relations Committee provided one answer when its 1970 report noted that the Peace Corps was "increasingly becoming the target of anti-American sentiment . . . . The committee believes that the time is near when the assumptions and concepts on which the Peace Corps was founded need complete reëxamination."

What would a reëxamination reveal? Has an idea which seemed so timely nine years ago now become outdated? Certainly the election of Richard Nixon, who has no need to champion the Peace Corps, and the shifting outlook of Congress toward foreign aid and involvement abroad, make the Peace Corps fair game for criticism. Are we seeing the beginning of the end for the Peace Corps, or is it perhaps the end of the beginning?

II

There can be little doubt that, as originally intended by the Congress, Peace Corps Volunteers have presented another and more favorable view of the United States, particularly in small

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countries where they are most visible. Nor can it be doubted that nearly 40,000 Volunteers have provided this country with a new wealth of knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures. Moreover, the Peace Corps experience has equipped Volunteers for innovative roles upon their return to the United States.

There have also been notable examples of success in "meeting the trained manpower needs of developing countries," as Congress expected. However, the Volunteers themselves have put that in perspective. A questionnaire completed by 7,000 returned Volunteers last year revealed that 92 percent thought their service "very valuable" to them and 45 percent felt it had been very valuable for the United States, but only 25 percent felt it had been very valuable for the foreign country. If those who have been through the Peace Corps are accurate judges, the Peace Corps must do more to fulfill its first goal: to help countries meet their needs for trained manpower.

What we have seen so far is that the Volunteer *is* a unique and valuable resource. The dedication and idealism associated with the Corps concept make the Volunteer willing to persevere. The fact that he serves a comparatively short time, outside of the local civil service systems, can make him constructively impatient and genuinely innovative. The fact that he will live among the people insures that he can understand how to apply his know-how or a particular technology in a way that makes sense in the local situation. The transfer of technology has to start with a desire to receive and use it, which in turn requires that someone see the problem through the eyes of the recipient. This approach, so often ignored, has been at the heart of the Peace Corps. What remains to be done is to hitch this approach consistently to problems of higher priority.

To meet the needs of this new decade the Peace Corps has been undergoing a renewal process for more than a year. In May 1969, a task force drawn from government, business, labor, Peace Corps staff and returned Volunteers undertook a study of 10 specific aspects of the Peace Corps. A survey was taken to get the suggestions of returned Volunteers; another national poll surveyed college seniors; a management consultant firm studied the organization of the Peace Corps and recommended reorganization and a 22 percent headquarters staff reduction, both of which have now been carried out. On two occasions we

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met with leaders of European peace-corps type agencies and for the first time in the agency's history the 60 overseas country directors were assembled to discuss the future of the Peace Corps and make recommendations.

The Task Force felt that with only 10,000 Volunteers in a world dramatically short of trained manpower, it was still possible to make a substantial contribution. However, they suggested a number of guidelines for increasing the value of their contribution, which have been adopted by the Peace Corps in the form of five new directions for the 1970s. These plans have been approved and supported by President Nixon and generally endorsed by Congress.

The first of these new directions is to shift more Volunteer assignments to the high priority needs of developing countries. Long-range planning is the first step; Country Directors have therefore been asked to work out with local leaders a four-year plan to utilize Volunteers. We expect this planning to take the Peace Corps more heavily into vocational training, irrigation, small business development and such hitherto ignored areas as educational television, self-help housing and urban planning.

In this search we will be making a number of new assumptions.

First, we are willing to seek out and send overseas a single man or woman with a special skill, or to put together a small team of people. Large numbers are not important and can even create an unhealthy dependency. What is important is providing people with the particular and often unusual skills found in a modern society, which a developing society cannot afford to educate—for example, a soil scientist, a man trained in forest fire control or a cattle rancher. Operating on this assumption the Peace Corps will soon have overseas Volunteers in over 320 skill categories.

Second, we will work with those private agencies which have standing within the country and work on important needs. In the past the Peace Corps has dealt almost exclusively with central governments.

Third, once a need is identified we will consult with volunteer-sending agencies in other countries, most of which are in Europe, to put together multinational teams of Volunteers. If carefully selected, these teams will provide a greater capability than Volunteers from a single country and will be less susceptible to political changes.

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We hope to build into all projects an indigenous capacity to perform the task for which American Volunteers are being imported; in other words, each project should work itself out of a job in a given number of years. Even in projects such as an immunization program or the building of an irrigation system, where the job needs to be performed only once, the Peace Corps must try to serve a training function.

Using these guidelines, local governments have identified dozens of new projects, 39 this summer alone. In Guinea (which dismissed the Peace Corps in 1966) Volunteer mechanics and electricians have put the bus and truck system of Conakry back on the road, trained Guineans to operate the maintenance system and are now going to expand into other parts of the country. This summer in Thailand, Volunteer engineers and agriculturalists began a project to bring irrigation water from the Nam Pong Dam, part of the Mekong Development complex, to thousands of farmers. In India last winter officials told me of the need for Volunteers to go beyond the miracle rice and wheat projects which have involved them for several years to second-stage problems of the green revolution, such as food distribution, grain storage and repair of farm machinery.

The second new direction is to recruit the Volunteers with the skills which meet these higher priority requests. To attract Volunteers from a wider spectrum of American society, the Peace Corps has to broaden its appeal. Many people still think that to serve they must have a college degree or be under 30 years of age. A new message must go out, a new call to all Americans to volunteer. These will, in turn, require new rules and recruiting methods. For example, an experienced engineer, or a machinist, carpenter or farmer is more likely to be married than the typical recent college graduate. To enable him to serve abroad, Peace Corps must relax its prohibition against Volunteers with families. This year 200 families will be serving overseas on an experimental basis to determine the feasibility of such a plan. To recruit the kinds of Volunteers requested overseas, Peace Corps must also achieve closer coöperation with unions and business so that craftsmen or mid-career professionals may join the Peace Corps without jeopardizing their seniority or advancement. In this, as in the recruitment of Volunteers, we already have the coöperation of the AFL-CIO, the U.A.W. and numerous businesses.

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Naturally there is widespread skepticism about the agency's ability to attract people with the critical skills, but I would suggest this skepticism misreads the changing times. In 1970 Americans are more mobile and flexible; they are unwilling to stay on one job or even live in one place for 30 years. We are therefore operating on the assumption that Americans with the needed skills *will* respond in this decade just as did the liberal arts graduate in the last decade.

Moreover, I am confident that the young person, single, just out of college, will continue to join the Peace Corps under the right conditions. This is a terribly serious generation. Today's student wants to apply his skills to significant social problems. If the Peace Corps speaks in slogans and vague pleas, it will not appeal. But it will attract students if we say, "Here is what has to be done in *X* country and here is the training we will provide to equip you to do the job." To cite just one example, the Peace Corps has initiated a program with the State University of New York at Brockport under which junior year math and science majors are recruited for study and training during their senior year at college and then for volunteer service as teachers in Peru. This year the University received over 10,000 inquiries to fill just 60 positions. Intern programs like this combine study with action in a dosage which appeals to today's students.

Intern programs are also one means of recruiting members of minority groups into the Peace Corps. Until now less than one percent of Volunteers have been black, and only a handful have come from the Spanish-speaking community. Africans, for one, feel that the Peace Corps is "lily white." The Peace Corps has set up a special division to recruit members of minority groups and recently appealed for the assistance of predominantly black colleges. Intern programs have been established with Shaw, Atlanta and Texas Southern Universities to provide training for Volunteers going to Africa and will award college credit for the service abroad. The same is true of Texas A & M, which is helping to send Mexican-Americans to Peru. We have already doubled the number of minority members in the Peace Corps, but this is only the first step.

III

The third new direction of the Peace Corps concerns its rela-

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tionship to the host country. For as long as we have operated them, aid programs have been presented in terms of coöperation and partnership between giver and receiver, but in fact genuine partnerships have been rare. For the most part the United States has played the benefactor who imprinted the signs of his generosity on all that he gave, like the rich uncle afraid his ragged nephews would forget his generosity. This has engendered in the recipients a hostility quite contrary to the friendship the aid was intended to inspire. Technical assistance has perhaps been better received, but too often the technicians have been clustered in the capital cities, well paid, well housed and isolated from the countryside. Of late, technical assistance has been conducted almost exclusively by contractors who serve a relatively short time overseas. Some do not speak the local language and very few speak the colloquial or tribal languages or understand the culture behind them.

In the beginning most Peace Corps projects also were clearly identifiable as being American undertakings but this slowly changed until in many instances the Volunteer is today responsible to a local ministry and sees the Peace Corps mainly as a paymaster and a source of occasional support. In the process I believe the Peace Corps has demonstrated something about how to conduct assistance programs. A modest living allowance insures that Volunteers will experience life below the level of the élite. Moreover, the Peace Corps has been increasingly concentrated in the sectors of society where change is taking place most rapidly, for example in the application of miracle wheat and rice technology, teacher training, and in the unique professional services which are crucial to development.

But if the Peace Corps has done better than some agencies, it is still behind the times. Somehow the Peace Corps must become a genuine partnership effort so that the undertaking will be "theirs" as well as "ours." It is difficult for Americans to understand the depth of local pride or how easily it can be offended. Dependency—whether in terms of markets or the need for outside manpower—is the bane of all who are conscious of this sense of national identity. In order for the Peace Corps to avoid engaging in a kind of Volunteer colonialism, it must be rooted in local desires and its projects administered by local people.

Therefore we have taken certain concrete steps to help make the Peace Corps a coöperative venture. Our goal is to fill 50

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percent of the Peace Corps overseas staff positions—including the upper echelons—with local citizens. The entire process by which projects are selected, operated and evaluated will henceforth be a joint responsibility.

When I visited India in February, the Speaker of the Maharashtra State Assembly and two of his ministers urged me to place responsibility for the Peace Corps under local advisory committees—all the way from a small committee in the township where each Volunteer worked, to national groups which would concern themselves with one type of project or with the operation of the entire Peace Corps in that country.

This idea is now being pursued in most of the 60 countries where the Peace Corps operates. One role for these local committees might be to encourage the establishment of local volunteer corps. These could range from groups of high school or college students working part-time to full-time service like Iran's successful Army of Knowledge, under which 27,000 young Iranian men and women teach or work in the area of their special training for one year upon completion of academic training.

Whether within governments or in semi-public or private organizations, dozens of such service corps are now springing up around the world as leaders recognize the value in harnessing academic training and the energy of youth to national development. The Peace Corps is lending staff and volunteer support to these movements wherever possible. In many cases these local volunteers will take over projects which now engage American Volunteers.

Encouraging volunteer service by international and multinational teams is the Peace Corps' fourth new direction. My experience has been that most countries still prefer to receive volunteers on a bilateral basis. However, this is not true in all cases. Sometimes one country cannot supply all of the skills needed in a particular project; sometimes governments—particularly those most sensitive to East-West tensions—prefer to avoid too close an identity with any one other government; and many of today's potential Volunteers prefer to serve under an international flag or in concert with Volunteers from other countries. (In a recent poll of college seniors, 80 percent favored service in the Peace Corps as part of an international team.)

The Peace Corps has already begun the process of assigning

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Volunteers to U.N. agencies and enthusiastically supports the idea of the U.N. Corps, which was approved by the U.N. Economic and Social Council last July and recommended to the General Assembly. If the proposal is adopted, requests will be formulated by U.N. agencies and member countries and their Volunteers supplied through existing private and governmental agencies like the Peace Corps. We expect to provide our share of Volunteers in the years ahead, and more immediately, to undertake joint projects with volunteers from other countries, principally in Europe, before the year is out. Twenty-three such projects have been identified. For example, the Peace Corpsmen in the Mekong River Project will be working with volunteers from England, Austria and Canada.

IV

If the first four new directions emphasize a greater contribution to the foreign country, the fifth is intended to relate the Peace Corps to the enormous problems in the United States. It is common for Americans to ask today, "Why go overseas when there is so much to be done at home?"

The answer to the question is also best exemplified in the nearly 40,000 Volunteers who have now served in the Peace Corps and returned home. After living among the poor abroad and struggling in the agonizing process of change, they are not satisfied with "band-aid" cures. Neither are they given to simplistic solutions such as revolution or benign neglect. It is not surprising that 40 percent of Volunteers change their career plans while in the Peace Corps or that upon returning they continue a life of service to society. Of those employed today one-third are in teaching, many of them in ghetto schools. (It was returned Volunteers who staffed the Cardoza Project in a Washington ghetto school which served as a model for the Teacher Corps.) Another third are working at all levels of government, particularly in community action and poverty programs. Twelve percent work in international and nonprofit organizations and foundations. The young man in Chicago who helped transform a Chicago street gang into a thriving economic development corporation is one of the more dramatic examples of the hundreds who have begun a life of promoting social change.

Still, the returned Volunteer is underutilized. There is too

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little effort to relate his work abroad directly to needs at home; moreover, with the Corps' emphasis on classroom teaching and rural community development, Volunteers have been prepared to meet only a limited number of America's problems.

In the future we expect the Peace Corps to play a larger role abroad in population, ecology and conservation problems, curriculum reform, vocational education and urban planning. In each of these areas the foreign experience can provide training to meet a need in the United States. We will also undertake programs of "combined service," in which a Volunteer would sign up for three years instead of two and serve part of his time in the United States and part of it abroad. We expect this year to undertake joint projects with the Smithsonian Institution in the fields of ecology and the environment overseas and to double and then triple the number of Volunteers working in cities.

More directly, we are working out "internships," under which Volunteers will return to specific change-oriented jobs in big city governments. Such programs have already been worked out with the cities of Cleveland, Atlanta and San Juan and more will follow with urban-oriented private organizations.

V

These five new directions are essentially untested, and the test flight is coming at a time when the political winds are as turbulent for the agency as at any time since 1961. There is bitter disillusionment over the Vietnam war among the Peace Corps' traditional college constituency. For many of these students the Peace Corps is tainted by the war, an arm of the Establishment, merely the most tolerable part of an intolerable government. An organized and vocal minority of returned Volunteers call the Peace Corps "the smile on the devil's policy."

Moreover, as the country turns inward, voluntary service at home becomes more attractive than service overseas. In the shifting and often fickle competition among social causes the Peace Corps trails well behind ecology or domestic politics. Then, too, the election of Richard Nixon could alter the traditional allegiances. Some think the President will allow the Peace Corps to die of inattention. In the Congress the Peace Corps could fall victim to partisan politics. As for the new directions, none of them lack detractors. Some people are opposed to the partnership approach, others to working with international

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agencies and volunteers from other countries. One critic has already called our recruitment of skilled workers, farmers and members of minority groups "a disaster," and more charitable commentators are still skeptical that the Peace Corps can recruit in sufficient numbers beyond the campus. To say the least, there is no reason to expect a smooth course for the Peace Corps in the years ahead.

And yet I believe there is reason for optimism. The Peace Corps is in 60 countries, trusted and respected in the main. There is genuine enthusiasm for the new directions among host countries, as reflected in the requests we receive. Two years ago 73 percent of the requests were for "A.B. Generalists," recent college graduates in the liberal arts. This summer the figure was 38 percent. Two years ago the request for experienced farmers was 5 percent of the total; this year 15 percent. The figure for skilled tradesmen and vocational instructors is two and five percent, and rising rapidly. Overall, the number of total requests are "up" for the first time in four years.

These requests *are* being filled in 1970. For the recruiting year ending August 31, we have met 94 percent of all requests. This includes over 260 separate skills. For example, Kenya has received 20 civil engineers and 20 experienced farmers and farm mechanics. Volunteers sent to India this summer include a tool and die maker, a welder, an electrical technician, a psychologist, x-ray and medical technicians, and an operational therapist. Iran got 11 experienced mechanics and craftsmen with 148 years combined experience. In total, the Peace Corps this year provided 157 engineers, 332 experienced teachers, 392 farmers, 127 with skill trades, 53 with backgrounds in forestry and conservation.

A Peace Corps so composed might not have been possible 10 years ago but today the volunteer spirit is expanding to students in the professional schools and older Americans who are no longer content to keep their place in the line for affluence and retirement. Millions of Americans still ask themselves what they can do for their country. They, too, are unwilling to undertake "band-aid" assistance overseas, so it is the responsibility of the Peace Corps to insure that the jobs we ask them to do are of high priority and match the skills they have to offer.

As for President Nixon, one would not expect him to shower the Peace Corps with attention as did President Kennedy, but neither would such a confirmed internationalist and advocate

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of voluntarism overlook the Peace Corps. This President sees the Peace Corps as a source of innovation, a proving ground for new ideas and a people-to-people form of nonpolitical assistance. The separation of the Peace Corps from foreign policy considerations has been reconfirmed by this Administration and the new directions given full support.

The possibility continues that the Peace Corps could suffer from the climate of apathy and skepticism which surrounds most forms of American assistance. Yet in the Congress support spans the political spectrum from Senator Goldwater who recently called the Peace Corps "the best thing we have going in the field of foreign relations" to Senator Church, who has proposed that the Peace Corps take over more of technical assistance.

And there is much more that could be achieved through the Peace Corps. The present system is built on subsistence living and saves $75 a month for Volunteers—taxable and without interest—in the United States. Under these conditions, there are limitations on what can be expected even if the important tasks are identified and matched to the skills of Americans with high idealism. Although we encourage as many as possible to extend for a third or fourth year, too few can afford to delay a return to some degree of savings accumulation and therefore go home at the time they become most effective and might be most willing to stay if they were given some additional incentive.

So we ask ourselves, should there be a second or perhaps a third level of Peace Corps service? Could a successful Volunteer be given additional training and sent back into the field, again living in a modest fashion but working at a higher level of sophistication with additional compensation held for him at home? Should the Volunteers be supported by a cadre of university-professional level experts serving less than two years, again living modestly and with their compensation held in the United States? Particularly in the smaller countries where the Peace Corps seems to have the greatest impact, should it be allowed to give material assistance in small quantities, or at least call upon funds from another grant and loan institution?

Finally, should the Peace Corps remain within the government in future, and if so, where? The Peterson Report has recommended that scientific and technical assistance and social development grants come from an institute having a private-public board of directors and operating like an independent

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foundation. Should the Peace Corps be part of such an institute?

Mention of these possibilities will no doubt fuel the criticism of those who see the Peace Corps becoming a junior AID—traditional technical assistance in new clothing. Instead of idealistic youth, it will be alleged, the Peace Corps will be the haven of professionals come to practice their trade among the élite; and we will be right back to where we started in 1960.

But the Peace Corps will continue to be a people's agency, dealing primarily with training others and distinguishable by the living style of its Volunteers. Language, adaptation to local culture, and modest living habits will continue to be at the heart of the Peace Corps. This will continue to be so not because idealism is somehow tested and made pure by adversity (villagers consider such reasoning irrelevant or a bit mad) but because the Volunteer must live among the people to become credible and to understand how his knowledge can be applied. As a country we must continue to work directly with the poor and middle classes abroad, particularly in those endeavors where change can take place most rapidly. Certainly an upper-echelon, government-only assistance effort would inappropriately represent the desire of the American people to aid their fellow men. In the Peace Corps, and also in all our dealings with other countries, there must be forged a hitherto unknown spirit of partnership not only with local citizens—which is the most crucial element—but also with international organizations and people from other countries. The Peace Corps cannot speak for others but we can pledge this spirit for ourselves, just as we can recognize the universality of human deprivation and help the returning Volunteer apply his skills to the problems of his homeland.

The world is long on plans today, but short on implementation because somehow the grand designs break down before someone carries them to the level of the people. This is where the Peace Corps must be found in the 1970s—near enough to the impoverished and disenfranchised to understand their problems, yet in touch with the larger forces which course through every society. We promise no panacea and the times have robbed us of the euphoric thrill found in leadership of a youth movement. But in the seventies the Peace Corps can be more lean, more innovative, more capable—a contributor to substantial change in a decade which sorely needs it.

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THE NEW GENERATION OF ISOLATIONISTS

By James A. Johnson

THE decade of the sixties has produced a new school of isolationism. The reaction to the war in Vietnam, the demands of domestic problems and the seeming hollowness of traditional assumptions of international involvement—all give rise to this outlook. The isolationism is sometimes incoherent, occasionally inconsistent, and very attractive to a large portion of the younger generation.

Essentially, the isolationists are assaulting the cherished lessons of the thirties, the war years and the aftermath of the cold war. Alliances, so valued in the fifties, have no more appeal than the ideas of the men responsible for them. The threat of communism to U.S. security no longer seems real. Like their fathers who rejected the isolationism of the twenties and thirties, their critique of American foreign policy is straightforward and all-inclusive, and, like their fathers they guarantee that when they control foreign policy they will not repeat the tragic errors of the present.

The isolationists are heterogeneous by age, ideology and temperament; however, the most rapid increase in converts is among the under-thirty generation, which is my own. In February of 1969 the Gallup Poll released a report with the following headline: "Isolationist Viewpoint Gains in Appeal." Respondents in their twenties accounted for the significant increase from 1967 to 1969. In 1967 only 11 percent of the persons between 21 and 29 said the United States should "keep independent in world affairs." In 1969 that percentage jumped to 28 percent, due—in Gallup's estimation—to discouragement caused by the war in Vietnam. A June 1970 report by Louis Harris and Associates on college students verified the important shift in attitudes of young people currently enrolled in college. It emphasized the dramatic differences between the students and their parents on the threat of communism to American society, the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and President Nixon's success in the handling of American foreign policy. Youth is not alone, however. The anti-Vietnam war statements of a broad spectrum of peace groups challenge American foreign policy throughout the world. The

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"Vietnam is no accident" theme is commonplace. Although certainly not all the youth are in organized peace groups, and only a fraction of the general American citizenry, the breadth and depth of isolationist sentiment is growing rapidly.

Many commentators, however, misunderstand the current isolationist sentiment. In my view, it is the juxtaposition of isolationism with internationalism that is responsible for much of the misunderstanding, for this juxtaposition is not appropriate for a meaningful analysis. Two words summarize the real conflict in orientation in the current debate: isolationism and interventionism. The isolationists of the current generation are in no sense xenophobic. They have travelled more, studied more about foreign countries, and probably sympathize more with the aspirations of the developing countries than any group in American society. They are neither suspicious of foreigners nor unsympathetic to their problems. Such important ingredients of the internationalist credo as economic aid, international trade and technical assistance, if properly administered, are strongly supported by many holding the isolationist position. Further, they consider that the problems of nuclear armaments, their potential for world destruction, are crucial, and soluble if at all, only on an international scale. Isolation from the dangers of nuclear war, they realize, is impossible.

Moreover, the isolationist of the 1970s is more attuned to the Eastern intellectual of the 1930s than the anti-British, chauvinistic Midwesterner of that era. He would be no more at home with the *Chicago Tribune* of the 1930s than with the *Chicago Tribune* of today. Just as some Eastern intellectuals, primarily on the Left, saw their alliances as horizontal rather than vertical, the younger generation today sees an alliance among the students, the minorities, the non-superpowers of Europe and the third world. Such an alliance in both instances is more a romantic affinity than a real alliance. Nevertheless, the perception of international camaraderie is real.

The central issue for the new isolationists is the use of American military power. The companion issues of economic and diplomatic presence are important, but not as important. The current definition of American military policy, though distorted by our involvement in Vietnam, remains firmly rooted in the experience of World War II. The widespread popular support for the Second World War was based on the unique combination

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of moral outrage and fear for national security, a combination which resulted in a deathblow to the isolationism of the thirties. However, the reluctance of the American populace to respond to the Nazi and Fascist danger prior to 1941, the fervor of the "Keep Us Out of War" movement, and the disillusionment following the settlement at Versailles, all testify to the depth of the prewar isolationism.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the catalyst of American commitment in late 1941 and early 1942. The Japanese triggered a total response which, without a direct attack, would have been virtually impossible, or at any rate would have come much more slowly. Nevertheless, many argue that the threat to England and the continued expansion of the Germans would have inspired American military action in any case. The major difference between the two paths to commitment of military forces in the two wars was the degree of consensus that existed in the United States. Moreover, because of its scale, the experience of the Second World War was very personal to most Americans. Everyone knew someone who had joined the military effort. The Jewish people felt the impact of being under ferocious attack.

The depth of commitment following Pearl Harbor and the "lessons" of the thirties made it relatively easy for the country to adjust to a shift of focus in the late forties from Hitler and Germany to Stalin and the Soviet Union. The threat was similar in many respects. The ideology of communism as manifested in the Soviet Union seemed in its effects to be as evil as Nazism. The threat to national security and the threat of expansionism were made real in Eastern Europe, Greece and finally in Korea. Though the postwar domestic demands did require a shift of emphasis, acceptance of the Marshall Plan and the policy of containment indicated that the country accepted the assumption that the international involvement engendered by the Second World War must be continued. There was no discussion of pulling back behind the protective illusion of the Atlantic and Pacific. America felt she had a duty, and she took it seriously.

II

The most basic change in the perception of international political reality in the last 18 years is that the delineation of the world into the "good guys" and the "bad guys" on a one-dimen-

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sional scale is impossible. The simplistic concept of a "free world" and a communist world which differ on essential standards of personal liberty, economic systems and participation in governmental institutions and decision-making is no longer believed. The younger generation neither accepts the contrast with the communist system nor understands the fear and condemnation of it. The generation of the cold war applied the word communist indiscriminately. Few particulars that distinguish Soviet communism from our own system are even pointed out—differences which would have greater impact than the overused and unspecific "communist" label. But the Soviet Union of today appears to be very different from Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union of the late forties and early fifties. Stalin and Hitler are gone. The existence of Jugoslavia and the more liberalizing communist régimes of Eastern Europe, plus the very success of the policy of containment, temper the modern view of the "enemy." Even the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a sufficient departure to change significantly the general perception of the communist system among the young in this country. If anything, it seems to have illustrated the similarity between the hegemony of the United States in its sphere of influence and the Soviets' dominance in theirs.

The old kind of American idealism is gone—and with it the sense of world mission. Youth does not think America is the showcase of democracy. Far from it. Fifty-eight percent of the college students questioned in the recent Harris survey indicated that they viewed America as a "highly repressive society—intolerant of dissent." Even among students who described their political outlook as conservative or middle-of-the-road, more than 40 percent agreed with that description. Further, Harris finds that 80 percent of the students think that protests will continue after the war in Vietnam is concluded due to "more basic faults in the society." He reports that 76 percent believe that basic changes are needed in the American political and social system to improve the quality of life in America. Youth cannot see the dramatic contrasts which would lead to a commitment to fight for this specific form of government or way of life.

The new idealism that does exist among American youth developed along remarkably different lines. The civil rights movement of the early sixties, the Kennedy era, and the general politicization of American youth—brought on by the gap between

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theory and practice—have combined to produce a new orientation toward political and social change. The national idealism of former days sought to present the world with the picture of a nation which was worthy of emulation, and indeed the American experiment seemed close enough to success for many to take seriously the possibility that the United States might set an example to the rest of the world.

Being neither nationalistic nor patriotic, the young today often claim, and justifiably so, that they show a deeper concern for the health of American society than nearly any other group. They are strongly committed to solving the problems of hunger and malnutrition, racism, pollution, urban decay and other grave social problems. But they do not see their electioneering, lobbying, and general political organization in an international context. The idea of using American domestic change for international propaganda is offensive, and in a curious way they find our unfortunate image abroad not objectionable. It reconfirms the disillusionment they themselves feel and lends additional support to their cause. Further, most young people feel that the United States will require long years of commitment to reform in order to achieve a credible record in the problems it must solve.

There is another important change in outlook toward the communist world. The communist expansionism which followed the Second World War seems to have reached its end. With only rare exceptions does anyone under thirty worry about countries "going communist." The often quoted statements by Soviet leaders dedicating the communist party to world domination are considered relics of the past. Moreover, why should we accept their definition of intentions? The fear that we might confront a monolithic international force has collapsed with the emergence of communist polycentrism, the liberalization in Eastern Europe and the Sino-Soviet conflict. And the possibility of a Chinese threat to us seems unlikely as long as China's internal situation remains unsolved.

Aside from an indigenous revolution in Cuba, it has been 20 years since a country has been taken over by a communist military or political manœuvre. For this reason the anti-communist dogma of the past has less and less meaning. One must now be over 40 to have any real memory of the era of communist expansion. And half the population of this country is under 25.

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III

A further change in outlook results from changes in the technology of war. The conventional armaments of the thirties and forties made the possibility of world conquest real. Now the threat of nuclear war dominates any discussion of international conflict. The rhetoric of destruction is well known. The symbol of the mushroom cloud and the picture of the nuclear wasteland are truly fearful. However, the Cuban missile crisis marked the only brush with nuclear disaster; the wars of the sixties have been conventional in weaponry.

Fear of the destructive capability of the long-range bomber could generate in the thirties the same forceful language that we hear today in talk of overkill and multiple warheads. Norman Thomas said frequently that a Second World War could bring the "destruction of civilization as we know it today." Rhetoric aside, however, the differences in technology between the two periods have produced a new reality. The major fear of the earlier generation was more of domination by an alien power than of actual physical destruction. The perception of armed conflict could be compartmentalized geographically into traditional concepts of theaters and fronts; ideas of containment and counterattack were significant. Nuclear capability has changed all that.

Today, the peace movement is no longer focused on "the Bomb." The late fifties and early sixties were times of test-ban rallies and nuclear disarmament excitement. The everyday potential of annihilation that we live with has permanently changed the perception of interdependency. America is both more vulnerable to physical destruction and less dependent on other countries for defense or survival.

Yet the discussion of communism, expansionism and weapons technology fails to reflect adequately the overall attitude of young Americans to involvement with other countries. The current sense of isolationism involves more than the analysis of international conflict and geopolitical calculations. Young Americans are disillusioned about what good America can do abroad. In the idealism of the Kennedy era, represented in the early years of the Peace Corps, they were convinced of their ability to contribute to international development. The successes of the Marshall Plan had been a source of encouragement. Be-

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sides the Peace Corps, young people were attracted by the AID program and the numerous private programs designed to develop the third world.

Several factors have combined in the past five years to shatter their optimism. The riots in American cities—Watts to Hough to Newark—focused attention on the overwhelming domestic problems of racism and urban decay. The gulf in culture and politics between the young and the rest of the society became wider. Shootings at Kent State and Jackson State reinforced the feelings generated by the war in Vietnam. Blacks who fought in Danang and Hue came home to fight even harder for a menial job and helped change the climate here.

The coming of independence in Africa changed the climate abroad dramatically. Since World War II, 37 new states have come into being, plus Rhodesia. Foreign countries would vary their policies and attitudes on foreign assistance, but the trend throughout was toward nationalism and self-sufficiency. The poverty, frustration, and restlessness in the new states had a domestic counterpart. An affinity developed between the emergent African countries, assertive, proud and defiant, and the younger blacks in the United States, similarly assertive, proud and defiant, proclaiming black is beautiful. Those few blacks who actually went to Africa often came back disappointed, but, for most, the empathy was strong indeed. White sympathizers rallied to their cause, attempting to shed the chains of affluence and narrow-mindedness which they felt fettered their parents and were an embarrassment to them themselves.

Seemingly unrelated factors also combined to dash the remaining hopes of the idealists. Returning Peace Corpsmen reported the futility of what they had been doing in some areas. They brought news that the struggle to bring development in many countries would take decades, if not generations. The revelations of the CIA involvement with American student, youth, and academic institutions dealt the ideological idealists a crippling blow and reinforced the outspoken critics of American international involvement. As AID appropriations decreased, many countries were forced to become more independent of the United States. In general, the possibilities for a constructive American presence or support greatly decreased throughout the decade.

Disillusionment with the American potential for good was also related to the hostility with which U.S. foreign policy was viewed

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abroad. American economic policy in Latin America, American support for Israel, American intervention in Vietnam—each caused a significant portion of the world not to welcome Americans. Young people who are critical of these policies feel helpless and would rather not be involved internationally at all in the current mode of behavior.

Even in light of the success of the Kennedy confrontation with the Soviets over missiles in Cuba, the changed perception of the national interest by the younger generation would preclude them from supporting risks which the Executive would have taken at the height of the cold war. In their eyes, the nuclear age has rendered obsolete the traditional concept of collective security. They see no country for whose security they would fight. This has come to include Israel, which has traditionally evoked strong positive sentiments. In a Harris poll of May 1969, only nine percent of the respondents favored sending American troops to help Israel if she were in danger of being overrun by Soviet-aided Arabs.

Paradoxically, in a world of increasing interdependence the isolationists consider that the policies of the major powers are becoming increasingly independent. As they have turned inward, focusing more on domestic problems, they seek to minimize external commitments. The United States has had to become more concerned with race issues, poverty and urban discord. Soviet Russia has serious economic and political troubles. Europe is examining ways to strengthen itself by its own means. China has not yet recovered from the internal upheaval of the cultural revolution. Everywhere the need to remedy troubles at home leads nations to try to avoid troubles abroad.

IV

Proponents of the new isolationism differ significantly among themselves as to whether there are limits beyond which defense requirements cannot be disregarded. A large portion of the group does not consciously advocate unilateral disarmament. Many are excited about the potential of the SALT talks for easing what they recognize as the nuclear crisis. However, an equal number would regard nuclear retaliation in response to a first strike as unconscionable—the willful destruction of human life is simply unacceptable for any reason. In this view, the building of new weapons systems, regardless of any Soviet or Chinese

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initiatives in that direction, is equally unsupportable. Indeed, the excesses of defense spending are considered so deplorable that in many cases literally no international crisis or threat to national security could generate support for defense appropriations at the current level. The isolationists are not the force which makes the strategy of nuclear deterrence credible.

Critics are quick to point out that the new generation has not confronted conditions like the Nazi expansionism in the late thirties and early forties. They have not faced existence versus annihilation. The critics also question the isolationist assumption that the United States will not be attacked as well as the demand that domestic priorities be set at the expense of allocations for defense. And perhaps rightly so. The response of the new isolationists to a conventional threat might well be to give more support to defensive measures than the current rhetoric would indicate. Actual physical destruction, imposition of foreign rule or a military coup might elicit a strong response. Many of the young who are so disillusioned with the present imperfect society would nevertheless fight a conventional war for it—if only for the chance to improve it. Only a small percentage are absolute pacifists.

Conventional threats of the type listed above may never test this generation, and until they do the response is unpredictable. One can only say that the current diversity of outlook, the changes in the technology of war and the prevailing mood of disillusionment would prevent formation of a broad consensus that would see justification for war of the sort that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The underlying issue is national commitment, and perhaps a new definition of the national interest. The divisions in the country which in part arise from the war in Vietnam preclude the consolidation of a national will which could force steps to eliminate the poverty and hunger of millions of American families, rebuild the cities and save our natural resources. None of the problems is unique to the United States, and isolationists in no way advocate turning our back on other nations with similar ills. But we must cure them here; if we can simultaneously assist foreign countries, so much the better. Those who argue for new priorities for human needs are sensitive to those needs both at home and abroad. The grape workers in California, as an example, oppressed and exploited, received fervent support from

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idealistic American youth. Real people were fighting for a decent life against overwhelming odds, and the "now" generation felt direct concern.

The statement of the issue in terms of national commitment highlights another important component of the priorities argument. If the war in Vietnam were to end in a few months, the issues of national security and national defense would not die. Congressional debates on the Anti-Ballistic Missile System, defense contracting, the space program and the development of supersonic air transport have stimulated public awareness and challenged automatic approval of such military and military-connected expenditures. Domestic politics will be permanently affected by the intellectual force of arguments against preparations for military intervention.

At bottom, the prolongation of the war in Indochina is mainly responsible for the popularity of the new concept of the proper American international posture. Many young Americans have lived their entire political lives with Vietnam as the overriding issue. The teach-ins started in the spring of 1965—five and one-half years ago. Then, earlier this year, the war expanded to Cambodia. The effect of the prolongation of the war and the resulting frustration has been to end discussion of intermediate solutions in many quarters. From 1966 to 1968 the fear that a precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to a communist takeover prevented many Americans—again, most of them over thirty—from calling for an immediate end to the war. But in a Gallup poll in June 1970 more than half the population of the United States supported immediate withdrawal or scheduled withdrawal within one year. Middle positions based on hopes for coalition governments, ceasefires, pauses in military activity and negotiations have all but passed from active consideration. These changes are more dramatic among the young, but they represent a general realization that the costs of continued intervention in Vietnam far exceed the consequences of even a precipitate withdrawal. The traditional "victory" over the enemy in war lies outside the frame of reference of Second-World-War babies. Growing up in a compromise atmosphere—balance of terror, of fear, of power—they find the alternative to winning not only acceptable but imperative.

America has a long isolationist tradition. Now that the interventionism which followed the Second World War has run its

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course, the price of intervention seems higher than ever. One need only think of the likely public response to another—hypothetical—invasion of the Dominican Republic to sense how far the national attitude has evolved.

For many years the isolationists were said to be willing to risk repeating the mistakes that led to the Second World War, to turn their backs on international realities. Today among young people the pendulum has swung dramatically in the opposite direction. Interventionists have taken on the burdens of a major military mistake in Southeast Asia. They also are considered responsible for the anti-Americanism of major portions of opinion in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. They are criticized for their unwillingness to discard what are considered outmoded assumptions about the "communist threat." Even among the not-so-young, many persons have a sense of past errors. A new internationalism based on a peaceful response to human needs is the only effective response that the new generation of isolationists will heed.

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ITALY: THE CRISIS OF GOVERNING

By Arrigo Levi

TEN years ago, in August 1960, the Socialist Party abstained in the vote of confidence for the third Fanfani cabinet, thus giving the first and irreversible indication that a new period was beginning in the brief history of the Italian Republic. The era of "quadripartito" coalitions, running from the Christian Democrats to the Liberals, and including the Republicans and Social Democrats, was over. The "opening to the Left" was on. Although the first Center-Left government, led by Aldo Moro and including the Nenni Socialists, the Republicans and Social Democrats, would not come into being until December 1963, it can be fairly said that the sixties, in Italy, belonged to that political constellation. At the end of the decade, during the critical summer of 1970, people wondered whether a new turning point had arrived. Had the Center-Left already exhausted its historical task? If so, what would come afterwards—the "opening to the Communists," or, on the contrary, a turn to the Right? Or would, after all, the Center-Left coalition be able to survive and even gather new strength?

Certainly, since the elections in May 1968, the Center-Left has been going through a serious crisis. But it is a question whether the crisis is mainly political or goes deeper and involves the whole social and economic fabric of Italian life. What did it mean that, while politicians debated in Rome the pros and cons of a new coalition, people were furiously rooting for days and days in Reggio Calabria, on the tip of Italy's boot, formally protesting against the threat to reject their town as capital of the new region of Calabria, but in reality complaining against all the "politicians" because of the backwardness of their province? As a foreign observer somewhat brutally said, "Italy was to be compared to a centaur, who, when ill, didn't know whether to call for a doctor or a veterinarian." Was this the illness of "European" Italy, sharing all the new diseases of progress and growth, or the ancient sickness of "the other Italy," depressed and almost Balkanic in nature, unable to catch up with the fast-growing North, nurturing within itself the old spirit of rebelliousness, perhaps even spreading it all over the country with its waves of immigrants? And would there be time to remedy these ills?

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One of Italy's most intelligent politicians, the Republican leader Ugo La Malfa, feared that this most creative period of Italian history (as he told me bitterly in March 1970) was going to pass without Italy being able to transform its structures and reach a degree of political stability and national unity comparable to those of older developed nations. In this case the great chance would be missed, and democratic institutions would fall apart under the strain of old and new disruptive forces.

II

Since 1968, crisis had followed crisis at a pace which reminded one of the last years of the French *Quatrième République*. This was the most visible sign of a general decline of the Center-Left. During the five years of the Fourth Legislature, from May 1963 to June 1968, Italy had had four governments: Giovanni Leone's "monocolore di transizione" for the first five months, then three successive Center-Left cabinets, all led by Premier Aldo Moro and Vice-Premier Pietro Nenni. During the first two years of the Fifth Legislature, from June 1968 to July 1970, one more Leone transitional "monocolore," also lasting five months, was followed by three Mariano Rumor cabinets. The first one of them included all Center-Left parties and lasted from December 1968 to August 1969. Then the recently reunited Socialist Party (PSI) split, the coalition fell apart, and Rumor had to face the strikes and bomb incidents of "hot autumn," with one more all-Christian Democratic cabinet, supported in Parliament by its Center-Left partners. He resigned in February 1970, claiming that it was impossible to face the serious problems of Italy—the slowing down of economic growth, wild-cat strikes, the threatening economic crisis, new union demands for sweeping social reforms in health, transport, housing, taxation—without a stronger coalition government. One of Italy's longest crises followed, lasting from February 27 until April 17. Then the coalition was painfully reborn.

Shortly afterwards, the new Center-Left government faced the difficult test of the administrative-regional elections. To everybody's surprise, the four Center-Left parties together increased their popular vote from 55.3 percent (1968) to over 58 percent, while the left Socialists (PSIUP) lost ground, and the Communists (PCI), for the first time since the war, did not increase their percentage. Everybody believed this victory would

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strengthen the government. It did not. The success of 1970 seemed only to weaken the coalition, by increasing the individuality and mutual hostility of the two socialist parties. Each one began playing a "hard-to-get" game. There seemed to be a weakening of the links between the Center-Left partners. Christian Democrats and Social Democrats loudly protested against the PSI's alleged tendency to form local alliances with the Communists.

While the economic horizon darkened, production grew slowly, and the unions pressed on with local and national strikes for more money and more reforms, the four parties seemed unable to take a strong common line in economic policy, as well as on the problem of the "giunte" (which 10 years earlier had delayed the birth of the Center-Left). So another crisis was approaching; but people expected it would come after the summer holidays. Instead, one Sunday in July, Premier Rumor, quiet, gentle but increasingly nervous, became fed up with the whole thing. His appeals to the unions against useless strikes had remained unheard. His attempts to hold in line the Center-Left partners seemed to be failing. Without telling anyone but a few Christian Democrat leaders, he made up his mind to throw in the towel. The following morning, Monday, July 6, he announced his resignation to an incredulous Council of Ministers, hastily convened during the night. Was this to be a new "crisi di chiarificazione," a showdown among the parties of the Center-Left coalition? Or could it become the final crisis of the Center-Left era? For a few weeks, Italy would wonder, without knowing the answer.

But the real question for Italy is whether the Center-Left is still to be considered the best political instrument for carrying forward, in an orderly and efficient way, the structural reforms which everybody seems to consider necessary for the very survival of the Italian Republic. No final answer is in sight, despite formation of yet another Center-Left coalition.

III

In the late fifties, the crisis of the Center "quadripartito" coalition arose out of the reëntry into the "democratic area" of Nenni's Socialist Party, after the Hungarian tragedy of 1956 and its divorce from the Communist Party. In the late sixties, many observers felt that the main reason for the growing crisis

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of the Center-Left was the appearance, on the political horizon of democratic Italy, of the Communists as possible "valid partners," due to their estrangement from the Soviet Union after the Czech tragedy. Some people also felt that unruly Italy could no longer be governed without the Communists. But were the Communists really "only three steps away from government," as some foreign observers seemed to believe? Most Italian commentators would probably still answer in the negative. However, before facing this question, we might try and fill in some of the general background of what undoubtedly is the changing picture of Italy in the seventies.

The Economic Background. Italy's economic growth continues at a rather fast rate (around five percent a year), but not as fast as it could and should. Research by experts in "growth economics" shows that Italy's fast growth is due to a notable extent to improved allocation of human resources, to people moving from farm to factory. This, however, will not last forever. Research also shows that the increase of physical inputs—both capital and manpower—is not so large as in other fast-growing countries, such as West Germany. In simpler terms, a faster growth would need greater investment, a containment of private consumption, and the improvement of those infrastructures (schools, housing, transport, health services) which make economic changes and the movement of population easier, while improving the quality of the human capital. These same changes are also needed for social and political reasons. Tensions arising out of economic progress, in the crowded urban areas of the North, add to the old reasons for protest in the underdeveloped regions. Italy, last-arrival of the developed nations, seems to get the worst of both worlds. The so-called "structural reforms" should make economic growth easier, reduce the gap between private and public consumption and increase the country's social and political stability. Everybody therefore is calling for reforms.

At the same time, the natural dynamic of Italy's new "affluent society" and the achievement of full employment in the developed areas have led to much greater pressure for increased salaries, reduced work hours and increased private consumption, but have also resulted in the waste of natural resources and the pollution of the environment. Those same unions that strike for "structural reforms" against the government's inaction are at

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the same time refusing any policy of wage restraint; they support to the utmost all the claims by state employees and industrial workers. So Italy lives in what has been called a "happy demagogy." For the sake of social peace, or out of weakness and division, Center-Left governments have seemed unable to resist or choose between contradictory wage claims and demands for reforms. Of course, if the gross national product were to grow at the yearly rate of seven percent, which experts consider feasible, resources might be found for all this. If, however, the very improvement of social and economic conditions understandably enough reduces the zest for work, the taste for long hours of toil, and the capacity for self-sacrifice, then the whole economic structure might suddenly get into serious trouble.

It has to be admitted that during the last couple of years the Center-Left coalition has proved unable to guide the economic life of the country with a firm hand. Faced with the new pugnacious spirit of the unions, themselves spurred on by the challenge of small but active revolutionary *groupuscules* on their left, the Center-Left coalition has seemed to be more led than leading. While the cost of the administration has gone up, and its effectiveness and solvency down, doubts have increased that funds may be found for the reforms approved and demanded unless the pace of economic growth quickens fairly soon. What originally was the main raison d'être of the Center-Left—that is to say the achievement of some fundamental social-economic reforms within the framework of a national plan (which seems to be ever more ignored)—does not appear to have been achieved yet. So a golden opportunity in Italian history may have been lost.

The Social Background. The key word, for the late sixties and early seventies, seems to be "la contestazione generale"—a general protest and confrontation. A weak state faces an impatient nation, where every individual and every social, economic or regional group appears to be convinced that only by violent and dramatic protest can its interests be defended, its demands satisfied. We have had rioting for some very strange reasons, not only as a protest against unemployment and economic stagnation (as in Battipaglia and Avola), but also as a reaction to a lost football game (Caserta), or as an expression of "bell-tower rivalries" between cities claiming the status of capital of their new regions (Pescara and Reggio Calabria). There have been urban guer-

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rillas formed from the students and *jacqueries* from the peasants, and sometimes the two have joined hands.

Even the more law-abiding social groups, like the top civil servants and the teachers, have paralyzed key activities of the state by strikes; often strikes among state employees have resulted from rivalries between unions. People say that only priests and prostitutes have not as yet gone on strike. Losses of production have been immense—in 1969, on the order of two percent of the GNP.

The general weakening of authority, common to all contemporary societies, seems to be particularly strong in Italy, where the prestige of the state has always been low and was nearly destroyed by the Fascist experience. In spite of the unexpected flag-showing, on a fantastic scale, for the World Cup soccer final (sociologists are at work trying to explain those extraordinary spontaneous mass demonstrations, with tens of thousands of cars flying the "tricolore" in all the cities of Italy), patriotism is a word long dead in Italy. This undoubtedly increases the general mood of skepticism, uncertainty and a morality of "everyone-for-himself."

Some observers claim that the Communists, with their strategy of "the worse the better," are partly responsible for this demoralization. Others, perhaps more rightly, believe that they indeed are sometimes "riding the tiger," but that the tiger is certainly there. This is a fast-changing society, where everybody is impatiently trying to improve his own lot. The very reasons which are at the root of Italy's miracle—that great psychological push that started Italy's rush into the world of affluence—do indeed explain to a large extent the anarchical and impatient atmosphere of the country. In such an atmosphere, government becomes difficult. The Center-Left coalition has not proved particularly able in controlling the strong centrifugal trends of Italian society, giving the impression of reacting to events rather than anticipating them.

The International Background. Russia's presence in the Mediterranean, close to Italy, has increased in the late sixties. At the same time trends appear to be leading to an American disengagement in Europe, perhaps throughout the world. Nixon's "low profile," the achievement by Russia of nuclear parity, Russian attempts at "infiltration" in Jugoslavia, Russia's "forward policy" after Czechoslovakia, all these elements contribute to create

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a general insecurity in Europe; and for political as well as geographical reasons, Italy is the most exposed among Western nations. The reassuring counter-trend of European unification, which should lead to Britain's entry into the Common Market, is still very much in the future. An international scenario might be imagined for the seventies which would leave Italy in the position of a frontier country of the Western world, a lonely advance post of democracy in the Mediterranean, something like a "Finland of the South," but with a stronger communist party.

Could all this lead Italy away from its Western alliance toward neutrality? The first "opening to the Left" in the late fifties was made possible by the Socialist Party's clear pro-Western choice. Pietro Nenni's article in the January 1962 issue of *Foreign Affairs* gave the assurance that Center-Left Italy would remain a faithful partner of NATO, and indeed formed an important premise of the rise of the Center-Left coalition. There has not yet been a similar article by Signor Longo, no similar Communist choice in the late sixties. Its criticism of single acts of Soviet policy has not led the party to a general revision of its alignment, on all fundamental questions, with Moscow. The Communist Party is still a staunch member of the communist movement. Its position cannot be compared, for instance, with that of the Jugoslav party. It vociferously demands neutrality for Italy: beyond that slogan lie unforeseeable developments. Although the Center-Left has not weakened in any way Italy's ties with the West, the international background in the late sixties and early seventies is less fixed than in the past.

Thus, the factors for change in Italy, as the Republic approaches its 25th anniversary on June 2, 1971, are undoubtedly strong. Their political consequences, affecting the behavior and structure of the parties, are there for everyone to see. Perhaps the most obvious effect has been the weakening of party loyalties and the strengthening of separate "currents." All parties, except the smallest, and including to a certain extent the Communist Party, seem to suffer, in various degrees, from the same disease; "currentocracy" is fast taking the place of "partitocracy" as the most talked about, and usually deplored, phenomenon of Italian political life. While the unions, which had been divided in the bad old days of the cold war, show a strong tendency to unify, or at least to coördinate their actions (which according to some harbors the danger of communist dominance),

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parties show a strong tendency toward splitting. Indeed, perhaps the unions are just filling a political void.

The Socialists, of course, are the arch-splitters of them all. The curious thing is that, the more they split, the more votes they get (which does not make the life of the Center-Left coalition easier). The Communist Party has expelled its left wing, the lively intellectuals of "Il Manifesto," for being both too anti-Russian and too revolutionary, as well as for their proposals for a more democratic, less centralistic party. For the Center-Left, the job of forming a coalition has become a matter of putting together and satisfying not just three or four political bodies, but 10 or 12, as many as the organized currents within the parties. And, of course, some currents feel nearer to similar currents of other parties than to opposing currents of their own party.

Such being the state of the parties, the members of the Communist Party are openly speaking of a future alliance—which might begin in some of the new regions—with the Socialists and the Christian Democratic Left. On the other side, some democrats believe that an agreement might be reached in a not too distant future with the more conservative wing of the Communist Party, *i.e.* the Amendola group. The long-term policy of all the big parties is partly based on the expectation of future splits among their main rivals. If the Communist Party were to work out some form of coöperation with the democratic parties, which would split sooner—Christian Democracy, with its strong inner ties of confessional origin, or the Communist Party, with its old Leninist tradition of monolithic discipline?

IV

How real, in fact, is the perspective of an "opening to the Communists"?

This could very well be, in the seventies, the key question of Italy's political life. Unfortunately, no prophet has yet come forward with an easy and convincing answer. The temptation to "converge" is felt on both sides. However, the stronger this temptation, the stronger the resistance by powerful political forces. Most of all, the Social Democrats are up in arms. They split again from the newly reunited Socialist Party in the summer of 1969, because, they claimed, they were being inexorably drawn toward an alliance with the Communists. They were not at the time very convincing in this claim. Some felt that the real

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reason for the split was the fear of the former Social Democratic leaders of being crushed by the more powerful Socialist Party machine. However it may be, the Social Democrats insist that the danger is becoming more and more real. Indeed, this was the *leitmotif* of their alarmed statements during the cabinet crisis in the summer of 1970. The fact that the main justification for their party's existence is its denunciation of the communist peril, and of the Socialist Party's alleged leaning toward the Communist Party, makes coöperation very difficult among them and their former party-partners inside the Center-Left coalition.

This is the most obvious reason for the general crisis of the Center-Left in 1969–70. But, of course, the Social Democrats by themselves could not provoke such a drama if they did not find powerful support inside the Christian Democratic Party. The main cause of the crisis, many people believe, is the multiplicity of divisions within the Christian Democrats, as shown by the breakdown of the majority group (the "Dorotei") who had led the party through the sixties. The so-called "partito della crisi," aiming at provoking the dissolution of Parliament and new elections, from which a new Center-Right majority might issue, or which would "discipline" the Socialists, is insistently alleged to be supported or led by Fanfani himself, one-time father of the "opening to the Left" (but politicians change along with events). Signor Rumor's resignation in July 1970 was indeed explained by observers from the Left as such a machination against the Center-Left itself and against the Socialists.

If these are the main forces resisting any idea of an "opening to the Communists," others are tempted by plans for a cautious move toward such an opening which might, so it is hoped, improve the general social atmosphere and help control the disruptive forces inside Italy. Some of the Christian Democratic Left are leaning in this direction. So are some of the Socialist leaders. Francesco De Martino, former Secretary of the PSI, has spoken on occasion of the possibility of a future "alliance of the Left," going from the Communists, through the Socialists, to the "progressive wing" of the Christian Democrats. But this is exactly the Communist plan for taking power. Does the PSI feel that it belongs, first of all, to the democratic camp, or to "the Left"? There is indeed no very clear answer to this question, in spite of all the repeated attempts at "clarification" through government crisis. Of course, this Hamlet-like attitude of the Social-

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ists is a powerful factor in the difficulties facing the Center-Left.

Finally, the Communists: after the expulsion of the "Il Manifesto" group, the situation inside the party seems to be much quieter. Factional strife is no longer apparent. But Luigi Longo, the Secretary-General, is an old man, and it is by no means certain who will be his successor. Enrico Berlinguer, his deputy, is not highly admired by the Russians. New "old men," such as Novella and Natta, good party men, are coming to the fore. What Moscow seems to like, above all, is the right wing of the party, the Amendola group. These are the more cautious in criticizing the Soviet Union, while being the more insistent in suggesting, with varying formulas, a deal with the Democratic parties. This might appear contradictory, but it is not; it is a new attempt at solving the old dilemmas of a party wavering between its old revolutionary ideology (and allegiance to Moscow), and its participation in a democratic Western environment. In the view of most Italians, however, the Communist Party has not yet made a clear choice; its old ties with the Soviet Union, and the fundamental imprint of its antidemocratic ideology, have not yet been destroyed.

Quoting the former party chief Palmiro Togliatti, Berlinguer claims that those who do not recognize the democratic character of the Italian Communist Party are like those ignorant people who denied the reality of a giraffe even when they saw it, because it looked so different from all other animals. But is this curious claim, with its clear implication that all other communist parties are *not* democratic, believable? Is the PCI really a giraffe? Is it so different? And if it is, why doesn't it make a clean and final break with Moscow? Why does it clearly aim at splitting the Democratic parties rather than at coöperating with them as they are?

V

The growing perspective of an "opening to the Communists" is not the only reason for the weakening of the Center-Left. First of all, this never was an easy coalition to keep together. Moreover, it was interesting because it was not easy. The very difficulty of having the Socialists as a partner might have brought something new into Italian political life. One can claim with some justice that they did make the need for fundamental reforms more strongly felt in government circles, and to some extent

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shifted government toward the Left. Unfortunately, the elections of 1968 and those of 1970 have shown that the stronger the cohesion between the coalition partners, the smaller their electoral success; by converging toward the center, they lost ground on both wings. Conversely, the stronger their disagreements, the more electoral ground they covered. Thus, there is a vested interest in disagreement which reflects the reality of the country.

Italian society is terribly rich with contradictions. But isn't the very function and duty of a ruling élite to try and reconcile such contradictions? In Italy, as a matter of fact, the Christian Democratic Party owed to a large extent its leading position to the fact that it was able to enclose and reconcile within itself so many opposing forces of Italian society. At the same time, it was able to mediate among political forces outside: between Liberals and Social Democrats in the fifties, between Social Democrats and Socialists in the sixties. After 1968, however, it appeared that Italy's ruling political class had lost its capacity to mediate and was reduced to reflecting passively the nation's contradictions. Though this might augment the democratic parties' vote-getting power, it also greatly reduced their capacity to rule.

The problem for the Center-Left is whether this policy of "quarreling for success" is not being carried out to such a point as to make the survival of the coalition itself impossible. This is what the "general crisis" of the Center-Left is about. Although many observers still believe that it can and will be overcome, this is clearly not going to be easy. How far can the Center-Left parties, most of all the Socialists, be allowed to follow a divergent line in local politics? How strongly can they unite in a common economic policy—how many reforms, and when? What line should be taken toward the unions? These were the very real obstacles upon which cabinet after cabinet fell.

If there were no political alternatives, not even the diversity of long-term aims or ideology would have made the Center-Left coalition so weak. If divisive forces have become stronger, this is mainly due to the fact that at least some political forces now consider that other alternatives are possible. This belief, whether realistic, or the fruit of wishful thinking, is the new factor which makes the survival of the Center-Left so precarious.

At least some Social Democrats feel that they might get the Socialists themselves out of the government—and vice-versa—through new elections. And both alternatives find at least some

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support inside the Christian Democratic Party's right or left wings. Of course, either of these choices would imply some form of outside support in Parliament, by the Liberals or by the Communists. Either of the two would also gravely endanger the unity of the Christian Democrats. Thus, the resistance to such new departures is very strong. But one feels, in the ever faster tempo of the crisis which plagues the Center-Left coalition, a new mood arising out of the spoken or unspoken feeling that "there might be other formulas." The Center-Left still appears to be the most obvious solution, and for very powerful reasons; but it is no longer considered a "must" by all people concerned.

VI

It must be said that in spite of all the above-mentioned factors for change most political observers still believe, rightly or wrongly, that the moment for drastic change has not come. It is generally expected that in the foreseeable future the Christian Democratic Party will remain united, that any coalition government will still be built around it, and that it will include neither the Communist Party nor be based on Communist support in Parliament. Most observers feel that the situation of 1970, in spite of the serious crisis of the Center-Left coalition, is not comparable to that of the late fifties and early sixties, when everybody knew that the "opening to the (Socialist) Left" was just around the corner.

It is, however, a remarkable fact that some new "formulas" have been added to the Italian political lexicon. One of them is the "Repubblica Conciliare," by which is meant, referring to the spirit of the Oecumenical Council, the possibility of a Christian Democratic-Communist grand alliance. A "rapprochement" between Catholics and Communists has indeed taken place in some regions, such as red Emilia, as well as among the workers' unions and among intellectuals. The fear of such a "Repubblica Conciliare" ever coming to life is greatly widespread. It is shared by Socialists of all tendencies as well as by what remains of the old Liberal lay tradition and by most of the independent press. The greatest fear is that this compromise of all compromises, this confusion between "grosse Koalition" and "combinazione" would all but kill the vitality of Italy's democratic life. And nobody knows who in the end would come out on top, whether the Catholic or the Leninist party.

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Other possible, and perhaps more realistic, "futures" include a much more cautious and partial "opening to the Communists," via a Christian Democrat-Socialist government, more or less consistently supported by the Communist Party. Through their slogan of the "Regioni aperte" (open Regions) the Communists try to seduce the parties of the Center-Left (sometimes courting the Socialists, sometimes wooing the Catholic Left), away from their alliance and toward some form of coöperation, which might get the Communist Party out of its self-chosen ghetto of so many years. At the least this might create disarray, confusion and further splits among the Center-Left parties. As seen from the other side, the transformation of a communist party into a democratic one (which would be the first case in history) would be such a great prize that it remains a constant temptation. And would not Italy find, at the same time, a new unity?

It is not yet possible to say how realistic, or wise, such a scenario might be. During the cabinet crisis of summer 1970, some observers considered it much more likely that the Christian Democrats might turn toward a Center-Right government, extending from the Social Democrats to the Liberals. In the end, however, while the approaching Ferragosto holidays and the darkening economic horizon created powerful new incentives for agreement, Emilio Colombo, a moderate with a great international reputation, who had ably managed Italy's Treasury for years, succeeded in forming again a four-party government of the Center-Left, by concentrating on issues rather than on slogans.

Could the rise to the premiership of Colombo, a younger man with a taste for efficiency in administration rather than for ideological quarrels, mean a truly new departure for the Center-Left on the path to more substantial achievements than in the past? One could only wish that it were so, and indeed Colombo started his new job in an atmosphere of general goodwill (even the Communists' criticism was rather muted). However, the general feeling is that even if this particular cabinet crisis is over, the general crisis of the Center-Left alliance has not suddenly melted away in the August heat. Relations between the two Socialist parties had been seriously embittered and remained tense and loaded with mutual suspicions to the very end.

At this time, then, it still appears that an "opening to the Communists" is not yet in the cards, and that the Center-Left coali-

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tion has not yet exhausted its historical function. Despite all the known weaknesses of the Center-Left, it is hard to envisage any other political alliance that could better strive to carry out, while defending the democratic institutions of Republican Italy, those structural reforms which can make Italy a better place to live in, and which should improve the social and political atmosphere of the country.

Even the social unrest of the last months has had the good result of bringing about a greater political involvement of the Italian workers' unions. Despite the series of crises, plans for reforms have made important progress in Parliament and are being transformed in some fields into reality. The tentative dialogue between government and unions is somewhat vaguely creating the shape of what has been called a new "atypical participatory democracy." Given enough time and a favorable international situation, Italy, though defined by some "the new sick man of Europe," still appears to have adequate resources, both physical and human, to achieve the construction of a more just and equal society. But how much time is there left for such a huge task?

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY: A WORLD ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM IN OUTLINE. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, 518 p. $8.95.

This book is first-rate social science. The author dissects and explores with relentless logic most of the traditional approaches to world poverty. He himself attacks the problem through sociological analyses and the tools of economic science.

ALLIANCE POLITICS. By Richard E. Neustadt. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 167 p. $5.95.

This is one of the most illuminating books on crisis politics in NATO so far written. The author deals with Anglo-American relations during the Suez crisis and with the Skybolt affair. A thoughtful conclusion rounds out a truly excellent book.

THE IMPARTIAL SOLDIER. By Michael Harbottle. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 210 p. $6.50.

A valuable account by a U.N. "peace soldier" of his experiences in the field. The author, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Force in Cyprus from 1966 to 1968, writes as a man deeply committed to the United Nations and as an idealist without illusions.

AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY. Edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore. New York: Basic Books, 1970, 533 p. $12.50.

Fifteen political scientists evaluate the different ways in which one-party political systems adapt or fail to adapt to socio-economic change. The case studies are well chosen and the quality of research and analysis is high.

MARSHALL IN CHINA. By John Robinson Beal. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 385 p. $7.95.

The author maintains that, twice during 1946, Marshall almost succeeded in bringing off a coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek passed up the first opportunity and the Communists rejected the second. The author seems to attribute more direct political influence to Marshall than the General actually may have exercised in China at the time.

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MY SEVERAL LIVES: MEMOIRS OF A SOCIAL INVENTOR. By James B. Conant. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 701 p. $12.50.

The author's three careers as scientist, educator and statesman are explored at a leisurely pace, in this interesting if somewhat overlong autobiography.

DIE AMERIKANISCHE STRATEGIE: ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZESS UND INSTRUMENTARIUM DER AMERIKANISCHEN AUSSENPOLITIK. By Ekkehart Krippendorff. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, 495 p. DM. 24.

This is a deeply pessimistic analysis of American foreign policy during the 1960s. The author concludes that the United States is willing to pay the price of considerable political repression and would risk atomic war in order to preserve the capitalist system.

THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT. By Lester B. Pearson. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1970, 117 p. $4.95.

The former Chairman of the Commission on International Development, in this personal synopsis of the Commission's Report, argues for increased aid programs for the developing countries as a matter of enlightened self-interest for the world's wealthy nations.

SOTSIOLOGICHESKIE PROBLEMY MEZHDUNARODNYKH OTNOSHENII. By F. V. Konstantinov and others. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1970, 328 p.

A socio-political symposium on the roots of political conflict in the modern world, by a group of prominent Soviet social scientists.

OON—25 LET. By B. P. Prokof'ev. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia," 1970, 80 p.

A popular though comprehensive Soviet account of the United Nations' first 25 years. The author is optimistic about the organization's future.

HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY. By Vernon Van Dyke. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 292 p. $7.00 (Paper, $3.75).

This informative monograph addresses itself to three basic questions: first, what are human rights? second, what is the nature of international obligation? and third, what is being done in the area of implementation? The treatment is the best since Lauterpacht's much earlier work.

MAN'S POWER: A BIASED GUIDE TO POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION. By Kalman H. Silvert. New York: Viking, 1970, 163 p. $4.95.

A highly subjective and challenging effort to explore the relations between constraint and freedom in man's political universe.

YOUTH AGAINST THE WORLD. By Marjorie Hope. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 409 p. $7.95.

An eyewitness report of youth protest around the world, written with considerable empathy and verve.

MAN'S FREEDOM. By Andreas G. Papandreou. New York: Columbia University Press (distributed for Carnegie-Mellon University), 1970, 71 p. $4.00.

Three rather discursive essays whose underlying theme is the undesirability of superpower intervention in the affairs of smaller states.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. By Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Hans J. Morgenthau. Waltham (Mass.): Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, 122 p. $2.25.

These three essays and the rejoinders to them strike a felicitous balance between revisionism and traditionalism.

THE CHURCHES AND THE NATIONS. By O. Frederick Nolde. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970, 184 p. $7.50.

The fundamental theme of this collection of essays is the obligation of the church to share in the secular quest for the improvement of man's lot in the political world.

DIPLOMATIC CEREMONIAL AND PROTOCOL. By John R. Wood and Jean Serres. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 378 p. $25.00.

This book is a diplomat's Emily Post-type guide to international good manners. The style is unnecessarily dull, but the information is quite useful.

FACT-FINDING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE. By William I. Shore. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1970, 183 p. $15.00.

A useful historical review of the development of impartial fact-finding machinery.

WESTERMANN LEXIKON DER GEOGRAPHIE. Edited by Wolf Tietze. Brunswick: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1968–69, 2 v. DM. 192.50 each.

The first two volumes of a projected five-volume geographical encyclopedia, written by an international team of scholars. The articles in this impressive reference work are based on up-to-date information and are supplemented with maps, statistical tables and bibliographies.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN. By Harlan Cleveland. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 204 p. $6.95.

An intelligent and pragmatic political analysis of alliance management between the United States and its European allies.

TERRACIDE: AMERICA'S DESTRUCTION OF HER LIVING ENVIRONMENT. By Ron M. Linton. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 376 p. $7.95.

This is one of the best organized and most persuasive polemics on the environmental challenge. Problems of life in a crowd, of breathing, smelling, hearing, eating and drinking are analyzed, and the author's recommendations are sensible and, hopefully, not too utopian.

POLITICS AND THE COMMUNITY OF SCIENCE. By Joseph Haberer. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969, 337 p. $5.50 (Paper).

A fine scholarly treatment of the relationship between scientist and government in different times and different political settings. Two case studies on German science and on J. Robert Oppenheimer are particularly well done. Unfortunately, there is almost no analysis of Soviet science.

OPERATION OVERFLIGHT. By Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 375 p. $6.95.

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Almost more interesting than the story of his overflight and capture are Powers' accounts of his training before the event and of his reception after his return home. Good reading.

DEUTSCHLAND UND JAPAN IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Bernd Martin. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969, 326 p. DM. 70.

An exhaustive analysis of Japanese-German alliance policy during World War II. The author dissects the many conflicts that characterized the alliance, even during its greatest wartime successes.

DISSENT IN THREE AMERICAN WARS. By Samuel Eliot Morison, Frederick Merk and Frank Freidel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 104 p. $4.95.

Three Harvard scholars take the measure of popular American dissent during the war of 1812, the Mexican war and the Spanish-American war. Frank Freidel suggests some interesting analogies between the Philippine insurrection and the Vietnam war.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN WORLD STRATEGY 1945–1969. By Robert Thompson. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 171 p. $4.95.

A British scholar's *tour d'horizon* of guerrilla warfare over the past quarter century, ending in a cogent defense of American policy in Vietnam.

ONE MORNING IN THE WAR: THE TRAGEDY AT SON MY. By Richard Hammer. New York: Coward-McCann, 1970, 207 p. $5.95 (Paper, $3.95).

The author perceives the My Lai massacre as an existential tragedy that followed logically from what he considers America's brutal and self-destructive war policy in Vietnam.

THE BOMB AND THE COMPUTER: WARGAMING FROM ANCIENT CHINESE MAPBOARD TO ATOMIC COMPUTER. By Andrew Wilson. New York: Delacorte Press, 1969, 218 p. $5.95.

An intelligent survey of the uses and abuses of war games in strategic analysis. Easily understandable by the layman.

THE NUCLEAR YEARS: THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL, 1945–70. By Chalmers M. Roberts. New York: Praeger, 1970, 159 p. $6.95.

This factual survey of the last 25 years of U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations is especially useful for the non-technical general reader.

THE TECHNOLOGY GAP: U.S. AND EUROPE. Prepared by the Atlantic Institute. New York: Praeger, 1970, 158 p. $12.50.

The authors of this symposium agree that the most significant technology gap between the United States and Europe is not one of knowledge, but one of failure to utilize available knowledge to the full by the Europeans.

SAIGON, U.S.A. By Alfred Hassler. New York: Richard W. Baron, 1970, 291 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.25).

In this political tract, the author takes a dim view of the Saigon régime and its American supporters. His answer is the evolution of a viable Third Force in Vietnam, between Saigon and the Vietcong.

THE FORGOTTEN FLEET. By John Winton. New York: Coward-McCann, 1970, 433 p. $8.95.

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An effort to fill a "blind spot" in the history of World War II: the role of the Royal Navy in the Pacific. The British at first were regarded as "the poor relations" of the United States, but their contribution gradually won the Americans' respect and admiration.

SPACE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR MANKIND. By Edward B. Lindaman. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 158 p. $4.95.

The former Program Control Director of NASA's Project Apollo seeks to demonstrate the numerous concrete benefits to man of space exploration.

SCIENCE, LOGIC, AND POLITICAL ACTION. By Marcus C. Goodall. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1970, 141 p. $4.95.

A somewhat meandering effort to build a bridge between science and politics. The book advances some provocative thoughts, but is lacking in focus.

General: Economic and Social

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE SEVENTIES: ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Robert E. Asher. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 248 p. $6.95.

One of the best-informed and balanced books on aid. Wasting no words, it deals with all the central issues of policy, weighs the evidence of experience and shows the implications of alternative choices. The author reaches concrete and well-reasoned conclusions on the wisdom of continuing aid, making it more multilateral, doing more about trade and a variety of related matters.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN AND THE USSR. By Angus Maddison. New York: Norton, 1969, 174 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

A leading authority on the growth of the West here looks at two different and special cases. Good historical sketches, condensed data and reasonable explanations.

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY MODERN STYLE: CHAPTERS IN THE FAILURE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. By Simon G. Hanson. Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1970, 189 p. $7.95.

Criticism of the Alliance for Progress—harsh, blunt, often sardonically eloquent. The primary indictments concern intervention, confusion of public and private interest and the use of taxpayers' money to bail out investors. Blame is allocated to U.S. politicians, businessmen and officials (not least for duplicity) and to Latin Americans (especially for self-pity).

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Edited by Paul A. Samuelson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 281 p. $9.75.

Papers on a number of major issues and summaries of discussions by some leading economists. (Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International Economic Association.)

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: DIRECT INVESTMENT IN PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Sidney E. Rolfe and Walter Damm. New York: Praeger (for the Atlantic Institute, the Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation and the Atlantic Council of the United States), 1970, 169 p. $10.00.

Useful papers, economic and legal, presented to a conference better described by the subtitle than the title of the book. Special emphasis on foreign investment in the United States.

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THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM: A GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC VIEW. By Willard W. Cochrane. New York: Crowell, 1969, 331 p. $7.95 (Paper, $3.50).

Neither alarmist nor complacent, this agricultural economist and former government official argues that neither birth control nor miracle grains can by itself solve the food problem. That can only be done as part of general development policy for which both rich and poor nations must share responsibility.

THE ROLE OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT. Edited by David Hapgood. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 222 p. $5.00 (Paper).

Congress has told AID to increase the role of local people in development. To help determine how to carry out this difficult mandate, experts and practitioners met for a number of weeks in the summer of 1968. Their cautious conclusions balance possibilities against risks and difficulties in an enlightening if not always encouraging way.

RESOURCE FLOWS TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: FINANCIAL TERMS AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS. By Clive S. Gray. New York: Praeger, 1969, 305 p. $15.00.

How much a developing country gets out of aid depends on the forms in which resources are transferred (grants, hard and soft loans, etc.) and the conditions attached by the countries exporting the capital. This effort to provide quantitative measures is comprehensive, thoughtful and technical.

MONEY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. By Tibor Scitovsky. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 188 p. $7.00.

Emphasizes the role of market forces and the difficulties they encounter internationally.

POUR UNE MONNAIE EUROPÉENNE. By François Garelli. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 155 p. Fr. 15.

This tract argues that Europe's need for a common money can be met before countries are ready for full political and economic fusion. But the formula proposed calls for a high degree of coördination of national policies, and the implications of this course are not very fully examined.

GELD UND GOLD: VORTRÄGE UND AUFSÄTZE 1962–1968. By L. Albert Hahn. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1969, 285 p. DM. 24.50.

Papers on monetary issues of the '60s by one of the fathers of German neoliberal economics.

THE ABOLITION OF POVERTY. By David Horowitz. New York: Praeger, 1969, 178 p. $5.95.

The Governor of the Bank of Israel prescribes for a massive increase in production and consumption throughout the world.

BACKWARD AREAS IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 474 p. $18.00.

Papers that provide a useful comparison of experience in a number of capitalist and socialist countries.

The United States

ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM. By James MacGregor Burns. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970, 722 p. $10.00.

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This splendid biography does justice to the enormous complexity of F.D.R.'s character. In the author's view, Roosevelt's own inner dualism as a war leader—the vacillation between a bold global vision and a narrow pursuit of *Realpolitik*—was projected on the larger canvas of world politics during World War II, and contributed to the coming of the cold war.

SEIZE THE TIME. By Bobby Seale. New York: Random House, 1970, 429 p. $6.95.

The Chairman of the Black Panther Party relates "the true story" of the Party. His hero is Huey P. Newton, its "Minister of Defense." A raging fury erupts from this book. However, the empathetic reader will learn a great deal from it about the Black Revolution in America.

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST IMPULSE. By Michael Parenti. New York: Random House, 1970, 333 p. $7.95.

Mindless anti-communism has been the propellant for many tragic misadventures in recent American foreign policy, in the author's view. The thesis is tantalizing, but has the faults of a single-factor analysis. The writing is often compelling and provocative, but also in places a little slick.

THE HIDDEN CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By Samuel Lubell. New York: Norton, 1970, 306 p. $5.95.

The well-known expert on American public opinion advocates a "consciously thought-through effort to reunite the nation."

THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT. By Harry Howe Ransom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 309 p. $9.95.

This welcome revision of the author's excellent earlier study, "Central Intelligence and National Security," probably constitutes the best study of American secret agencies presently available.

EARLY WRITINGS. By Walter Lippmann; introduction and annotations by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Liveright, 1970, 356 p. $7.50.

These writings from the author's mid-twenties reveal a remarkable commitment to reason and a grace of style. Mr. Schlesinger's sensitive annotations are most helpful.

AMERICA AND THE WORLD: FROM THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE TO VIETNAM. By Robert E. Osgood and others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in collaboration with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), 1970, 434 p. $12.00 (Paper, $2.95).

Seven professors associated with The Johns Hopkins University have contributed essays of a high order on American foreign policy. In an age when many symposia degenerate into "non-books," this volume is a refreshing exception.

THE AMERICAN THREAT. By James L. Payne. Chicago: Markham, 1970, 241 p. $7.95 (Paper, $3.95).

A sophisticated exploration, with a pronounced theoretical bent, of "our nation's most powerful foreign policy instrument: the threat of war." The author strikes a felicitous balance in his use of illustrative case materials.

PAX AMERICANA: IMPERSKAIA IDEOLOGIIA. By A. N. Iakovlev. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Molodaia Gvardiia," 1970, 368 p.

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A Marxist critique of America's conception of herself as "world policeman." Henry Kissinger, Walt Rostow and Dean Acheson are singled out for particular attention.

THE HIGHER CIRCLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA. By G. William Domhoff. New York: Random House, 1970, 367 p. $6.95.

This book is in essence a theoretical amplification of the thesis advanced by C. Wright Mills in his "The Power Elite," and an effort to document it empirically and bring it up to date. The author concludes with a rebuttal of his critics. On the whole, an impressive, though polemical work.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM, 1940–1945. By Edward R. Drachman. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970, 186 p. $10.00.

This small book fills a large gap in Vietnam scholarship. It describes U.S. policy in Indochina during the war years. Vietnam, in the author's view, was largely lost in the shuffle, as the United States placed a high priority on coöperation with Britain and France in Europe.

JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG. By William J. Bosch. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970, 272 p. $9.75.

The author of this well-researched monograph examines the attitudes of American policy-makers, legislators, lawyers, military people, historians and men of God toward the Nuremberg Trials. He considers the trial "a test of men's basic concepts of law, politics, and morality."

THE NIXON WATCH. By John Osborne. New York: Liveright, 1970, 201 p. $5.95.

The author admits grudgingly that Nixon has been a better President than he thought the candidate of 1968 capable of being.

PUBLIC ETHICS. By James Sellers. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 349 p. $8.95.

A learned though at times somewhat discursive inquiry into American morals and manners, by a leading theologian.

THE MAKING OF AN UN-AMERICAN: A DIALOGUE WITH EXPERIENCE. By Paul Cowan. New York: Viking, 1970, 370 p. $6.95.

A former Peace Corps Volunteer discovers that America is not "the last best hope for man." Through his experiences in Ecuador, he gradually learns that self-criticism is a necessary prerequisite for criticism of America as a nation.

WHAT COUNTRY HAVE I? Edited by Herbert J. Storing. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 235 p. $6.95.

A thoughtfully put-together selection of political writings by Black Americans. The result is a self-contained body of serious political philosophy.

MILITARISM, U.S.A. By J. A. Donovan. New York: Scribner, 1970, 288 p. $6.95.

A former marine asserts that "America has become a militaristic and aggressive nation," and warns against the temptation to assume the role of world policeman.

STATE DEPARTMENT, PRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: A ROLE ANALYSIS. By William O. Chittick. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970, 373 p. $9.95.

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A workmanlike analysis of the roles of different actors in and close to the State Department as they affect the policy-making process and the balance between democracy and foreign policy.

The Western Hemisphere

MODELS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Paul E. Sigmund. New York: Praeger, 1970, 338 p. $9.00 (Paper, $3.95).

An interesting technique: excerpts from source materials, linked by short commentaries, to illuminate recent political developments in nine nations selected as models of revolutionary, military and constitutional democratic change.

THE NEW LATINS: FATEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA. By Georgie Anne Geyer. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 340 p. $7.95.

The author describes social and psychological change in Latin America, in a vividly written first-hand account. There are many sound analyses of character, though a few errors and exaggerations of fact.

DEATH OF A REVOLUTIONARY: CHE GUEVARA'S LAST MISSION. By Richard Harris. New York: Norton, 1970, 219 p. $5.95.

An account of the controversial revolutionary, written from a viewpoint partial to armed uprising.

CRISIS IN BRAZIL. By Octavio Ianni. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 244 p. $8.50.

The author, analyzing the political and economic causes and consequences of the 1964 coup, views the subsequent administrations as fascist systems characterized by foreign dependency, and predicts that they may terminate in a socialist society.

THE ECONOMY OF BRAZIL. Edited by Howard S. Ellis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 408 p. $10.50.

Fourteen eminent Brazilian and American economists contribute analyses, replete with tables and charts, of postwar economic development.

THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA. By Darrell F. Fienup and others. New York: Praeger, 1969, 437 p. $17.50.

A thorough study, culminating in suggested solutions for basic agricultural problems.

THE POLITICS OF PUERTO RICAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. By Arthur Liebman. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1970, 205 p. $6.00.

Unlike their activist Latin American peers, students at the University of Puerto Rico are moderate and career-oriented, reflecting a pragmatic and basically conservative society.

THE DILEMMA OF A MINISTATE: ANGUILLA. By William J. Brisk. Columbia: University of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, 1969, 93 p. $2.00 (Paper).

Tiny territories can generate surprisingly large international issues, as Anguilla has demonstrated during the last three years. This is the best account to date, with possible solutions to the continuing impasse.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLACK MAN IN RED CUBA. By John Clytus with Jane Rieker. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970, 158 p. $4.95.

A cry of disillusionment from an American Black who sought justice in Castro's Cuba.

Western Europe

DONE THIS DAY: THE EUROPEAN IDEA IN ACTION. By Oliver Crawford. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 399 p. $13.50.

Both an historical account of the work of the Council of Europe and a plea for a federated Europe, by a well-informed Englishman.

EURATLANTICA: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN ELITES. By Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 447 p. $12.50.

Two American social scientists, using interviews and survey data, seek to establish the changing attitudes of British, French and German élites in the decade 1955–1965. Among other findings, the authors stress that these "élites have turned from ideology to pragmatism, from nationalism to transnationalism, from parochialism to pluralism." A taxing, but suggestive and important work.

EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 314 p. $7.95 (Paper, $5.50).

Two veteran students of the European Community have digested a mass of fragmentary evidence in an effort to analyze how it works and how it may change. Systematic, sensible, sometimes subtle, often theoretical—for the political scientist rather than the general reader.

DER UNVOLLENDETE BUNDESSTAAT: EUROPÄISCHE ERFAHRUNGEN UND ERKENNTNISSE. By Walter Hallstein. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1969, 283 p. DM. 22.

A former president of the EEC writes part-memoir, part-history of the Community and its problems and achievements. Written with a strong commitment to a still growing Europe.

OLD WORLD, NEW HORIZONS: BRITAIN, EUROPE, AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. By Edward Heath. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 89 p. $4.95.

The 1967 Godkin lectures, by the surprise winner of the 1970 election. A rapid, rather personal, survey of the problems of Europe and of England, dedicated to the proposition that "the Old World must now be brought together to redress the balance of the New." A new introduction brings the argument up-to-date, and Heath's accession to power gives this volume special significance.

PEACE IN EUROPE: EAST-WEST RELATIONS 1966–1968 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT. By Karl E. Birnbaum. New York: Oxford University Press (in coöperation with the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 159 p. $2.50 (Paper).

A thoughtful essay on the premises and perceptions of leading statesmen in East and West in the years of new efforts at détente. By a Swedish scholar, familiar with America and Europe. (Written under the auspices of the Harvard Center for International Affairs.)

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THE RISE OF ENOCH POWELL: AN EXAMINATION OF ENOCH POWELL'S ATTITUDE TO IMMIGRATION AND RACE. By Paul Foot. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 142 p. 95 cents (Paper).

A documented and revealing polemic against England's most controversial politician.

MONEY IN BRITAIN, 1959–1969. Edited by David R. Croome and Harry G. Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 304 p. $6.25 (Paper, $2.85).

The tenth anniversary of the Radcliffe Report provided the occasion for a sophisticated set of discussions of British monetary policy.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF IRELAND. By Basil Chubb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 364 p. $10.00.

A valuable study of the Irish political system, by a political scientist in Dublin.

WARS, PLOTS AND SCANDALS IN POST-WAR FRANCE. By Philip M. Williams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 232 p. $9.50.

This work—a kind of scandals for school—lifts the enticing scandals of French politics to the level of high seriousness. An indispensable guide through the maze of plots and conspiracies, most of which were connected with unpopular wars. Of de Gaulle's withdrawal from Algeria the author writes: "The indispensable key to his success was his decision . . . to pursue the new course wholeheartedly: no more nostalgic regrets, no more haggling over details, no more crude or cunning manœuvres to put the other side in a false position. . . ."

LE MALAISE FRANÇAIS. By Régis Paranque. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, 206 p. Fr. 18.

An inquiry into familiar troubles, with a reasoned plea that France must find her own way out of economic and moral difficulties. By a young French journalist-economist.

FRENCH SOCIALISTS IN SEARCH OF A ROLE, 1956–1967. By Harvey G. Simmons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 313 p. $9.75.

A rather spirited analysis of the decline of French socialism in the years since the Socialist Mollet helped to launch the Suez campaign. A scholarly work, by a professor of political science in Canada.

THE BENELUX NATIONS: THE POLITICS OF SMALL-COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES. By Gordon L. Weil. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 260 p. $2.95 (Paper).

A compact survey of how the three countries operate and why, on the whole, they have been successful.

DENMARK. By W. Glyn Jones. New York: Praeger, 1970, 256 p. $8.00.

A rapid glance at the history and present politics of Denmark.

INSIDE THE THIRD REICH: MEMOIRS. By Albert Speer. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 596 p. $12.50.

Probably the most revealing memoirs of the Hitler régime, by its chief architect turned technocrat and organizer of armaments. As Hitler's confidant, he was close to important men and events, and he had a shrewd, surprisingly non-ideological perspective on the Third Reich.

AFTER HITLER: A REPORT ON TODAY'S WEST GERMANS. By Jürgen Neven-du Mont. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, 319 p. $6.95.

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A well-known German journalist records 42 interviews with a wide variety of citizens in Heidelberg. The flavor is authentic and his conclusion significant: "I found little of the civic spirit and social initiative that are common in the Anglo-Saxon world."

DIE DEUTSCHE MONTANINDUSTRIE: IHRE ENTWICKLUNG UND GESTALTUNG. By Gustav Hempel. Essen: Vulkan-Verlag Classen, 1969, 231 p. DM. 28.

History of the German coal and steel industries that is stronger on pre-1945 than on more recent developments.

LE FACTEUR JUIF DANS LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU IIIe REICH (1933–1939). By Eliahu Ben Elissar. Paris: Julliard, 1969, 521 p.

Based on new German archival sources, this thesis by an Israeli scholar analyzes the impact of the Nazi treatment of Jews on German relations to other countries, including America. For many years, the Nazis were quite concerned about foreign responses.

THE UGLY FRONTIER. By David Shears. New York: Knopf, 1970, 233 p. $6.95.

A British journalist describes conditions along the 858-mile frontier separating East and West Germany. Informative and timely.

GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITÄT. By Edgar Bonjour. Basel: Helbing, 1970, 2 v. Swiss Fr. 38 each.

An authoritative guide through the maze of Swiss politics and policies during the years when Axis successes threatened Swiss neutrality. By a leading Swiss scholar whose account of the struggles between proponents of resistance and accommodation is detached and absorbing. (Volumes IV and V, covering the period 1939–1945.)

TRIESTE, 1941–1954: THE ETHNIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. By Bogdan C. Novak. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 526 p. $16.50.

The fate of a city and its hinterland, depicted with scholarly detachment by a native of the area who has become an American professor of history.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN SPAIN: POLICY-MAKING IN AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM. By Charles W. Anderson. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, 282 p. $12.50.

A painstaking study of the political factors in Spain's economic progress from 1957 to 1967.

A COMMUNITY IN LIMBO. By Dennison Nash. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970, 230 p. $8.50.

An anthropological close-up of Innocents Abroad—Americans in a Spanish town. Interesting and informative.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS: A CITIZEN'S PRIMER. By Foy D. Kohler. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 441 p. $10.00.

On the basis of his extended diplomatic career, including a number of years in Moscow—as Counselor of Embassy (1947–49) and Ambassador (1962–66)—Mr. Kohler surveys the history and nature of the Soviet system. He is definitely anti-revisionist in his view of the origins and the continuation of the cold war.

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CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS. Edited by Chalmers Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 368 p. $8.95.

Some 12 specialists tackle in their respective essays the problem of defining, identifying and measuring political and economic change in the world's 14 communist nations. Part of their effort is to work toward more appropriate theoretical models in dealing with communist régimes.

EASTERN EUROPE: POLITICS, REVOLUTION, AND DIPLOMACY. By Henry L. Roberts. New York: Knopf, 1970, 324 p. $6.95.

A selection of the author's essays written since 1951 and dealing with the historiography, politics and diplomacy of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

LE GRAND TOURNANT DU SOCIALISME. By Roger Garaudy. Paris: Gallimard, 1970, 315 p. Fr. 6.

A prominent and long-standing French communist intellectual wrestles earnestly with a number of contemporary crises within the communist movement. The book has subsequently been charged with right-wing deviationism.

RUSSIA: HOPES AND FEARS. By Alexander Werth. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, 352 p. $6.95.

This posthumously published book by a leading and generally amiable observer attempts to sum up Soviet progress in the years since World War II. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia while the book was at the printers added a somewhat bittersweet flavor to the text.

THE OTHER SIDE OF COEXISTENCE. By Albert L. Weeks. New York: Pitman, 1970, 304 p. $7.50.

An analysis of Soviet foreign policy, especially in respect to relations with the United States. As the author looks forward into the 1970s he finds Russia facing some crossroads and paradoxes—a common plight of states, it appears.

WILL THE SOVIET UNION SURVIVE UNTIL 1984? By Andrei Amalrik. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 93 p. $4.95.

A young Russian writer's bleakly apocalyptic view of the Soviet future. It was only published abroad, and Amalrik was subsequently incarcerated. A significant but hardly representative oppositional tract.

RUSSIA AND NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. By Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in coöperation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University), 1970, 325 p. $10.95.

An intensive study, focusing on Tadzhikistan in the decade 1946–56, of Soviet nationality policy and native response in Central Asia.

THE JEWS IN SOVIET RUSSIA SINCE 1917. Edited by Lionel Kochan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London), 1970, 357 p. $7.95.

A substantial volume of essays dealing with various aspects of the situation of the Jews in the Soviet period of Russian history.

TWO YEARS IN SOVIET UKRAINE. By John Kolasky. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970, 264 p. $6.95 (Paper, $3.95).

A former Canadian communist, of Ukrainian background, tells of two disillusioning years as a student in the Soviet Ukraine.

DAS ROTE WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER. By Fritz Schenk. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969, 247 p. DM. 12.

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An extensive account of the development and achievements of centralized planning in the German Democratic Republic.

GESCHICHTE DER BALTISCHEN STAATEN. By Georg von Rauch. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970, 224 p. DM. 16.80.

A solid history of the Baltic States from the establishment of their independence in the end-phase of World War I to their occupation by the Soviets in May 1940. The author is a professor of East European history at the University of Kiel.

THE ESSENTIAL TITO. Edited by Henry M. Christman. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 197 p. $6.50.

A useful, if necessarily highly selective collection, in translation, of a number of Tito's major speeches and papers.

AUFSTAND FÜR DIE TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI. By Wolfgang Venohr. Hamburg: Wegner, 1969, 372 p. DM. 25.

An extensive account of the relatively little-known armed anti-German uprising in Slovakia in the autumn of 1944.

THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. By Bennett Kovrig. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 206 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.45).

This volume is one in a series of monographs designed to deal with "integration and community building among the communist party states of Eastern Europe."

THE GREEK TRAGEDY. By Constantine Tsoucalas. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 207 p. $1.45 (Paper).

A Greek lawyer, now living abroad, provides a concise, informed historical background to the military coup of April 21, 1967. Of particular interest is the account of the emergence of a center-left group in the early 1960s.

EDUCATION FOR COMMUNISM: SCHOOL AND STATE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA. By John I. Thomas. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969, 131 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.60).

A welcome study of education and the school system in communist Albania, based largely on Albanian-language sources.

The Middle East

THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING. By Jon Kimche. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 288 p. $6.95.

The policies and diplomacy of the great powers, especially Great Britain, with the main focus on Palestine and also on Egypt as the key country of the Arab world. The author's original research and his personal involvements and acquaintances make this a particularly enlightening and valuable book.

LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE ARABE CONTEMPORAINE. By Anouar Abdel-Malek. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, 378 p.

This collection of articles, statements and essays over the past half-century is especially worth noting because it includes many important pieces not easily available to Western readers. Abdel-Malek contributes a stimulating introduction.

ARMY OFFICERS IN ARAB POLITICS AND SOCIETY. By Eliezer Be'eri. New York: Praeger, 1970, 514 p. $9.50.

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In this detailed treatment of a now popular subject an Israeli scholar covers much of the history of Arab politics in the past three decades country by country. More broadly, he analyzes the origins, motives and achievements of the officer class and finds military dictatorship neither an admirable nor an inevitable phenomenon at this stage of the development of Arab society.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. By Michael E. Jansen. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970, 215 p. L.L. 9.

A review of the Palestine question strongly critical of U.S. policy as pro-Zionist and unfair to the Palestine Arabs.

BETWEEN THE ROCK AND THE HARD PLACE. By Paul Jacobs. New York: Random House, 1970, 155 p. $4.95.

The account of an ill-fated attempt by the Center for Democratic Institutions to hold a conference of nongovernmental Arabs and Israelis, of interest mainly for the conversations the author had with individual Israelis and with Palestinian Arabs (including Al-Fatah representatives).

THE CHATHAM HOUSE VERSION AND OTHER MIDDLE-EASTERN STUDIES. By Elie Kedourie. New York: Praeger, 1970, 488 p. $12.50.

A dozen historical essays all previously published except the one named in the title. The author criticizes the interpretations of the Middle East in publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs over 50 years, particularly those of Arnold Toynbee, as superficial, eccentric and doctrinaire.

ESHKOL: THE MAN AND THE NATION. By Terence Prittie. New York: Pitman, 1969, 368 p. $7.95.

More about the nation than the man and a hardly critical appraisal of either, this hasty though heavy biography has some items of interest on Israeli politics.

South and Southeast Asia

THE FULCRUM OF ASIA: RELATIONS AMONG CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE USSR. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. New York: Pegasus, 1970, 383 p. $8.95.

The theory and practice of international politics among these nations and the relationships between their foreign policies and internal developments. The challenge of China is also discussed.

SOUTHEAST ASIA TOMORROW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR US POLICY. By Melvin Gurtov. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 114 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An assessment of the implications of the prospective security environment in Southeast Asia over the next decade, with suggestions for policy changes based on a more closely defined decision on the scope and nature of American interests and responsibilities in that area.

PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM IN INDIA: STRATEGY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. By Victor M. Fic. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1969, 478 p. Rs. 50.

The instrumentalities and techniques of the Kremlin's attempt to set India on the road to communism, with chapters on the origin of the split of the communist movement in India and the establishment of a militant wing calling for the application of revolutionary Maoist techniques in India.

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GANDHI: THEORY AND PRACTICE. Edited by S. C. Biswas. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969, 635 p. Rs. 60.

Papers presented at a 1968 seminar discussing Gandhi's views on social change, economics and politics as well as his legacy and its contemporary relevance.

THE CROSS AND THE BO-TREE: CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS IN VIETNAM. By Piero Gheddo. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970, 368 p. $7.95.

Religions as they influence the Vietnam scene, especially in the field of politics. Translated from the Italian.

THE MONTAGNARDS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. By Robert L. Mole. Rutland: Tuttle, 1970, 277 p. $4.50.

A missionary-chaplain prepared this study, under combat conditions, of the cross-cultural relations among nine of the 33 Montagnard tribes who, although a minority group, inhabit almost 50 percent of the South Vietnamese land area.

VINH LONG. By Harvey Meyerson. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 220 p. $5.95.

A two-year study of intense warfare in the Mekong Delta. This journalist observed especially the pacification program, the Vietcong's system of organization and attack and the Tet offensive.

THE PEASANTS OF NORTH VIETNAM. By Gérard Chaliand. Baltimore: Penguin, 1970, 244 p. $1.65 (Paper).

What the rural inhabitants of North Vietnam think about the war and the war's impact on them, together with a socio-economic explanation of their tremendous capacity for resistance.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF THAILAND. By David A. Wilson. New York: Praeger, 1970, 181 p. $7.50.

The history and nature of the Thai-American alliance. The author estimates Thailand's future ability to sustain its cohesion and maintain coöperation with the United States once the Vietnamese war is over.

MALAYAN FEDERALISM 1945–1963. By B. Simandjuntak. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 347 p. $11.75.

Why the federal system was introduced into Malaya and Malaysia and how it operates, with an interesting survey of major problems posed by a population of differing cultures.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INDONESIA. By Ailsa Zainu'ddin. New York: Praeger, 1970, 299 p. $8.50.

The persistence of tradition into the present, with emphasis on nationalism and independence.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

PARTY LEADERSHIP AND REVOLUTIONARY POWER IN CHINA. Edited by John Wilson Lewis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 422 p. $9.50 (Paper, $2.95).

Twelve American and British scholars discuss communist China's political system, the divergent attitudes toward the organization of power, the changing roles of the Party and its élite and the new view of power occasioned by the Great Cultural Revolution.

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THE SECURITY OF CHINA: CHINESE APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY. By Arthur Huck. New York: Columbia University Press (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1970, 93 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

The ignorance of the outside world of the communist Chinese and how they view military and political threats to their nation.

CHINA'S CULTURAL LEGACY AND COMMUNISM. Edited by Ralph C. Croizier. New York: Praeger, 1970, 313 p. $8.50 (Paper, $3.50).

A selection of essays and documents from many sources to show the development of communist policy toward art, history, philosophy and religion, language and literature and other forms of culture.

CHINA AS I SEE IT. By Pearl S. Buck; compiled and edited by Theodore F. Harris. New York: Day, 1970, 305 p. $7.95.

Articles, speeches and other papers selected from this author's files of many years. A newly written chapter explains that she ceased to write about China after 1951 because she no longer understood the country and its people.

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNIST CHINA: 1949–1966. By Robert Chin and Ai-li S. Chin. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 274 p. $10.00.

A competent psychologist-sociologist team presents the state of psychological research on the Chinese mainland and its effects on the social and political scene.

REVOLUTION AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. By Peter Van Ness. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 266 p. $6.50.

How the Maoists have interpreted the Chinese Communist Party's experience in making revolution in China from 1921 to 1949 and have applied the results to their attempts to foment the overthrow of governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

THE KUOMINTANG: SELECTED HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1894–1969. By Milton J. T. Shieh. Jamaica: St. John's University Press, 1970, 434 p. $10.00.

The Deputy Secretary General of the Kuomintang shows the dominant role of China's Nationalist Party as it developed from the inaugural of the Hsing-chung Hui in Honolulu in 1894 through its Tenth National Congress in 1969.

HALF-CROWN COLONY: A HISTORICAL PROFILE OF HONG KONG. By James Pope-Hennessy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 149 p. $6.50.

Major topics here are the effects of the influx of refugees from the Chinese mainland, drug traffic, communist-inspired riots and the potentially dangerous political situation.

THE POLITICS OF FORMOSAN NATIONALISM. By Douglas Mendel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 315 p. $7.95.

Political attitudes of native-born Formosans, whose government in Taipei is dominated by the élite of post-1945 Nationalist refugees from China's mainland who account for only 20 percent of the island's population.

JAPAN IN POSTWAR ASIA. By Lawrence Olson. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1970, 292 p. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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A scholarly work tracing the shift in the character of Japanese-Asian relations from one predominantly commercial to one that recognizes the need to promote stability throughout the entire Asian region. The author has made extensive use of Japanese sources.

JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION. By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Knopf, 1970, 345 p. $6.95.

A thorough revision, with substantial changes, of this classic, first published in 1946 (last revised in 1964) under the title "Japan: Past and Present."

FROM THE LAND OF LOST CONTENT: THE DALAI LAMA'S FIGHT FOR TIBET. By Noel Barber. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 235 p. $5.95.

A prolific writer of history, biography and travel has here compiled a story of the 1959 Tibetan revolt. Those interviewed include the Dalai Lama and his mother.

POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN AUSTRALIA: THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM AND CONSCRIPTION. By Henry S. Albinski. Durham: Duke University Press, 1970, 238 p. $8.00.

The use of the Vietnam situation and of conscription as dominant themes for interpreting the interplay between Australia's external affairs and domestic policies.

Africa

PROTEST AND POWER IN BLACK AFRICA. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 1,274 p. $25.00.

A massive collection of excellent essays by outstanding scholars. Political, religious, economic, military, literary and ideological forms of protest from the colonial period to the present are considered.

SOLDIER AND STATE IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE. Edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 320 p. $9.00.

This reader combines two general essays and two appendixes on military activity in Africa with case studies of Dahomey and Upper Volta, Congo-Kinshasa, Ghana and Algeria. A good collection.

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: VOLUME I: ESSAYS. Edited by John N. Paden and Edward W. Soja. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 655 p. $15.00 (Paper, $6.50).

Thirty-one original essays by eminent Africanists designed to serve as an introduction to African studies.

FOUR AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. By Christian P. Potholm. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 308 p. $8.95.

The author, a professor at Vassar, has written an excellent introductory text for courses on the comparative analysis of African politics. General and theoretical chapters are combined with an examination of politics in South Africa, Tanzania, the Somali Republic and the Ivory Coast.

THE SUDAN: A SOUTHERN VIEWPOINT. By Oliver Albino. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1970, 132 p. $2.50 (Paper).

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A short, competent history of the north-south conflict in the Sudan by an exile. He argues that the division of the country into two sovereign states must ultimately be the outcome of the civil war if peace is to be lasting.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS AND POLITICS IN SENEGAL. By Lucy C. Behrman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 224 p. $7.25.

Professor Behrman of the University of Pennsylvania has written a first-rate study of the sources of power of traditional religious leaders and the complicated relationships of dependence and competition between these leaders and the party politicians.

BIAFRA: THE MAKING OF A NATION. By Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo and Samuel Udochukwu Ifejika. New York: Praeger, 1970, 361 p. $8.95.

Written before the Federal victory over "Biafra," the case for secession and Biafran independence is made by two supporters of Colonel Ojukwu's movement. The book deals largely with events between 1960 and 1967.

THE CAMEROON FEDERATION: POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN A FRAGMENTARY SOCIETY. By Willard R. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 426 p. $12.50.

A political scientist at M.I.T. argues that there are important distinctions between the processes of integration required for building a state and the processes of integration required for developing a nation.

PLANNING PROCESSES: THE EAST AFRICAN CASE. By Rolf E. Vente. New York: Humanities Press, 1970, 233 p. $13.00.

The decision-processes involved in the formulation and implementation of economic planning is the subject of this work published under the auspices of the Munich IFO-Institute for Economic Development.

FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM/UHURU NA UJAMAA. By Julius K. Nyerere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 422 p. $2.95 (Paper).

The ideology of Tanzania's President and ruling party is well set forth in a selection of the President's speeches and writings from the period 1965–67. Includes the Arusha Declaration. First published in Dar es Salaam in 1968.

RWANDA AND BURUNDI. By René Lemarchand. New York: Praeger, 1970, 562 p. $12.50.

A good full-length study of the two little-known states by a scholar now teaching at the University of Florida. The character of revolution and social change are the underlying concerns of this largely historical work.

DE LÉOPOLDVILLE À KINSHASA: LA SITUATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET FINANCIÈRE AU CONGO EX-BELGE AU JOUR DE L'INDÉPENDANCE. By Shafik-G. Saïd. Brussels: Centre National d'Étude des Problèmes Sociaux de l'Industrialisation en Afrique Noire, 1969, 262 p. Belgian Fr. 500.

The economic and political difficulties faced at independence are analyzed and the record since 1960 is assessed in this work by a staff member of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board who had wide responsibilities in the organization's Congo operations.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

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